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Foreword
This thesis is an account of rural life in post-socialist Uzbekistan in two set-
tings, namely the oasis of Bukhara and the Ferghana Valley. It is about a
post-socialist context where continuity and change exist at the same time and
in sometimes puzzling forms. What has changed is missed strongly, while that
what has taken over is challenged by many. Both sides, continuity and change,
determine the lives that people have to face and deal with as a result of in-
dependence. In the centre of this are the former collective enterprises, the
kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the socialist period, and their modern successors,
the shirkat. They embody the economic continuity and change in the country.
While the socialist collectives were dissolved as secure employment units, in a
way they continue to exist under new Uzbek labels and still attached to a plan
economy. This facet is the starting point of this study. The question is what
has changed, to what extent and how rural residents deal with these changes
in their everyday lives.
The radical changes in agrarian structures have brought a handful of new
actors to the field, in one site semi-private fermer (land leaser) and in the other
the heads of the new shirkat enterprises. Both have often been part of the elite
already in the past. The changes have also created numerous dependents to
the fermer and shirkat in form of the formal kolkhoz workers who became a
reservoir of unpaid labor force. In some way, the rural population of Uzbekistan
can thus be diﬀerentiated in those who have access to lease agrarian land and
those who have not (or only very precarious). These diﬀerent groups of actors
shape the agrarian landscape and make the focus of this study.
Besides the more narrowly economic aspects of the restructuring of rural
economy and of how people try to secure their livelihoods, there are other
dimensions closely related to this. The main part of the thesis is structured
along these dimensions, which have been labelled as economic, social, politi-
cal and ideological strategies. Obviously, this is simplifying reality and none
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of these are easy to demarcate. But they serve their purpose as analytical
categories. Social relations and their transformation are of key importance in
this regard. As a sedentary population, Uzbeks have a strong local identity,
which units them with other local groups while creating rivalry towards other
places within the country. This rivalry can be in any aspect, from success in
cotton plan fulfilment to being a proper Muslim or being more civilized. In
daily life, when talking with an anthropologist, these diﬀerentiating aspects
are very often mentioned. They thus also build an important part of the data
and a secondary focus of the study, ranging from kinship and (inter-)ethnic re-
lations to the local community and the meaning of religion. Actors’ economic
strategies and interests are not decoupled from their community life and in-
teraction with others. Trust between actors but also trust towards the state
and its institutions, social networks and solidarity groups are important fac-
tors that shape the decision-making processes and determine the possibilities
of actors. In that respect, related with the location of the two field sites, not
only the process of rural restructuring are diﬀerent but also how actors deal
with problems and with which kind of solutions they respond.
This work has its limits. These limits are to a large extend related with the
focus of the study. Rural economy is not an easy-going subject in Uzbekistan
since many things are organized either illegally, behind closed doors or people
do not feel free to talk about it because of strong state surveillance. The reason
behind choosing two field sites has also been related with the peculiarities of
doing fieldwork in Uzbekistan. Having all necessary documents and permis-
sions does not mean that one can stay until the necessary data is collected
or all questions are answered. Two field sites were chosen in order to relieve
the host families and the others as interlocutors. In this thesis, I also do not
organize my data along two separate sections according to two settings. The
anonymity of interlocutors was one of the reasons but also the variability of the
data; therefore it is organized along subjects, namely the variety of strategies
that actors employ. It was also necessary to have thematic variation during
fieldwork to ease my interaction with the people. The consequence is a rather
broad and ethnographic approach covering diﬀerent aspects from everyday life.
Retrospectively, I believe that these aspects complement the works that others
have done in Central Asia but also reveals and challenges their findings.
Two institutions and many people provided support during the lengthy and
often interrupted period of writing this dissertation. The Max Planck Institute
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for Social Anthropology Halle/Saale enabled me to realize the fieldwork and
provided me with many other (material as well as non-material) resources.
Fieldwork and data analysis would not have been possible without this support.
One of my supervisors, Günther Schlee, is part of this support and he waited
and waited with patience and generosity at every stage of this work. The work
started in Halle and travelled with my husband and me to other places to end
up in Zürich. Mareile Flitsch to whom I am equally grateful not only for her
support and criticism but also encouraging me to think about things in a way
I had not done before. I consider myself more than fortune to have both these
supervisors without whom this work would not have start and without whom
it would not have been finished. I am deeply indebted to both of them.
There are many more people to whom I am thankful. Unfortunately, I feel
unable to name those people in person that would deserve it most, my hosts,
friends and acquaintances in the two field sites. While using pseudonyms is
a common practise in anthropology, there are few places where they are as
necessary than in a place like Uzbekistan. They provided me with everything
and accepted me as a member of their family. Their generosity and eloquence,
trust and patience made it possible for me to put those stories on paper.
People in diﬀerent places and at diﬀerent stages of this work gave their
readiness to help and support. In Halle, Anett Kirchof, Lale Yalçın-Heckmann,
Kathrin Niehuus, Viktoria Zeng are among those. In Zürich, this includes
Anna Racca de Oliveira Lima, Miriam Wohlgemuth, Buzz, Georg Winter-
berger, Ilona Möwe and Baktygul Karimova, in Luzern Mahide Aslan, and in
Berlin Hale Deceli-Holzwarth. Chris Kelly proofread this work with all his pa-
tience and time; I owe him many thanks as well as to Wolfgang Wohlwend who
was always there for any kind of help and for a “kahve molası”. There are other
people in other places. Neville Dyson-Hudson is one of them; he inspired me
a lot. Asli Baykal shared her Uzbekistan fieldwork experiences and ideas with
me. She was of great help in the last days of this work. Neşe Öztimur, Yavuz
Ayan and Sevgi Saldamli gave their support from afar whenever I needed them.
Last but not least, I would like to mention my parents and my husband.
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Chapter ￿
Introduction
￿.￿ Searching for the Field Site
As may also be true in regards to other field sides, the beginning of my research
period of anthropological fieldwork in Uzbekistan proved to be quite challeng-
ing and disappointing. In the beginning I tended to be rather insecure as to
whether I would be able to study the “sensitive” subject I had chosen. After
all, many publications on Central Asia touched this subject and described the
region, and specifically the Ferghana Valley, as having “high conflict poten-
tial.”￿ After organizing the necessary documents and spending a few weeks in
Tashkent, it was time to travel to the countryside and find a “suitable” village
for my research project. Actually, only two criteria were important to me:
finding a “multiethnic” site and gaining the acceptance of the local oﬃcials.
For this purpose, I decided to travel and see the countryside with the goal of
finding a field site where I could spend an entire year.
First access was relatively easy. I was always welcome in every place,
whether it was a potential field site or not. Uzbeks love to have guests and
are unsurpassed hosts. My decision to stay or look further in any village
merely depended on the aforementioned criteria. When I carefully described
my research project, either to the local oﬃcials or to people in the village, they
seemed to be quite impressed and tried to make their villages as attractive as
possible for me. Depending on the region and its respective ethnic combination,
most of the time the following comment tended to be made: “Ooohhh we have
lots of millet. There are more than one hundred in Uzbekistan. We have
￿ For a recent review see Canfield (￿￿￿￿) and Khazanov (￿￿￿￿).
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Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kazak, Tatar, Russians, and Germans; but by the
way they left for Germany. We also had other nationalities but some of them
also left after independence, yet some of them are still here. We all live in
peace.” Sometimes during the conversations, however, it would turn out that
there actually was one Tatar wife or an old Russian widow in the village who
had married her husband during his military service in Russia, or a grandchild
who is one fourth Kazak.
Both the local oﬃcials and villagers were proud of their “multi-ethnic” pop-
ulation and it was good bait for an anthropologist. After a while of visiting
some possible field sites, I decided to stay in a village in the province (viloyat)
of Bukhara. The province oﬃcials sent me to the district oﬃcials and subse-
quently to the village administration unit, which felt responsible for my well-
being during my stay in the village. Hospitability is to be found in the whole of
Uzbekistan, yet spending an entire year together requires more than that. The
village administration was, however, not only responsible for my well-being but
also had to answer to the district and province administrations regarding my
work. Readiness to host me not only meant having a guest from Germany
but also brought the possibility of unwanted consequences in the case of my
stay causing unexpected problems with the authorities. Fortunately, nothing
happened in that sense, yet the reason I had to choose a further field site was
directly related thereto. Going to the Ferghana Valley and staying there for
a while was not only interesting for my research but also provided me, my
host family and the village administration with a break. My stay in the vil-
lage could be sabotaged from above using any arbitrary reason and anytime
the village administration might start to perceive me as a problem for their
anyhow unappreciated work.
After explaining my intention and providing my references from the district
and province oﬃcials to the village administration, there emerged a serious
problem: finding a place to stay. In rural Uzbekistan, it is almost impossible
to find a house to rent or to stay in alone – quite luckily as a matter of
fact, as this had not been my intention anyway. The oﬃcials, employees and
other people were intensely discussing the issue and trying to find a solution.
Who and where might be a good, suitable host to me; who could tell me
about the village history, tradition and the way of life; who might have enough
space? While the local authorities in Bukhara were trying to find a solution,
Alisher, who dropped in for some paper work, agreed to take me home. It
￿
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was immediately accepted by the village administration. His father was a
hajji and a former school director, so they could answer all of my questions.
Furthermore, they had enough space to accommodate me. He was quickly
introduced to my “scientific work” as an ethnographer and to my research
topic:
“She is interested in our tradition, how we Uzbeks, Tajiks and other mil-
let live with each other. Take her to weddings, to our circumcisions and
to other ceremonies; she wants to learn the language, actually she speaks
and understands it already. If there is any problem, any shortcomings -
tell us. She has all the necessary documents and the xokimiyat￿ knows
about her.”
Alisher, the younger son of my host family took me to his house in which
he lives in one courtyard together with his own family of four and his parents.
Within the same courtyard is located the house of his elder brother’s family.
For the village administration, this was the best solution for many reasons. Not
only was the family educated and the father was the first hajji in the village,
both of his sons were also already teaching at the local school. Thus, besides
their intellectual background and available space, they were also respected and
had connections to local government oﬃcials, which was not an unimportant
factor.
My acquaintance with my second host family in the Ferghana Valley goes
back to a nawruz feast, when I was visiting the region in the beginning.￿ As
already mentioned, I did not intend for a second field side in the beginning
and this encounter in the Ferghana Valley dated back to that event. A visit
to the district (tuman) centre of Marxamat, the day before the feast, pro-
vided me with the opportunity to be invited to the coming celebrations in the
xokimiyat. Almost every institution (schools, hospitals, government oﬃces) is
engaged in this time-consuming and costly event, which includes the preparing
of sumelek ￿, eating, drinking with colleagues and having visitors from other
institutions. In an exclusive circle in the xokimiyat￿, I had the chance to meet
￿ The administrative body, in this case of the district (cf. chapter ￿).
￿ This literally means “new day” in Persian and other Iranian languages. It indicates
the New Year and the beginning of spring, and is celebrated all over the Iranian world and
beyond. Since independence, the ￿￿st of March is an oﬃcial holiday in Uzbekistan.
￿ Sumelek is a special semi-sweet dish, prepared with germinated grain and with other
six ingredients especially for nawruz.
￿ I think that as foreigners, my husband and I were privileged and allowed to sit with high-
ranking tuman oﬃcials. They were either chiefs of the police force, banks or the kolkhoz.
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my prospective host, a doctor, who invited me to his house whenever I was
in the region and needed a place to stay. At that time it was not beyond a
usual invitation. When I was accompanied by my husband, having us as guests
was even more interesting. In both field sites I was immediately perceived as
“one of us” and my non-Turkish husband was automatically “our son-in-law”
(bizining domat), because he was married to “one of them”. I was considered
as “one of us” partly because of my language, partly due to my religion, yet
“bizning domat” was considered as “ours” simply due to marriage. His religion
or whether he converted to Islam was never a subject in either field site.
When I returned to the Ferghana Valley the next time, I took the chance
to stay with the doctor and his family. Similar to what happened in Bukhara,
my host was not arranged for or searched out by me. I count myself lucky
that the question of where I was to stay was spontaneously solved in both field
sites. Bahodir worked very hard and came home late and exhausted most of
the time. His tiredness and workload was not so much because of the num-
ber of patients but rather due to the meetings, which were held in the tuman
centre with the governor, the xokim, and other oﬃcials. It was no diﬀerent in
Bukhara with another close acquaintance of mine who was working in the tu-
man administration and was spending days and nights at regular and irregular
meetings. Although the doctor had four children, his household was smaller.
Their two unmarried sons were studying in two other cities of the viloyat and
only came home on weekends. The two daughters were married and only one
of them was in the village, while the other one lived in Tashkent. Daily life
was calmer than in Bukhara. Most of the time the doctor organized things,
directed people and defined their jobs; tasks that should have been done by his
brothers and others. He was a problem solver mainly due to his connections
to the tuman administration; a person constantly needed by everybody, from
the tuman governor to the ordinary kolkhoz worker. His graduation years in
Moscow made him a well-known person in his discipline, a fact often mentioned
by people. I think my two hosts with their completely diﬀerent jobs secured
and created a certain type of relation which allowed them access to diﬀerent
resources that were quite valuable at that time in Uzbekistan and proved to
be extremely helpful for my own research.
We were considered as “guests of the tuman”.
￿
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￿.￿ Objective of the Study
This work is about everyday life in rural Uzbekistan under changing and un-
changing circumstances following the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Since
independence, Uzbekistan has created its own ideology of nationhood and
economic development. Local actors experience, live and play a part in this
process as far as they possibly can and attempt to make the best out of it.
In my field sites, my aim was to observe the direct responses of individuals
to this new situation at the local level and to understand that interaction.
Everyday life comprises diﬀerent life spheres with diﬀerent challenges and so-
lutions. Some people have the necessary means to deal with their problems
and reach satisfactory solutions, while others do not. Some problems occur
every now and then, such as the financing of a wedding ceremony, while some
are constantly lingering, like the struggle to make ends meet.
My goal in this dissertation is thus to study how individuals and families
in two rural communities live their lives. I do not attempt to provide a com-
prehensive survey of each and every sphere of those lives, which would not be
possible. It suﬃces to say that, given the conditions following the demise of
the Soviet Union, any subject can be a concern for research among scholars.
Nevertheless, we hardly find an abundance of ethnographic studies on Central
Asia. Perhaps, not enough time has passed. Since ￿￿￿￿, a variety of topics
have made the headlines in Central Asian studies, regardless of whether they
have been researched or not. It started with ethnicity and conflict, followed
by Islam and for a few years now has focused on emigration.
As indicated above, the original focus of my research has been on inter-
and intra-ethnic relations in Uzbekistan and my field sites were chosen for
that purpose. The standard answers of the people I met stressed the peaceful
co-existence of diﬀerent ethnic groups again and again. This was not just lip
service for foreigner guests in order to make a good impression. According to all
accounts, it was simply true in both regions. My switch of the topic, however,
should not be understood as if there was nothing to research regarding ethnic
issues. Of course, ethnicity matters to people. Of course, relations with others
are also defined along ethnic lines, closeness and relatedness. The reasons or
explanations have their origins in many diﬀerent factors.￿
Independence in ￿￿￿￿ brought new challenges to the former republics of
￿ For a detailed study on Uzbek ethnicity and identity see Finke (￿￿￿￿).
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the Soviet Union. The early years were seen as a transition phase from so-
cialist plan economy to market economy and the introduction of democratic
institutions in the political realm. For this purpose reforms were necessary
and inevitable. The creation of new state institutions was part of this process.
While the political legitimacy of the new independent states was overwhelm-
ingly kept in the hands of the old power holders, economic reforms also diﬀered
in their degree. Since then, the Soviet legacy has continued to exist in many
respects; not only in the form of the survival of already-existing institutions;
the new ones as well started their work in the spirit of the past. This new
system, especially in Uzbekistan, became what could be called a “legacy sys-
tem” - in the beginning it was understood as a temporary and transitional
system with limited reforms, yet in time established itself as stable and per-
manent. Transition became permanent. A system that had the structures
and institutions of the past, yet adjusted itself to the demands of the world
market through some amendments. Within this frame, a new and independent
Uzbek state attempted to create domestic economic and political institutions,
constructed to benefit every level of society. And the actors within attempted
to participate and improve their position in those institutions. The reforms
and institutions introduced as part of a new world order and the symbols of
independence smacked of arbitrariness for many, while for others it cemented
their position and advantages of the past.
In both settings, however, independence was not accompanied by the an-
ticipated economic liberalization and democracy. It did not lead to a retreat
of the state and its control; on the contrary, this control was inherited and re-
named. Many things have basically stayed the same; plan economy, intensive
cotton cultivation, kolkhoz-similar production units and, perhaps the most im-
portant aspect, state-owned agricultural land. Other aspects of life may look
diﬀerent at first glance, yet even these are usually not free from the restrictions
and control of the state as in the case of religion or freedom of speech. On
the one hand, after independence people are to take their faith into their own
hands and should not expect much from the state since the old regime does
not exist anymore. On the other hand, people are not able to get through life
without paid salaries, pensions or employment.
After some time, it became evident that most everyday conversations, the
division of labour, social contacts and tensions among family members all re-
volved around economic activities and the planning of the family budget. At
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that time, Bukhara viloyat was experimenting some first few steps in “privati-
zation”, which dominated daily life– much more so than identity or marriage
partners for example, the latter of which were chosen along ethnic and local
lines. These were predictable, well-known decisions based on pre-existing ex-
periences, which were not challenged after independence. The challenge was
managing and planning marriage costs under the new circumstances. This
forced me to make a decision: either to stay and work on what was going on
in the village without focusing too much on ethnicity or to leave and look for a
further setting. The decision was not diﬃcult, not least due to the reason that
I could not be sure whether the oﬃcials would accept my stay elsewhere. I
thus stayed in the village with the exception of my later visits to the Ferghana
Valley and some shorter trips to Karakalpakistan and Kashkadarya viloyat.
Two provinces meant two places where locality was “formed and lived” by
diﬀerent groups of people. Bukhara is similar to Andijon in that since ￿￿￿￿
it has been located along an international border. Other than that, these
two provinces contrast in many aspects, including geography, demography and
economy. People have diﬀerent experiences and a diﬀerent relation to state
power as well as to their inclusion or exclusion. The two field sites with their
own spatial, economic, political, social and historical configurations formed
diﬀerent types of Uzbeks with diﬀerent attitudes to daily life and to the state.
This should not mean that in the vodi, the valley, as the Ferghana Valley is
commonly called throughout the country, and in Bukhara we have two dif-
ferent but within itself homogeneous people since they have each shared the
same historical, economic and political processes in one place. What was quite
similar in both field sites was how cautious people were when giving accounts
and showing their expressions in the beginning – quite understandable in view
of contemporary Uzbek politics. What was diﬀerent yet also unique in this
field site was that people in Marxamat did not really find it necessary to hide
the fact that things were better in Kyrgyzstan, especially in regards to priva-
tization and religious and political freedom. In Bukhara I got the feeling I was
the person connecting them to the world outside; I was the person bringing
news from Tashkent and of how things were elsewhere. My Bukharian infor-
mants acted as if they were locked in there and could not get out again. In
Marxamat, people were just tired of border crossings.
￿
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￿.￿ The Uzbek Way of Transformation
In Soviet times, Central Asian societies were seen as more or less resistant to
change and as preserving their way of life through rituals, identities and prac-
tices (Allworth ￿￿￿￿, Fierman ￿￿￿￿). The post-Soviet period can in certain
aspects similarly be interpreted as a continuity of the past. Goals are no diﬀer-
ent than in the past. For the elites, the goal is to retain power and resources,
for others, it is to keep their living standards at the level of the economic and
social benefits of the past. The latter group is less successful. New policies
introduced after independence left people without the benefits and security of
the past. Individual responsibility and individualism within a capitalist econ-
omy replaced the caring Soviet state. But at the same time, commitment and
labour power are highly demanded in this cotton monoculture.
Nevertheless, independence has brought significant changes to the lives of
people. Loss of employment and social security as well as the unattainability
of goods and services is one aspect of it. The past is remembered as the
good times but it is clear that there is no way back. Within this context, the
burden is passed down from one level to another and everybody passes the buck
when it comes to failures. People on the local level thus carry the bulk of the
burden of independence. In that context, family and relatives have become the
basic unit that absorbs the problems and diﬃculties of its members. Family
solidarity became important in dealing with the problems of everyday life.
Simultaneously, depending on the specific problems, family and kin relations
are also redefined. The kolkhoz of the Soviet period as a “total institution”
(Humphrey ￿￿￿￿) disappeared without its place having been refilled by any
other state institution. Family and kin started to take over the role of state
institutions, which in the past had wide range of duties and responsibilities.
The Uzbek government, however, did not totally get out of the way of its
citizens, especially in regards to their economic desires. Directly after inde-
pendence, the government made it clear that prospective economic and po-
litical developments following a unique “Uzbek model” would be the best and
most suitable one. President Karimov characterized this model by gradualism,
which was to allow for a smooth parting from a centrally planned economy yet
in the following years far more painted a picture of slow or unwilling, reluctant
reforms. There was no oﬃcial denial that changes had to be made regarding
economic issues. However, gradual reforms were to prevent abrupt changes,
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which were seen as a threat to the country’s stability.
“An analysis of the past period of our independent development reveals
the solid basis of the Uzbek model of reforms. Today this is acknowl-
edged by authoritative international economic organizations. But most
importantly, everyday experience also proves its appropriateness. Post-
Soviet reality obliges many post-Soviet leaders, politicians and economists
to refer to the principles and features of our model of market reforms.
. . .We have chosen the most diﬃcult road. . . . We created a mod-
ern, technologically equipped base both for export oriented production
and for filling our domestic market with home-made goods.” (Karimov
￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿f.)
This cautious attitude of slow reforms did have its advantages in the early
￿￿￿￿’s yet within time it prevented necessary reforms such as convertibility
of the currency. Authors such as Pomfret praise the wariness of the Uzbek
government regarding the introduction of reform policies yet admit they were
not sustainable since they burst the government’s budget and had to be cut
following the mid-￿￿￿￿’s (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). While cotton was under a price control
as the main cash crop of the country, allowing small business for other agri-
cultural products brought market forces partially to the Uzbek economy. Yet,
large-scale privatization and agrarian reforms in Uzbekistan were still very
limited compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In a similar way, Zettle-
meyer argues that, although – or precisely because – Uzbekistan was “hesitant
and idiosyncratic” regarding reforms, the country has experienced less of an
output fall in comparison to other former Soviet republics and even a positive
growth in ￿￿￿￿/￿￿. He seeks answers to Uzbekistan’s initial performance since
“[O]bservers are often puzzled by Uzbekistan’s output performance, typically
because they think that the country should have done much worse given its
hesitancy to engage in rapid market-oriented reforms and sustained macroeco-
nomic stabilization-policies that have been widely credited with contributing
toward milder transitional recessions and quicker and stronger recoveries”. In
this puzzle, he stresses the role of other variables as determinants such as
“low initial industrialization, its cotton production and its self-suﬃciency in
energy” besides “structural reforms and macroeconomic policies” (Zettlemeyer
￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
Thus, the transition to a market economy and related reforms occurred
with significant restrictions yet at some point were introduced in Uzbekistan.
While the market and prices for consumption goods were liberalized, the state
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monopoly on natural resources and state procurement of cotton and wheat
remained in power. In the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s primary role was the
production of cotton, followed by raw silk, fruits and vegetables. In the context
of a restructuring of the rural economy after independence this is undeniably
a serious challenge and not easy to handle. The Uzbek government tries to
make its profit margin from cotton as high as possible. This is done by keeping
local costs and procurement prices, which can be influenced, low, and to sell
the products for world market prices. Using cheap or unpaid labour allows
the government to thus create a huge gap between the procurement price
and the export price of cotton. This unfair condition is able to exist since
unemployment is high and people are ready to work for low – and usually
delayed – wages or simply work in order to secure the possibility of getting
access to the fields after harvest and being able to use them for their own
cultivation until the next sowing season starts (cf. chapters ￿ and ￿).
Decoupled from the former social benefits, the Uzbek government tries to
keep this system alive through limited changes in the economic structures.
Humphrey, leaning on Verdery (￿￿￿￿), describes the lateral flows in the social-
ist system as one “. . . of products flowing ‘upward’ to the state and subsidies
and inputs going ‘downward’ to the farms” (Humphrey ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). In the con-
temporary Uzbek system, the “downward” flow or the giving back of cotton
revenues to the direct producers happens in a very limited form. The improve-
ments or reforms are mostly done within a frame, which allows the government
to retain control of the agricultural output. In present Uzbekistan, the state
tries to maintain its regulative and determinant role, and expects its citizens
to obey the rules. This permanent liminal stage did not lead to any chaos
or unrest under the strong hand of president Karimov, yet poverty, insecurity
and out-migration did develop. Economic insecurity made some people ready
to take more risks in entrepreneurial activities such as in trade. Some people
were willing to take risks in agriculture and become - more or less - indepen-
dent farmers (fermer). A lack of trust in institutions, however, appeared as
significant components of life in independent Uzbekistan and allowed only a
minority to prosper.
Parallel to the economic changes, the year ￿￿￿￿ made formerly internal
borders “real” ones. This sudden “border feeling” has aﬀected people’s lives
very directly. During Soviet times, republic borders did not carry the same
meaning and consequent results as today. In the past, a “real” border was one
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between the Soviet Union and other states with other economic and political
agendas. These, however, had no relevance for the daily life of the people as
they were basically impassable. A border in that sense did not exist and did
not separate Soviet republics. The borders with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan or
Kazakstan were not perceived as real borders (Megoran ￿￿￿￿; Reeves ￿￿￿￿).
￿.￿ Theoretical Considerations
What post-socialist conditions actually are and how they are lived and experi-
enced by individuals in former Soviet republics is the focus of this work. While
focusing on this theme, it also poses the question of what “post-socialism” is
and what remained “socialist”. Does the demise of the Soviet Union and in-
dependence simply make those countries post-socialist? The aim of this work
is not to discuss the meaning of these terms because this has already been
done by many others (Burawoy and Verdery ￿￿￿￿; Chari and Verdery ￿￿￿￿;
Verdery ￿￿￿￿). In the case of Uzbekistan, it is perhaps not terribly meaningful
to talk about political and economic transformations in comparison to Eastern
European cases. Still, however, the post-socialist era is at least nominally a
fact and perceived as such, while it is an era in which socialist conditions con-
sciously continue to exist. People live in this post-socialist world and, similar
to flowing water, they try to find their way in a context in which resistance
does not bring about change.￿ Everyday experiences of the residents in my
two field settings, however, are not unique in every aspect to post-socialism.
This is not to ignore that there are in fact new challenges with which one
was not confronted before, yet within this frame, individuals calculate and act
according to their own agenda and goals.
It does not matter how arbitrary products of the Soviet policy they were,
both the borders and the titular ethnic group Uzbeks as such are; indepen-
dence further necessitates a reformulation of the Uzbek identity as part of a
nation building process that is seen as a requirement for political stability.
The highly appreciated co-existence of diﬀerent ethnic groups as a legacy of
the past has also started to melt in this context. In that process, not only the
external condition is decisive but also how Uzbek identity is conceptualised.
￿ More recently, Stenning and Hörschelmann discuss post-socialism in more detail. They
also provide an overview of the studies, mainly focusing on Eastern Europe where „people
resist the larger political and economic process of transformation (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
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The permeability and the flexibility of Uzbekness make it easy for everyone
to accept and make it applicable both in the long term or in a situational
context.￿ Ethnic identity and other reference points such as nomadic versus
sedentary, or local belongings, play an important role in everyday-life as well.
Of course, independence has opened up a new platform of how ethnic and
other identities are lived and expressed in relation to the conceptualization of
national identity in Uzbekistan (Adams ￿￿￿￿).
In the following, I will diﬀerentiate between the role and importance of
ethnicity and identity in social and economic spheres in people’s everyday
life. In the case of the social sphere, when we consider marriage patterns,
which are strongly determined by kinship and locality, the role of ethnicity
is not particularly prominent. Interactions and decisions in the daily life of
a relatively insecure economic environment put actors in a situation in which
they are forced, in order to reduce their risks, to carefully calculate the available
resources before they act and make decisions. In this period of economic
instability, not only is the risk of loss high but also the cost of a potential
loss is significant for the livelihoods of people and may threaten their long-
term survival. Some people avoid getting involved in any kind of economic or
material interaction with others (be that lending money or becoming a fermer),
others are highly engaged in it. For instance, land access is a very important
subject and there is no inclusion or exclusion of actors from this competition
on the basis of their ethnic belongings as one might expect. If there is a line,
which separates and locates “us” and “them” (Elwert ￿￿￿￿, Eriksen ￿￿￿￿), then
it is not drawn along ethnic belongings as a particular type of identity, since
people with the same ethnic background can fall on both sides of the line as
winners or losers of the game. Still, it is a significant instrument and it does
no harm to show flexibility in this respect.
It may, perhaps, be better, however, to use the term identification instead
of identity and the Uzbek case is also a good example of why. Since any ac-
tor’s group attachment is not fixed and its contents are an aspect of change
and flexibility, people evade strict definition traits by defining themselves by
multiple markers (Schlee ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿; Finke ￿￿￿￿). However, when claiming a
diﬀerent group aﬃliation, one must somehow be convincing for other actors
and display traits that make sense to others in order to change group belonging
(Schlee ￿￿￿￿). Barth’s understanding of ethnicity, which is considered to be
￿ On the meaning of Uzbek identity and how it is constructed locally see Finke (￿￿￿￿).
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the instrumentalist approach, contains this flexibility; yet depending on the in-
tention, diﬀerences are stressed or played down while retaining certain markers
for constructing boundaries. He puts emphasis on the ethnic boundary, which
defines the group, “not the cultural stuﬀ that it encloses” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). In the
larger context, locality can override ethnicity and unite multiple identities in
one setting while stressing diﬀerence against other places.
Drawing and fortifying internal as well as international borders after the
demise of the Soviet Union has become a typical component of Uzbekistan
as an independent nation-state, creating a new “we-group-processes” (Elwert
￿￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿). “We” creates a feeling of unity and also produces readiness
to sacrifice one’s own wishes for the sake of the whole. In the early years of
independence and also during my fieldwork, this is expressed through patience
and a level of sacrifice for the sake of the coming generations and the general
future of the country.
Since the former Soviet stratification model and access to resources along
the occupational status remained significant after independence, ethnicity in
daily life or being a member of the titular ethnic group has not replaced the
above and is not used to include or exclude others from scarce and valuable
resources. Whoever was outside of the system in the past has not become part
of it after independence and a change of group aﬃliation does not bring any
benefits in this regard. If we look at interaction strategies in this context, we
can observe some individuals who are involved in the new economic restructur-
ing process since they have the necessary social and economic resources from
the past and are better equipped to influence other people’s strategies (Finke
￿￿￿￿). Others either do not have suﬃcient resources or they simply think that
what they have is enough. Although they could make more, they do not want
to have additional stress due to their insecure environment. This stems from
their specific cost-benefit calculations, one might argue. Solidarity is not nec-
essarily established and maintained along ethnic lines and kinship is also not
a solidarity group by itself.
Changing sides in regards to group aﬃliation is a decision making process
which actors have to pursue in a given situation for certain reasons. This
should carry certain consequences or returns for the individual according to
his or her aim. If ethnicity is one of the means that an individual has in or-
der to gain access to certain spheres or resources, there must also be further
conditions and a frame in which the interaction with others is made possi-
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ble. Predictability of the behaviour of others and a certain degree of trust is
necessary before the means are employed and used for one’s aims. Moreover,
trust and predictability is not only limited to the acts of other actors, also
the environment in which these acts take place must oﬀer a certain liability.
Individuals want to act and invest under conditions they can trust and under
which “the rules of the game” can be anticipated and be counted as valid in
the same manner for all participants (North ￿￿￿￿:￿). Institutions cover a wide
spectrum from unwritten everyday norms and agreements up to the complex
level of regulatory systems such as religion or the state. Through this regu-
lation, a certain level of confidence and trust is created and maintained while
misbehaviour is sanctioned.
This aspect has become a fundamental issue and determinant of the be-
haviour of the individuals in the post-Soviet context. Uzbekistan did not sink
into chaos after independence but this does not mean that formal, state-backed
institutions are trusted (Finke ￿￿￿￿). In fact, everyday norms of conduct and
traditional regulatory mechanisms such as village elders may be much more
eﬀective in some circumstances. This failure by formal institutions, or better
said the lack of trust in the legal system, has shaped the behavioural patterns
of individuals and as a result their decision-making processes. Willingness to
take risks and openness to new engagements in the economic sphere is strongly
related to this aspect. Lack of trust in others and in the institutions has opened
a space for certain people who are able to predict and calculate situations and
who feel more confident than others due to the fact that they are equipped with
better access to information, social networks and economic resources (North
￿￿￿￿, Ensminger ￿￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿).
If we consider the continuity of networks and the constraints that are cre-
ated by actors on other actors in the form of inclusion and exclusion from
various types of resources, this informal institutionalization shapes people’s
interaction possibilities. These inherited informal institutions, according to
Gel’man, “. . . live at the expense of formal ones by occupying or penetrating
them” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿￿). I argue in line with this that the strength of these arrange-
ments derives from the actors located within the more formal structures who
simultaneously are part of the inherited informal institutions. In the post-
Soviet context, Uzbekistan has not created an environment, in which habitual
practices of the past, both in the form of dealing with state resources through
hording and stealing and of individuals acting within more or less corrupt net-
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works, must be significantly changed concerning the behaviour of individuals
(Verdery ￿￿￿￿; Ledeneva ￿￿￿￿). Trust is thus limited to certain actors, patron-
client relationships and social networks while mistrust in formal institutions
remains a survival strategy for individual actors (Gel’man ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿).
I was not equipped to or concerned with placing the question of the state in
my research. I was also not intending to analyze the political events, bureau-
cratic structure or Uzbek policymaking in detail. However, during my stay,
not only because of the not so distant Soviet past or “fresh independence”, but
also because of neighbouring countries with diﬀerent economic and political
models, which had been shared until ￿￿￿￿, forced me to think more about the
imagination of the state. This imagination was diﬀerent in the two settings.
The encountering with the state is challenging everyday life with everyday
practices inspired me to follow its meaning somewhat more closely (cf. Gupta
￿￿￿￿). During my interviews, I encountered imaginations of the state when
people would talk about their lives in the past and in the present. To a high
degree, the understanding of the present is based on how they recalled the
past.
Social networks, a variety of state or non-state institutions and re-shaped
traditional and Soviet structures were all involved in governing activities and
strategies when it came to shaping regimes of power in present-day Uzbek-
istan. While the state did not become the centre of my analysis, it emerged
in multiple forms in everyday life as a highly relevant issue that I had to keep
in mind. Furthermore, my informants, some of them more, some of them less,
had the acting of the state in their minds and this shaped the quantity and
the quality of information I gathered in the field. During my fieldwork, I en-
countered the state in numerous and multiple forms, some expected and some
unexpected, each with diﬀerent intensity and complexity. For instance, the
role of formalized neighbourhoods (mahalla), to be discussed in detail in chap-
ter five, is, according to my informants, based more on control and regulation
of the local conditions than during the Soviet period. In a field site such as
the Ferghana Valley, which directly bordered another country, the appearing
and disappearing of state power and its local implementation shows how in
everyday life the state is produced and reproduced. This was less obvious in
the oasis of Bukhara.
Ferguson and Gupta discuss “spatial characteristics” of states in the form
of “verticality” (the state is “above” society)” or “encompassment” (the state
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encompasses its localities)”. These are produced through routine bureaucratic
practices. Beyond merely being a bureaucratic entity, however, the state is seen
as “powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are themselves al-
ways culturally represented and understood in particular ways” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). In
order to understand state-reproduced “spatial orders” and “scalar hierarchies”,
it is necessary to look at “everyday practices of state institutions” since “routine
operation of state institutions produces spatial and scalar hierarchies” (ibid:
￿￿￿). According to these authors, states are imagined through metaphors and
the social practices make these images eﬀective and experienced. For “verti-
cal encompassment”, mundane rituals and procedures are seen necessary since
through them imaginations are successful. Border surveillance as in Uzbek-
istan, is then a “body show” of the state, which displays the permeating char-
acter of the state (Ferguson & Gupta ￿￿￿￿).
￿.￿ Methods
As mentioned above, this dissertation is based on ￿￿ months of fieldwork in
two diﬀerent provinces of Uzbekistan. My stay in the capital Tashkent was
mostly related to bureaucratic work and formalities. These stays were also
useful in regards to certain facilities, which were of limited availability in the
countryside, like the Internet or bathing opportunities.
Doing fieldwork in a country like Uzbekistan has never been easy since
independence, yet conductibility has changed over the years. My experience
certainly confirms the importance and strength of participant observation as an
important tool of ethnology while certain other methods displayed limitations
and restrictions. Without knowing anybody in the beginning, the support,
understanding and help that I got in a small place, which did not have the
anonymity of a town or a city, was ideal considering the circumstances. Enter-
ing the field and establishing a certain amount of trust, of course, took time
in both sites. I tried to observe as much as I could and get a general idea
of things and at the same time study certain cases more intensively. Aim-
ing to gain in-depth knowledge through case studies helped me to investigate
the casual mechanisms of local structures - especially when thinking about
decision-making processes and coping strategies following the collapse of the
old system.
Other research methods employed included in-depth interviews with indi-
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viduals and groups, as well as surveys. At the beginning, I had some self-made
disappointing experiences. I had brought my digital recorder and wanted to
record my interviews with the permission of my interview partner (intervie-
wee). The first was a fermer. The interview was short; the answers were almost
the same for every question and my interview partner quickly looked bored as
well as uncomfortable. It was simply unsatisfactory. The coming interviews
were not very diﬀerent. This was when I came to the conclusion that it made
little sense to talk to people in this way, and I even wondered if it made sense
to continue my stay here. On evenings, when we would all sit together, my
activities of the day were reported to other members of the family as well as
to whom I had talked and what about. This frustrating period came to an end
not only because I gradually became more and more accepted in the family, in
the village and by local authorities, but also because I got rid of the recorder.
One day during an interview, I was suddenly told to “press the stop button;
there is no need to record what I tell you.”. This was the lesson that made
my field stay possible. Visiting families, sitting in the kitchens of diﬀerent
houses and peeling potatoes was important and useful for me in order to find
answers to my questions, which occurred more in passing. Taking notes during
talks was possible but not with every theme, especially concerning economic
or political issues.￿
From my experience in Bukhara, I did not even consider taking my recorder
to the Ferghana Valley. I felt free to walk around and talk to people as I had
been accustomed to in Bukhara. The mahalla structures in the Valley gave
the impression that things were more under control than in Bukhara. The
reputation of the vodi with ethnic clashes and Islamic fundamentalism may be
the reason that there was more control on the part of the local state on me
as well as my interview partners. In the beginning, I was often accompanied
by mahalla committee members. Sometimes, it was to politely introduce me
to people, sometimes it was in order to know why and what I wanted to talk
to them about. I also heard that a few families were visited and interviewed
by the secret police about my visits and our conversations. This was not the
case in Bukhara or at least I did not notice it. It was a significant restriction
to my data gathering and I inevitably missed valuable information because of
￿ In some cases, I could not even take notes during my interviews. I had to reconstruct
the conversation and data after I went home. This was often the case in the Ferghana Valley.
See also Baykal’s work in Samarqand with similar experience (￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
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this mutual fear.
Being refused interviews, or being invited in order to show me Uzbek hos-
pitality yet not being willing to talk about the issues I wanted to know about,
was part of my research. Either people did not have the time and interest or
talking frankly to me might reveal activities that one does not really want to
share. I had the intention of doing a household survey, like the tape recording,
which was to be conducted in the early stage of the research. I expected the
rather formal character of the survey not to be very supportive to my inten-
tion of a long-term stay. In this context, making a survey in fact endangered
the existing trust relationships with informants and local oﬃcials. Yet again,
unsuccessful experiences belong to the field site reality.
Drawing diagrams and charts and talking about kinship were the most
relaxed topics. If gossip and conversations between doors or in the kitchen
while cooking did not exist, I believe a large part of reality would be missing
in my observation. During my fieldwork, depending on the season or occasion,
I attended various meetings, rituals (“It will be interesting for you, you should
come”), and was introduced to diﬀerent people. Constructing genealogies was
not only interesting but also relaxing and “harmless” for both sides. Talking
about genealogy was a way of drawing a map of the village by showing the
relatedness of people to the place and to each other.
So, with whom did I talk? Women, men, children, teachers, police and
military, doctors, kolkhoz workers, fermer, government oﬃcials and village
elders. Some people I was not able to find, some people did not want to talk
to me. For instance, a former kolkhoz chief never got back to me when I
asked him if he had time to tell me about the kolkhoz and its history. One
may only speculate as to why. Although I felt integrated and welcomed in
both field sites, the reality of having to be cautious changed neither for me
and nor for my informants. Interviews, talks and chats were variably long
and took place under diﬀerent circumstances, which was sometimes good, yet,
sometimes unhelpful. In some cases, when I would visit a family, many people
would notice my visit and some of them would then come and visit. Depending
on the person, this changed the atmosphere of our conversation, which was then
often monopolized by the visitor - to the better or worse.
Getting oﬃcial data from the village administration, the kolkhoz or the
xokimiyat was time consuming and often that information itself was contra-
dictory. Chasing after statistics was frowned upon and made oﬃcials uneasy.
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Being seen too often in the corridors of oﬃcial buildings was not helpful for my
longer stay either. Getting oﬃcial data through other channels (via acquain-
tances) was the most eﬀective way. In general, access was only allowed irreg-
ularly and nobody seemed to know why. The researchers I met in Tashkent,
historians, political scientists, linguists and ethnologists, had all made similar
experiences. This information exchange shows how erratic the conditions of
research can be in diﬀerent years or even in the same year with or without
comprehensible reasons. For the oﬃcials, no matter where they were from, the
presence of a foreigner in their tuman made it necessary for them to keep an
eye on that person. Especially a border tuman such as Marxamat legitimizes
any kind of control from the oﬃcial’s side. I was never directly refused any
information, but the responses were late and tiresome so that I either had to
decide on my own and stop asking or I was informed by other people not to
follow this issue. These delays, pretexts and excuses were mostly given politely,
explaining that I should come back the next day or that the person responsible
for the issue would be back in a while.
As it turned out, talking about agriculture is a kind of taboo since it is
an entangled topic covering all state breakdowns, malfunctions, and collapses.
It all revolves around corruption and an unlawful state. Simultaneously, it
is all about what determines daily decisions and the exchange of information
by people. Everyday life comprises numerous concealed routines, which can
be mundane for some disciplines and researchers but also for the people who
practice them. Yet exactly this is the strength of anthropology and its methods
– namely to find out about these routines and about ordinary life, about the
knowledge, skills and insights people live, cope and deal with. In everyday
life, where mundane practises, interactions and daily encounters occur, these
routines can be discovered. They necessitate a range of survival strategies
and skills while the appropriation of new technologies rather failed, as they
proved unaﬀordable or incompatible to local conditions: Thus, in contrast the
significance of traditional knowledge increases. Especially the transmission of
knowledge about agriculture and the reparation of tools to the next generation
play an important role. As Ingold put it, “. . . . through training and experience
in the performance of a particular task” skills are incorporated (￿￿￿￿:￿). Fear
of any kind of loss necessitates attention and a careful division of labour among
family members along gender and generation, through which again knowledge
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is transmitted (Flitsch ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).￿￿
I count myself lucky that despite these diﬃculties and restrictions, I alto-
gether had a pleasant fieldwork period with the people who hosted me. There
were many factors and actors involved in that process. Being watchful was not
only concerned me but also the people who opened their doors to me. They
felt responsible for me and did everything to make me feel well and enjoy the
Uzbek hospitality. But they also felt responsible for me to finish my project
and gather the necessary data. They took my work seriously and I take their
concerns and worries within the existing political system seriously. That is
why some questions remain unasked. Although a mutual trust existed within
the family, this did not mean there were no limits. But it made this fieldwork
possible.
Gender is a further factor that can open or close doors concerning certain
topics and encounters. In Uzbekistan, the women of the house should feel com-
fortable in the presence of a long-term guest who is unknown in every aspect.
Relations with them is thus of outmost importance. I think gender support
was an inevitable factor during my research, which created a comfortable and
welcome atmosphere. This allowed me to gain valuable information about how
things work. Contacts, networks and trustful relations within the community
are not only the means to deal with problems in the field, but are at the same
time the principle support when it comes to data gathering.
Language skills are of key importance in any anthropological research. My
Uzbek was fluent enough to follow all conversations in both field sites without
any external help. Living with and within a family was not only very valuable
for improving my language skills but also for many other things which one can
better appreciate after a while in the field. I learned a lot about daily life,
decisions, plans and other things another method would not have been able to
detect. Me doing participant observation was also enjoyed by the residents of
the villages. I was continuously informed about and taken along to meetings or
ceremonies that locals thought might be interesting for my work. If participant
observation is one of the methods of anthropological fieldwork, it was the one
￿￿ For instance, during Soviet times people did not really worry about their expenses
and bought bread and other foodstuﬀ from shops since they could aﬀord it. During my
stay, this was seldom the case; it was mostly backed at home. Although people argue that
„home made bread“ is also more tasteful - to which I agree - the economic situation is the
main reason for this. Even in the rayon centre, in three or four floor houses, people have a
tandir in the garden. Cf. Flitsch (￿￿￿￿) on knowledge and skills - and specifically the role
of woman - for China.
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best suited to Uzbekistan, my field sites and definitely my research theme. I
am aware that participant observation does not allow us to gain information
on certain subjects such as local statistics, the size of the fields, the amount
of water for irrigation or salaries. There is no doubt that as many methods as
possible should be used complementary. Yet not all of the methods I would
have preferred to use were possible.
￿￿
Map ￿.￿: Field Sites Marxamat and Romitan, based on map by Jutta Turner
Chapter ￿
Ecological Setting and Historical
Background
￿.￿ The State of Uzbekistan
Location and Geography
The contemporary state of Uzbekistan is located in the very heart of Central
Asia and as such was throughout its history a place where diﬀerent populations
mixed with each other creating a complex mosaic of peoples and languages.
The interactions with the wider world were characterized by its nature as a
landmass in-between that could both hamper and enable the movement of peo-
ple and good, be these long-distance trade routes or whole-scale migrations,
connecting China, India, the Middle East and Europe (Hambly ￿￿￿￿; Soucek
￿￿￿￿). This allowed economic and cultural exchange between those regions to
flourish. In particular, various religious faiths, including Buddhism, Christian-
ity and Islam made their impact on the region and in turn helped their further
spread (Sinor ￿￿￿￿; Heissig and Klimkeit ￿￿￿￿).
Among the former Soviet republics that gained independence in ￿￿￿￿Uzbek-
istan is the only one with a common border with all the other Central Asian
republics. In the north and south it borders larger republics like Kazakstan
and Turkmenistan while in the west and south-west it is the mountainous Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan. The shortest border is in the south with Afghanistan.
As most of the region this is landlocked territory. Rivers give life before they
vanish shortly after reaching the plains or emptying into one of the few, mostly
salty lakes. Deserts, steppes and mountain ranges shape the landscape spotted
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by fertile valleys and oases. Major rivers include the Amu Darya and the Syr
Darya and their tributaries like the Zarafshan that have provided the water
for intensive irrigation for millennia (Frye ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿–￿￿).
Corresponding to the environmental conditions, the history of the region
was characterized by the coexistence of two complementary production sys-
tems, namely nomadic pastoralism and sedentary agriculture based on irriga-
tion. Their interaction is a defining characteristic of the region’s history and
until present it plays a significant role. Before modern and intensive agricul-
ture, arable land made up only a small portion of Central Asia. Nevertheless,
the sedentary population probably always exceeded that of the pastoralists who
in case of conquest usually quickly assimilated in cultural terms (Khazanov
￿￿￿￿; Subtelny ￿￿￿￿). This nomad and sedentary dichotomy is still strongly
expressed and used as a decisive criterion, which separates and distinguish one
group from another.
“If nomads occupied the most characteristic place of human presence in
Inner Asia, they were by no means its only inhabitants, and agriculture
as well as urban life have flourished in many parts of it. Settlements
usually owed their existence to mountains, but indirectly: agriculture
was mostly of the irrigated oasis type, dependent on rivers or under-
ground conduits whose sources feed from rainfall and glaciers of Inner
Asian mountains. Dry farming depending on rainfall was not absent,
but it in turn occurred chiefly in the higher elevations and foothills of
the mountains or, more recently, in the northern latitudes of the steppe
belt” (Soucek ￿￿￿￿:￿).
Agriculture has had a long history in the region (Harris and Gosden ￿￿￿￿).
While in some places dating back much earlier, by the beginning of the first
millennium BC it had reached all the major oases in the southern parts (Khaz-
anov ￿￿￿￿). This was also the time when the first cities emerged, some of which
survived more or less at the same spot until today (Frye ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿–￿￿). The do-
mestication of animals, it is believed, may go back as early as that, although a
specialized type of pastoral nomadism developed much later (Khazanov ￿￿￿￿,
￿￿￿￿; Masanov ￿￿￿￿). With trade, revenues from the Silk Road the region be-
came not only of commercial but also of great cultural importance and became
the connection link between Europe and China (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.).
Besides land, water is also a scarce resource in the Uzbekistan. Oases like
Bukhara or the Ferghana Valley get their water from the rivers coming down
the mountains. By now, they all have reduced flow. Since decades the cotton
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monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan reduced the water flow of these
rivers, which contributed to the well-known tragic consequence of the shrinkage
of the Aral Sea. Irrigation has changed this not only by making cotton fields
from steppe and desert land but also from grain fields and orchards. Cotton
fields shape the landscape all over Uzbekistan with other components like
huge irrigation canals and kolkhozcu on the fields (Soucek ￿￿￿￿:￿). Only in
the western parts large sectors of semi-deserts dominate the picture. Intensive
use of pesticides and salinization of the soil aﬀect not only the eﬃciency of
agriculture with decreasing cotton yields but also has significant consequences
on health of the people (Critchlow ￿￿￿￿, Capisani ￿￿￿￿). This is particularly
the case in the western regions of Uzbekistan. In the following chapters I will
show how environmental, economic, political and other factors have influenced
the lives of people in the two regions where I collected my data for this study.
I will show that local conditions put certain limits and that people adapt to
this making the best out of it, within their capacities and possibilities. It will
be shown that this also a matter of individual decisions.
The Coexistence of Turks and Iranians in Transoxania
In this context the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks presents a paradigmatic case as
a result of a continual mixing of populations, nomadic and sedentary, from all
over Central Asia (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ﬀ.; Soucek ￿￿￿￿; Finke ￿￿￿￿). During the
early centuries AD, the oases were populated by people speaking East-Iranian
languages like the Sogdians and the Khorezmians (Souchek ￿￿￿￿:￿). To the
north, the nomadic Cimmerians and Scythians also spoke related languages.
According to Golden communication with them was possible (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Al-
though the majority of the population believed a Central Asian variant of
Zoroastrism, Buddhism, Nestorianism and Manichaeism also gained in influ-
ence (Frye ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
By the sixth century AD, a new linguistic group arrived from the eastern
steppes. In the course of the expansion of the first Türk Qaghanate, all the
oases in what is nowadays Uzbekistan came under domination of its western
wing (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.; Soucek ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ﬀ.). After the Qaghanate’s final
disintegration in the eigthth century, the Turks founded petty states governing
the local oases but were soon absorbed by the local Iranian population. Accord-
ing to Frye (￿￿￿￿), while the Iranian nomads were assimilated by the Turkic
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groups, their sedentary cousins mostly became vassals. Some nomads also set-
tled in the fertile regions of Transoxania and the Ferghana Valley (Bosworth
and Bolshakov ￿￿￿￿). Nomadism, although agriculture increased in impor-
tance, remained significant for the people (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.).
The rise of Turkic states coincided with the arrival of Islam in Central
Asia. Starting from the first Arab presence by crossing the Amu Darya in ￿￿￿,
the early eighth century saw the factual conquest of Transoxania. Resistance
of Turkic nomads and Soghdian sedentaries were suppressed successfully and
by the ninth century Islam dominated in the urban areas while in the coun-
tryside earlier beliefs survived for some more time (Frye ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.). The
Turkic groups along the northern edges of the belt of oases become the first
to be Islamicized (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿–￿). In that process, wandering Sufis, in
particular members of the Yassawi order, played a significant role (Paul ￿￿￿￿;
DeWeese ￿￿￿￿).
During the following Samanid rule – the last period of Iranian supremacy in
the region – a flourishing economy and a cultural blossoming was established.
The works of Ibn Sina, Al-Khorezmi and Al-Beruni were from this period and
they are the proud of contemporary Uzbekistan. Linguistically the Samanids
were diﬀerent than earlier populations in Central Asia. During this time, the
Western-Iranian tongue New Persian emerged as lingua franca of the region
and replaced the older East Iranian languages (Soucek ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ﬀ.). At the
end of the tenth century the Samanids were gradually replaced by new Turkic
dynasties as the Ghaznavids and the Qarakhanids (Frye ￿￿￿￿; Bosworth ￿￿￿￿;
Paul ￿￿￿￿). These had already converted to Islam, which helped the accelera-
tion of the Turkification of the local Iranian population (Subtelny ￿￿￿￿).
A further crucial event in the history of Transoxania was the Mongol in-
vasion in the ￿￿th century. Linguistically, Mongols made up only a small
portion of the army while the bulk was presumably Turkic-speakers, in their
majority of the north-western branch. Settling in the oases, pastoralists not
only became farmers but also took over the eastern Turkic dialect spoken by
the Qarakhanids and other groups who had already been there (Golden ￿￿￿￿:
￿￿￿ﬀ.). This situation would continue during the following Timurid rule in
Transoxania. The period of Timur and his successors in many ways repre-
sented the culmination of the symbiosis of Turks and Iranians, of nomads and
sedentaries that is an essential part of Transoxanian culture and society (Ross-
abi ￿￿￿￿; Finke ￿￿￿￿). At the same time, Islam gained more importance in
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the political discourse (Fierman ￿￿￿￿; Manz ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿).
During the second half of the fourteenth century the pastoralists settling
to the north of the Timurid realm came to be known as Uzbeks, the name
probably deriving from a descendant of Chinggis Khan (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.).
In ￿￿￿￿, under the rule of Muhammad Shaybani, the Uzbek confederation
invaded Transoxania putting an end to Timurid rule (Soucek ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.).
Babur, as the last Timurid fled and later founded the Moghul dynasty in India
(Foltz ￿￿￿￿). From the beginning the Uzbek state was unstable and later split
into three independent territories, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates
of Khiva (Khorezm) and Qoqand (in the Ferghana Valley). In all three, the
Chinggisid descendants of Muhammad Shaybani were replaced in the following
centuries (Becker ￿￿￿￿; Soucek ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿–￿￿).
All three Uzbek states were not only multi-ethnic in nature but also their
populations diﬀerentiated according to partly overlapping criteria. The main
dividing line was drawn between the nomadic pastoralists (mainly Kazaks,
Kyrgyz and Turkmens) and the sedentary agriculturalists, the predecessors
of modern Uzbeks and Tajiks, who inhabited mainly the central heartland of
Transoxania and Khorezm. At that time, both terms were referring to diﬀerent
communities while their meaning varied also regionally. Similar to present day
usage in some regions the label Uzbek was used for Turkic-speaking seden-
tary population. In other areas it defined groups depending on pastoralism
while Tajik referred to all sedentaries irrespective of language (Fragner ￿￿￿￿;
Holzwarth ￿￿￿￿). In the end the Turkic-speaking population constituted the
origin of the Uzbek nationality. This included non-tribal population, mostly
assimilated former Iranian speakers who lived in the region prior to the Uzbek
conquest, earlier Turkic tribes and the Qipchaq-speaking groups who arrived
since the Shaybanid took possession of the land (Karmysheva ￿￿￿￿; Zhdanko
￿￿￿￿; Shanijazov ￿￿￿￿; Baldauf ￿￿￿￿; Fragner ￿￿￿￿; Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿;
Finke ￿￿￿￿). Locality replaced tribal organisation in settled Turkic speakers
community and identity and social relations were defined primarily via com-
mon residence. Regional reference points such as Bukharalik and Ferghanalik
were prevailing and more significant than ethnonyms such as Uzbek and Tajik
(Becker ￿￿￿￿; Matley ￿￿￿￿; Schoeberlein ￿￿￿￿).
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Russian and Soviet Rule
Since the beginning of the eighteenth century the lands north of the oases,
used predominantly by Kazak nomads, began to be exposed to the Tsarist
Empire’s invasion. In the second half of the nineteenth century Russian troops
reached further south, capturing most of western Central Asia, which was now
called Russian Turkestan. Cities like Tashkent in ￿￿￿￿ and Samarqand in ￿￿￿￿
were conquered. The Amir of Bukhara accepted Russian suzerainty in the
same year, and the same happened to the Khan of Khiva five years later. The
Khanate of Qoqand, as the third political entity was in ￿￿￿￿ directly integrated
into the state structure. With the territory seized from Bukhara and Khiva
and Qoqand the General Government of Turkestan was created (Becker ￿￿￿￿:
￿￿ﬀ.; MacFadyen ￿￿￿￿:￿ﬀ).
Interfere of Russian colonial rule into local aﬀairs in Central Asia and the
intermingling with the local population did not happen on a large scale so that
life did not change much at first for the local population. As mostly urban
settlers in separate quarters their contact with the locals was limited (Bacon
￿￿￿￿; Becker ￿￿￿￿; Allworth ￿￿￿￿). Putting pastureland under agriculture
brought changes and transformations to the region in the coming future. Land
use had been based on wheat, barley or alfa alfa but now cotton became the
major crop in the oases (Thurman ￿￿￿￿; O’Hara ￿￿￿￿; Bichsel, ￿￿￿￿). Oﬃ-
cially, the still independent states Khiva and Bukhara at the end of nineteenth
century becoming more and more dependent on Russia (Becker ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.).
Trade of agricultural products also gained more volume. Especially in the
Ferghana Valley, in the former Khanate of Qoqand, cotton became almost the
sole export.
In ￿￿￿￿ the Bolsheviks gained power and hoped to easily gain the support
of the people in Central Asia. However, readiness and enthusiasm for the new
regime – altering the existing social order and its attitudes towards religion
– was less than expected (Northrop ￿￿￿￿). This period led not only revolts
but also to huge numbers of people fleeing to Afghanistan, China, Turkey and
other destinations (Shahrani ￿￿￿￿; Shalinsky ￿￿￿￿; Svanberg ￿￿￿￿). Bukhara
and Khiva in the beginning became nominally independent People’s Soviet
republics.
Besides promoting economic transformation, a distinctive element of early
Soviet rule was the creation of ethnic and territorial boundaries so far alien to
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the region. In the ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s “the establishment of a national territory
and government institutions, the standardization of a national language, and
the emergence of a mass educational system” was accomplished in the region
(Edgar ￿￿￿￿:￿). This had already begun during tsarist colonial rulers and
continued within the Soviet state in a radical form. In that process every indi-
vidual had to be assigned to one particular ethnic or national group. Territory
and cultural distinctiveness were created for these groups. According to most
authors, in the case of the sedentary population of Central Asia, the blurriness
and porousness of boundaries between groups made the creation by Soviet
design enormously diﬃcult. So, for example, Tajiks and Uzbeks who make
up the majority of the settled population in the core areas of Soviet Central
Asia today, and there were not divided by any clear boundaries (Hirsch ￿￿￿￿;
Schoeberlein ￿￿￿￿; Edgar ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿). They married each other, were largely
bilingual and one language had elements of the other one. Neither language
nor descent are useful categories to identify people (Finke ￿￿￿￿).
Each of the major thus established groups was also awarded an administrative-
territorial unit. In ￿￿￿￿ the national delimitation processes was almost com-
pleted and five Soviet Republics had been established: Uzbekistan, Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. What happened in Central Asia
was not unusual since in other parts of the Soviet Union similar divisions were
created (Martin ￿￿￿￿). From the side of Soviet authorities a positive attitude
of many Central Asians to this subject was expected since:
“Interest in a unified Turkistan was limited to a small group of urban
intellectuals, many of whom subsequently became leading figures in the
Uzbek republic. The elites of other groups were less enthusiastic, fearing
that pan-Turkistani unity would mean Uzbek domination. Turkmen and
Kazaks, in particular, complained that they were underrepresented and
ill-treated in republics where they were in the minority” (Edgar ￿￿￿￿:
￿￿).
However, along the planned border line there were people whose dialects
were in-between, e.g., Turkmen and Uzbek, their genealogies ambiguous and
they could not define to which group they belong (Edgar ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿). Others
switched for more or less opportunistic reasons (Baldauf ￿￿￿￿). Uzbekistan
had territorial boundaries that seemed to have been drawn in a particularly
arbitrary way and therefore many people were forced to register as Uzbeks
precisely to make these borders appear to make more sense (Allworth ￿￿￿￿;
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Schoeberlein ￿￿￿￿; Subtelny ￿￿￿￿; Finke ￿￿￿￿). At the same time, the So-
viet definition of Uzbekness clearly favoured the sedentary elements and its
boundaries were drawn generously (Finke ￿￿￿￿).
Martin names the Soviet Union “the world’s first Aﬃrmative Action Em-
pire” which was intensively busy with the practice of ethnic labelling and indoc-
trination of it. Ethnicity was seen as an “inherent, fundamental, and crucially
important characteristic of all individuals” (Martin ￿￿￿￿:￿, ￿￿￿). The Soviet
state created structures so that its citizens were regularly confronted with their
nationality question as a part of their everyday life. In ￿￿￿￿ the internal pass-
ports with a line indicating ones ethnicity was introduced. This information
was “not a neutral piece of information”, it brought both a crucial advantage
or disadvantage on one’s personal life. According to Martin, the declaration of
nationality on the passports helped “reinforcing the belief, and the social fact
that, national identity was primordial and inherited” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿).
All these developments were done under surveillance of the government in
Moscow but it did not mean that local realities and local bargaining did not
play a role. During the border-drawing phase people tried to achieve their
territorial claims in contrast to Moscow’s intentions (Hirsch ￿￿￿￿). At the
same time, having the name of a republic or an autonomous region did not
mean that much. As mentioned before, the Russian population was mainly
urban and they occupied most of the bureaucratic positions especially during
the beginning of socialist rule. With korenizatsiya, or indigenization, it was
aimed at increasing the number of local functionaries and members of the
communist party. But this policy brought reproaches and accusations of locals
with nationalist orientations so that during the ￿￿￿￿s, this policy was reversed
and replaced. During the Brezhnev period it was revived and in the early ￿￿￿￿s
the famous Uzbek “cotton scandal” with unfilled plans and undelivered cotton
left its marks in the region (Critchlow ￿￿￿￿:￿￿f). Accusations like corruption,
nepotism and misuse of collective property were militating against Moscow’s
expectations.
In the process of building socialism by campaigns attacking religion or di-
rected to women’s liberation took also its share (Northrop ￿￿￿￿; Kamp ￿￿￿￿)
How successful these campaigns were, what was preserved under the label of
Islam and tradition, is long debated. Benningsen and Broxup (￿￿￿￿) antici-
pated in their book, “The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State” a significant role
to Islam for the collapse of the Soviet Union (cf. Kemper ￿￿￿￿:￿). The collapse
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of the Soviet Union showed that these assumptions were not felicitous. After
independence the Central Asian republics, each have their own way of handling
freedom of religion as other realms of society, or economy. Northrop argues
that a broadband label with “a vast variety of local customs and religious
practices” namely “Muslim identitiy” was claimed by people (￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
Independent Uzbekistan
In ￿￿￿￿ the willingness to accept the independence and dissolving of the Union
was not very enthusiastic in Uzbekistan.￿ First of September since then is cel-
ebrated as Independence Day in Uzbekistan, which also became one of the
members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Since then the coun-
try is under the rule of Islam Karimov who was the general secretary of the
Communist Party of Uzbekistan and as such the leading figure in the republic
since ￿￿￿￿ (Akbarzadeh ￿￿￿￿; Fierman ￿￿￿￿). Not only the president but also
the new elites within the following years showed a continuum as being former
communists functionaries in their majority. The same thing was also the case
in rural areas where in many cases former chiefs of collectives and other sig-
nificant position holders stayed at least in useful network positions and also
passed those over to their children.￿
The democratic movements and the opposition to president Karimov was
not long living since after a short period of tolerance they were banned by
the government (Fierman ￿￿￿￿; Capisani ￿￿￿￿). Any kind of movement and
demand were interpreted as a threat to internal peace and harmony so that
the government kept a stick control over all live spheres until present time.
The civil war in Tajikistan in the early ￿￿￿￿s, internal violent unrests like in
Andijon in ￿￿￿￿ as well as the situation in Afghanistan were examples that were
used to consolidate this power. Until today, the term of presidency is regularly
renewed (Kangas ￿￿￿￿; Akbarzadeh ￿￿￿￿b; Fierman ￿￿￿￿). Karimov’s power
is not questioned or seriously challenged. He determines the destiny of the
country and makes all appointments, which furthermore strengthen his power.
In the provinces governors are appointed and removed from their positions
by him. As to be expected, the juridical system is also under his control as
￿ Kemper mentions that according to referendums conducted in ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ to ￿￿% of the
population of the Central Asian republics voted for staying a part of a reformed Soviet Union
(￿￿￿￿:￿).
￿ See also Trevisani (￿￿￿￿).
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the president exerts total control over legislation and the execution of laws
(Fierman ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ.). Human rights violation, censorship on the media, and
noticeable presence of secret service enforce this policy. The number of people
as suspects put in jail, accused of their intentions to overthrow the regime or
of religious fundamentalism, is tremendous. Fair trail and legal support is not
the case for the suspects and their families are also intimidated so that they
cannot support their relatives properly.￿ The post-Soviet period did not start
with serious political reforms, which until today are missing or limited to a
renaming of places and institutions to remind people of the independency of
Uzbekistan and its cultural richness. For that purpose in ￿￿￿￿, the statue of
Lenin on the central square of Tashkent was removed, and the place renamed as
‘Independence Square’. In ￿￿￿￿, Amir Timur replaced Karl Marx’s sculpture
(Hegarty ￿￿￿￿).
Not diﬀerent than with other republics in the region, Uzbekistan’s popu-
lation is heterogeneous. But the contemporary politic has usbekisation on its
agenda. For the minorities, for instance, to attend native language schools
within time became impossible since schools are closed or do not have enough
teaching material in the native language. Also, in order to increase the future
opportunities of the children parents prefer to send their children to an Uzbek
school (Finke ￿￿￿￿). Especially Tajiks were aﬀected from this policy and its
consequences. The relations with direct neighbours are often in the news, be-
ing either accused of how weak they are in their fight against terrorism and
Islamic fundamentalism or with issues like water theft or drug traﬃcking. In
particular, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are described as “weak”
countries, which cannot manage their borders and deal with their problems.
Islam and Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan are other debated issues
inside and outside the country. Images of terrorism especially after ￿/￿￿ and
developments in Afghanistan are used as a threat also for the Uzbek state,
the fight against it legitimises a strong and controlling state, which aims to
crush any kind of oppositional movement. It is sure that groups like the IMU,
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, had contacts to the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, while Hizb-u-Tahrir is much less clear in their ideological ori-
entation and political practices. But how radical these movements are and
whether they are aimed at establishing some type of Sharia-based policy and
￿ See for the reiterating accreditation denial of Human Rights Watch representative in
Uzbekistan http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=￿￿￿￿ accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿￿￿
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the support among the population are open questions.￿ These questions open
also the role of Islam in post-Soviet context and its survival during the Soviet
period. Just counting the number of mosques and observing revival of Islamic
practices are insuﬃcient hints to say about the role of Islam in the region.
Inherent problems of the socialist system had been the main reason behind
the need for change. Unfulfilled production targets and shortage of resources
were one side of the problem while at the same time resources were wasted
and cheated within collective structures by collective members. Initiatives
like rewards to bring members of the collective to work more eﬃciently were
not enough to get the system moving. Radical reforms were necessary and
that occurred under Gorbachov as the politics of perestroika and glasnost. It
was not rare that people described Gorbachov’s period in opposition to the
Brezhnev period, as the one that brought the end of the Soviet Union, as a
“break down”. His period also had other associations for people like increasing
criminality, which caused people in towns to install additional iron doors to
their homes, and economically the end of a relatively secure way of life (Werner
￿￿￿￿; Zanca ￿￿￿￿; Finke and Sancak ￿￿￿￿). Few people saw this end inevitable
when they looked retrospectively at their lives. How the things could have the
same price in the whole of the Soviet Union, and why the costs of production
were not reflected on the price of goods was not something thought about too
often.
In order to protect itself from post-Soviet economic contraction, the “Uzbek
way” of reform was introduced. National self-reliance was the main purpose
in the energy and in the food sector that should be ensured by a gradual,
step by step approach to macro-economic, market oriented reforms (Gleason
￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). This self-suﬃciency strategy aimed to reduce grain imports. For
this, a shift from a nearly exclusive concentration on cotton was necessary in
order to realize food security (cf. chapter three). Parallel to this, reminders of
the old system, at least in form of names, were eliminated and replaced with
Uzbek terms. Without introducing significant reforms in their structures and
remaining as a part of a planned economy the kolkhoz and sovkhoz were con-
verted into collective farms and got Uzbek names (Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿). It is not
only the administrative structure that remained relatively intact from Soviet
times, but also much of the socialist economic organization. With this, for-
￿ According to Schoeberlein (￿￿￿￿) and Zanca (￿￿￿￿) Uzbek government may actually
foster rather than deter the fundamentalist threat.
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mer elites maintain their power monopoly by controlling both the production
process and the allocation of resources. Uzbekistan was an agrarian country
and the economy is still largely based on agricultural products and their pro-
cessing.￿ The plans from the government and its ministries are handed down
via the viloyat to the tuman and farms. For the production these administra-
tive units were put in competition and in harvest periods the statistics were
broadcasted by reporting progress and success at the fulfilment of the plans.
The state’s role as the key actor and manager in the economy brought along
positive outcomes in the early years of independence and additionally prices of
the main consumer goods and services were controlled rigidly. The neighbours
Kazakstan and especially Kyrgyzstan implemented structural reforms with less
hesitation (Gleason ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿, Pomfret ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). The aforementioned poli-
cies in order to avoid post-Soviet chaos or to soften the shock after the demise
of Soviet system led to a milder recession compared with other states in the re-
gion. The other side of the coin showed rapid growth in unregulated trade, low
quality of goods at the market, avoidance of tax and custom duties and cap-
ital flight, rising unemployment and high inflation (Gleason ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). Strict
currency control on Uzbek sum did not create favourable trade climate and in
￿￿￿￿ the IMF froze credits to Uzbekistan because of the overvalued, artificial
currency exchange rate. The first step for the abolition of multiple currency
exchange rates came in ￿￿￿￿ with the aim of full convertibility of the sum
in ￿￿￿￿. The situation was not really diﬀerent during most of the ￿￿￿￿s and
while the abolishment of a multiple exchange rate regime was announced these
still continued to exist.￿ This has also consequences for foreign investments
(Gleason ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿-￿￿, Bartlett ￿￿￿￿).￿
With the demise of the socialist system the majority of the population
has suﬀered a dramatic decrease in living standards. Those who still have an
employment as a teacher or a nurse are lucky but receive salaries far from
being enough. In that context appropriation of new skills and recalling of old
ones became more significant in order to survive in post-socialist Uzbekistan.
In this situation, for most people there was no need to keep themselves busy
with the names and the legal status of the new institutions since their daily life
￿ Gas, oil and gold are the major mineral resources (Capisani ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
￿ During the period of my fieldwork, the black market rate fluctuated between ￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿ sum for one US dollar.
￿ For an overview of economic reforms see Craumer (￿￿￿￿), Pomfret (￿￿￿￿), Biermann
(￿￿￿￿), Rumer (￿￿￿￿) and Kaser (￿￿￿￿); on land reforms see Lerman (￿￿￿￿).
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was not touched by these diﬀerences. They bothered rather about lost jobs,
shortened or disappearing social benefits as well as unpaid and insuﬃcient
salaries. Their daily life – what bothers them and how they cope with the
problems – was keeping not only them but also me busy. This point makes
the main focus of this work.
￿.￿ The Oasis of Bukhara
Ecology
The city of Bukhara, which gives the name to the oasis and to the viloyat,
is besides Samarqand probably the most famous place in Central Asia. It
has also been one of the regions political and cultural centres for millennia.
The city centre sprinkled with historical and architectural monuments from
medieval and later periods, and is often described as a “treasure” (Gangler et
al. ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). According to archaeological finds starting from the Bronze Age
this was a region with continuous human settlement. Located along the long
distance trade route of the “Silk Road”, this was also a source of wealth for
Bukhara. Caravans from China to the west – to Russia, the Middle East and
Europe – converged here and their variety of influence was far beyond the
purely economic (Frye ￿￿￿￿, Gangler et al. ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
The oasis of Bukhara is approximately fifty kilometres wide and located
in a vast desert area, which stretches from the Amu Darya in the south to
the Syr Darya in the north, and from the Aral Sea in the west to the western
foothills of the Turkestan Range in the east (cf. Finke ￿￿￿￿). The area has
some natural elevations otherwise it is almost entirely flat lowland. It is a
landscape where water determines and shapes topography by creating abrupt
boundaries where the oasis ends and the desert begins. The neighbouring
Qizil-Qum (‘Red Sand’) and Qara-Qum (‘Black Sand’) deserts host a small
number of nomads. The only major river within the oasis is the Zarafshan,
originating from mountains of present-day Tajikistan. Along this river besides
Bukhara many of the most famous cultural centres were located like Panjiqand
or Samarqand.
Basis to this was suﬃcient water of the Zarafshan River, which made the
region one of the most fertile of Central Asia. In the absence of smaller ravines
(as exist in the Ferghana Valley) the Bukhara oasis has always relied totally on
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the waters that descend from the mountains further to the east. Rainfall is not
suﬃcient to support cultivation. The oasis was nourished by complex systems
of canals, which allowed to grow a variety of agricultural products from grain,
vegetables and fruits (including apples, cherries, melons and grapes) to the
fatal cotton. Tending mulberry trees for the production of silk is also a long-
established industry. Some of the canals have been in use since pre-Islamic
times even with names from that period (Barthold [Frye] ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿). Under
Russian protectorate, its economic interests became more and more dominant
and Bukhara exported cotton and dried fruits, and acquired manufactured
commodities.
The climate is arid and continental. Especially hot summer months with
temperatures reaching 45 ◦C and monthly averages around 35 ◦C are laborious
and exhausting (UNEP ￿￿￿￿). Spring and autumn with moderately temper-
atures are warm and relatively short each lasting only a few weeks. Win-
ter and spring are the main precipitation months. Precipitation is less than
￿￿￿ millimetres annually, often dropping below ￿￿￿ millimetres, and it can
be also occasionally observed that the desert is blanketed lightly with snow
(cf. Makhmudovich ￿￿￿￿). Beyond the irrigation zone natural vegetation is
sparse. Saxaul (Haloxylon ammodendron) can be found in the interior parts
of the desert. Since it has been used for heating purposes and its warmth is
highly appreciated, there is a significant decrease in the number of trees in
the vicinity of the oases.￿ Further away, the desert zone has been used for
centuries by pastoralists for herding camels, sheep and goats. The loamy soil
is fertile and contains almost no rocks. With rain the ground turns into mud
within a few hours, unpaved or not anymore paved roads in settlement areas
often become impassable. Shoes of pedestrians sink in mud and it is a struggle
to walk on the streets. Old Russian cars and new Uzbek ones also mostly sink
in mud. What is also to observe in the sparsely vegetated Qizil-Qum is salt
clusters. If it is not summer it can be deceiving that there is a light snow coat
on the desert.
Water scarcity is a general problem in Uzbekistan but worst in the western
regions of the country like in Khorezm and Karakalpakistan, which are the
￿ Saxaul is widespread in the desert and semi-desert zones of Central Asia from Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan until Mongolia. Saxaul is a multifunctional plant for the eco system
useful for the stabilisation of eroded ground, reducing the risk of sand and salt dust storm,
and the regulation of the water balance. http://www.succow-stiftung.de/turkmenistan-
saxaul.￿￿.html (accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿￿￿).
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regions furthest downstream in the Amu Darya Basin. Population growth,
increase in cotton production and ineﬃciency of water management are some
of the reasons for this problem. The main water sources, the rivers, were
used intensively already since colonial times. During the Soviet period the
situation deteriorated, as in order to gain more land from the poorer regions of
Uzbekistan and to increase overall cotton output, a network of new channels
was created and more water needed. Land gain from the desert or former
pasture areas was realized by irrigation. Expansion into the desert further
upstream had direct consequences for the Zarafshan, which became a poor
runnel. Besides the Zarafshan also the Amu Darya lost its flow immensely out
of the same reasons. The present weak flow of the Zarafshan was already the
case in the ￿￿th century due to extensive irrigation demands and the river had
lost all of its water long before it reached Bukhara (Khanikoﬀ ￿￿￿￿; Olufsen
￿￿￿￿). The Amu-Bukhara canal was completed in the ￿￿￿￿s, to draw water
from the Amu Darya and redirect it upland to the north-west to replenish the
water supply of the oasis.
The consequences of water shortage for an agricultural country like Uzbek-
istan are disastrous. When we consider this problem regionally, aﬀectedness
in Bukhara was also serious. Precipitation related drought and population
growth were often given as the main reasons of water scarcity by state oﬃ-
cials. But these aﬀect the available amount of water not as severe as argued.￿
A well-known ecological disaster, the shrinkage of the surface of Aral Sea, is
not happening far from Bukhara. However, the consequences of this ecological
crisis are to perceive far beyond neighbouring provinces. The ecological bal-
ance was destroyed during the Soviet Union with increasing consumption of
water especially for cotton monoculture. Salinization and pollution of water
with pesticides, herbicides and tribities contributed this water to the Aral Sea.
At the local level while combating desertification does not play an impor-
tant role and the rural residents did not seem too concerned about it, land
salinity with its visible existence was playing an important role. Bukharians
had seen the poor land quality as a bad destiny in compare to Ferghana Val-
ley but they regard themselves luckier than residents of Karakalpakistan and
Khorezm who are even more directly aﬀected. In Bukhara land salinity and
￿ See also Wegerich ￿￿￿￿:￿. He discusses the drought in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ in Central Asia
and argues that the reason of water scarcity lies beyond natural causes and responsibility
of water management institutions. The reason behind downstream water shortage was seen
political.
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the lack of suﬃcient water (for any purpose) was the main complaints of all
people irrespectively if they work on family plots or large fields. To reduce
the soil salinity all agricultural fields have to be leached as a part of prepa-
ration before starting with seeding. Without leaching, the fields would turn
white and nothing would grow (Smith ￿￿￿￿). For this purpose fields are cov-
ered with water several times, and salt is washed out by draining oﬀ farther
downstream where part of the original Zarafshan now serves to collect it.
“It is like scratching a wound. It itches, you scratch, more you scratch,
more it starts to itch. Washing out the field is also like that, in order
to get rid of salt, we wash out. It does not reduce the salt, next time
there’s even more”. (Anvar)
This problem, “secondary land salinisation is caused by human interven-
tions such as inappropriate irrigation practices, use of salt-rich irrigation water
and/or poor drainage conditions”￿￿. In order to leach the salinized land a sub-
stantial amount of water is used and at that point cause-eﬀect is intermingled
in a vicious circle. Water for leaching according to estimations “makes up ￿￿%
of all water used in the fields” (Welfare Improvement Strategy of Uzbekistan
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿). This problem is even more serious in Karakalpakistan where the
underground water table is high. Additionally, climatic changes has led to a
rise in temperatures and aridity in surrounding areas as far as four hundred
kilometres away and has an significant impact on vegetation periods. Through
wind scoured seabed reach in form of salt, dust and sand reaches other parts
of the Central Asia (Giese ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
History and Population
The described ecology had a profound impact on the history and ethnic con-
figuration in the oasis. Nomad-sedentary interaction, which was a significant
factor in other parts of Central Asia, was less so in Bukhara. The reason
was that the deserts surrounding Bukhara could not sustain large numbers of
livestock. This did not allow a close interaction as occurred in other regions,
except when nomads became sedentary. Those who retained a pastoral way
of life had to do so at some distance from the oasis.￿￿ Nevertheless, ethnic
￿￿ see ENVASSO (Environmental Assessment of Soil for Monitoring , EU Sixth Framework
Research Programme) http://www.envasso.com/ (accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿)
￿￿ This aspect is discussed in the work of Finke (￿￿￿￿) in detail.
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configuration in Bukhara represents the close intermingling of Turkic and Ira-
nian speakers that continues to the present day. The intermingling of these
two groups is so strong that any diﬀerence is not only almost unrecognizable
but also denied by people. This peaceful coexistence of the two groups also in
other regions exists but it is nowhere as close as in Bukhara. While some set-
tled Turks adopted the Tajik language, in other areas local Iranians switched
to Turkic. Local circumstances and power configurations played a significant
role in that respect (Frye ￿￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿).
Although it probably existed for several centuries prior to that the city of
Bukhara was first mentioned in the seventh century AD. Its name is usually
explained as deriving from the Sanskrit vihara, meaning ‘monastery’ (Barthold
[Frye] ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Important for the development in Bukhara, Sogdians
became the main agent of the Silk Road trade with their colonies in China.
Changes of supremacies did not have significant eﬀect on the economic and
cultural life over the years. Ability of arrangement under new rulers “. . . had
its roots in the business-mindedness of the Sogdian, whose main interest was
the continued long-distance trade and the specific political structure of the
Sogdian city-states (Gangler et al. ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Thus, after ￿￿￿ by marriage
Turks were absorbed into Sogdian society while during later periods marriage
was absorbing Tajiks into the Turkic realm.
Until the Arab invasion in the second half of the seventh century Sogdia
was described prosperous. It was one of the first regions in Central Asia to
become thoroughly Islamized and soon developed into a well-known spiritual
centre for Islam. However, acceptance by the population was not immediate.
Especially in the rural areas, there were rebellions against the new rulers and
their religion (Frye ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ﬀ.). The ninth and tenth century were maybe the
heydays of Bukhara. Samanid rule not only attracted famous scholars but also
poets like Firdausi who wrote the shahnama in the New Persian language. Up
to this time Arabic was in use also by Persian intellectuals and artists. The
Qarakhanid invasion in ￿￿￿ was seen as the end of this glorious period. Not
only lost Bukhara its pre-eminent position but also this opened up the region
to a more extensive encroachment by Turkic groups (Frye ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ﬀ., Finke
￿￿ Frye calls this interpretation a „popular etymology“ (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). He prefers the expla-
nation that the word derived from the Sogdian word fwx’r „fortunate place“ (Gangler et al.
￿￿￿￿:￿￿) Beside the meaning of Buddist monastery, according to a ￿￿th century annalist
of Bukhara Hafizi Tanish, Bukhara derived from „bukhar“ as a Zorastrian name it means
„source of knowledge“ (Mankovskaya ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
￿￿
sancak
￿￿￿￿). Bukhara remained, however, an important centre for Islamic education.
The heavy destruction under the Mongols in ￿￿￿￿ made the situation worse.
Things slightly recovered under the Timurids (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿). But Samarqand
as capital of Timurids overshadowed Bukhara until ￿￿￿￿ and the Shaybanid
conquest. Now, Bukhara became the capital of an Uzbek state that would soon
split, however, into three distinct khanates and emirates (cf. chapter ￿.￿).
Following the arrival of the Shaybanids, the population was an amalga-
mation of sedentary groups and former nomads. Although Iranian speakers
remained in the majority, they were strongly merged with now sedentary Tur-
kic groups into one bilingual entity by intermarriage, which was very common.
Over time, Turkmens and other Turkic tribes also entered the oasis and settled
on its edges or in small enclaves around the older villages. Because of the lack
of good pastureland, there was no extensive influx of new Qipchaq tribes to the
region accompanying Muhammad Shaybani (Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). The current
terms Uzbek and Tajik were hardly used at all or in a very diﬀerent meaning
as today. Uzbek usually referred to tribal and semi-nomadic groups, few in
numbers in the immediate vicinity of the oasis. Mostly people used local terms
such as Bukharalik or, within the oasis, more precisely Gijduvanlik, Vobkentlik
and the like (Schoeberlein ￿￿￿￿).
This had an end in ￿￿￿￿ when the Amir of Bukhara became a vassal of the
Russian tsar (Gaube et al. ￿￿￿￿:￿). The Amir put up little resistance, and the
local troops were defeated easily. While the northern regions of Samarqand
and Jizzak were attached to the General Government of Turkistan, the rest
of Bukhara was not formally incorporated into the Tsarist state but became
its vassal (Barthold [Frye] ￿￿￿￿). The Amir remained in power but accepted
orders from Russia. Internal aﬀairs in the Emirate were left more or less
untouched (Becker ￿￿￿￿). In ￿￿￿￿ the Central Asian railway opened in ￿￿ km
southeast of Bukhara, where a new Russian settlement established, the city of
Kagan.
Bukhara integrated also later into the new Soviet state than other parts.
Its formal independence continued as a People’s Republic until ￿￿￿￿. Later, it
was incorporated into the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Resistance against
the new regime was less strong than in the Ferghana Valley and the reason for
that can be the aforementioned late incorporation (Becker ￿￿￿￿). With the
transfer of the capital from Samarqand to Tashkent in ￿￿￿￿, the latter became
the centre of power. While Samarqand and the Ferghana Valley retained a sig-
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nificant influence, Bukhara became a less important player within Uzbekistan
(Carlisle ￿￿￿￿). During this period, due to the only vague diﬀerentiation be-
tween Turkic and Iranian speakers national delimitation process was not easy
in Bukhara. Since the ethnic labels were not used as Russian oﬃcials expected
and wanted, many people had to decide on one or the other. It was not unusual
that particularly in Bukhara within the same family diﬀerent ethnicities have
been reported (Naby ￿￿￿￿). The genuine reasons behind these decisions can
be political pressure or simply having no preference to oﬀered categories.
In present, Bukhara is not only the name of the city but also the name of
a viloyat in western-central Uzbekistan as well as the capital of that province.
The viloyat Bukhara has a population of ￿.￿ million, and one fifth of it live in
the capital, and comprises as subdivision eleven tuman and the city of Bukhara.
The distance from most of the tuman centres to the viloyat capital is from ￿￿
to ￿￿ kilometres. Including most of the surrounding desert territories, it had
become the largest province of Uzbekistan during Soviet times. Today, the
province territory is ￿￿.￿￿ thousand sq. km. According to oﬃcial statistics
￿￿% of the population live in the countryside. Agriculture makes up ￿￿% of
the gross regional product.￿￿ Some light industry based on textile and silk,
astrakhan lambskin and food also exists.
Although oﬃcial statistics count more than seventy per cent of the provin-
cial population as Uzbek, Bukhara is, in linguistic or ethnic terms, often de-
picted for its Tajikness. Outside the region it is common to hear that everyone
originating from there is a Tajik. Oﬃcial statistics in regard to number of
Tajiks and the used, preferred, learned language does not overlap. In the
statistics, people can declare themselves as Uzbeks (political reasons, practical
reasons) but speak and perceive themselves as Tajiks. Russians and Kazaks
are the next largest groups, while the number of Tajiks is given as merely
￿.￿ per cent of the population (Aman ￿￿￿￿). In contrast, Foltz claims that
ninety per cent of the population in Bukhara city to be Tajiks (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). In
the city, as well as in some rural settlements, Tajik is the dominant language.
According to Finke (￿￿￿￿), the total number of Tajik speakers may at least
be half of the population of the viloyat. Estimations of local historians and
ethnographers even run as high as sixty to seventy per cent.
Besides that there are also smaller minorities of Turkic-speaking groups
￿￿Governmental Portal of the republic of Uzbekistan. http://www.gov.uz/en/
regional_authorities/￿￿￿￿, accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿
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(Turkmens, Meskhetianian Turks and Tatars) as well as Ukrainians, Armeni-
ans, Chechens, Koreans, Bukharian Jews.￿￿ These groups are rather urban
except for the Turkmens who are predominantly rural. The southern tuman
towards the border to Turkmenistan – Karakul and Olot and the eastern
Karaul-Bozor – are predominantly Uzbek and Turkmen. Local intellectuals
with Turkmen background believed that similar to the Tajik case the Turk-
men population is in fact much higher than in oﬃcial statistics. Out of same
reasons as the other minorities have done, many people register themselves as
Uzbeks. Turkmens to whom I talked in the vicinity of my field setting did
not mention any intention to emigrate to Turkmenistan and had no link by
kinship. They argued that they are called as Turkmens but since they live
here for a long time, they are almost Uzbeks. Some sound diﬀerences in their
Uzbek for their own perception did not make themselves Turkmens, although
called as such.
The District of Romitan
The tuman of Romitan, the main field site within the oasis, is located in the
north-west of the viloyat including a major portion of the Bukharian Qizil-
Qum. The population is concentrated in the east, while most of the western
parts are only seasonally used as pasture lands. It is proudly claimed by local
historians that the town predates that of Bukhara city by centuries (Halidov
and Kobilov ￿￿￿￿). The tuman has also from the oasis separated one town-
ship, Gazli, and a village, Qizil-Ravot, both deep in the Qizil Qum. The rural
population of the tuman is organized in seven municipalities. Each of them
contains between ten to twenty villages and has an average population of about
fifteen thousand. The towns of Gazli and Romitan are each subdivided into
neighbourhoods (mahalla) but in contrast to the mahalla discourse in Uzbek-
istan in the rural areas neither in administrative nor in daily usage people did
not mentioned it at all (Massicard and Trevisani ￿￿￿￿; Sievers ￿￿￿￿).
Uzbeks and Tajiks are the largest groups in numbers. In ￿￿￿￿, out of
￿￿,￿￿￿ individuals ￿￿,￿￿￿ were oﬃcially registered as Uzbeks and ￿,￿￿￿ as
Tajiks but again the number of speakers is much higher for the latter. The
largest minorities are Turkmens, Arabs and Kazaks, while the few Russian,
￿￿ Many Russians and Ukrainians but also Bukharian Jews have emigrated in recent years.
The emigration of a Jewish doctor was told to me with a deep sorrow, since he was a very
good, respected doctor and his place remained empty.
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Tatar and Ironi families live mainly in the tuman centre. Most Kazaks live
outside the oasis territory in the Qizil Qum. Uzbeks and Tajiks called the
settlements in that region as the ‘desert zone’ (chul zonasi), where one would
not settle voluntarily. The architecture in these settlements where Kazaks and
Russians live is also diﬀerent than in oasis with block like houses and open
gardens.
The research site proper was the municipality (selsoviet)￿￿ of Chilongu
within Romitan tumani, which consists of three former kolkhozes. Two of
them were specialized on cotton production, a small third one on honey. This
one was not only located apart from the two other but also as a not cotton
producer did not play a significant role both for the villagers and the local
oﬃcials. The names of the kolkhozes were not unusual. In Soviet times they
were called Marx and Engels. After independence Engels was renamed af-
ter a national intellectual Fayzi Kurbanov. Fieldwork was concentrated on
the former kolkhoz Karl Marx, now called Chilongu. It formerly had con-
sisted of seventeen brigades, usually identified with a single village. Along the
major highway of Uzbekistan from Tashkent via Samarqand and Bukhara to
Khorezm and Karakalpakistan are also two villages separated from the other
villages. These are the aforementioned villages with Turkmen background
named Chandir One and Two.
As a result of population growth villages had grown towards each other
and appeared to be one village since physical boundaries for an outsider like
me have become undetectable. Irrigation canals are the markers of the borders
between the villages. The knowledge of the local residents on their settlements
was limited. “We live here for a long time, my parents, my grandparents have
also lived here. I have no idea, where the name of the village comes from”.
This fertile oasis lands had already been extensively farmed.
The ethnic relations and composition of the region is described in detail
by Finke (￿￿￿￿) and has been mentioned in past paragraphs. A Tajik-Uzbek
majority is the common form, with individual villages inhabited by Arabs,
Turkmens and others. One selsoviet in Romitan, Kurgon, is almost exclu-
sively Tajik and the only selsoviet within Romitan tumani with a Tajik school.
Sometimes, within a selsoviet, one half is Tajik and another Uzbek, such as
￿￿ The oﬃcial Uzbek term for municipality is kishlok fukarolar yigini (“the council of the
village citizens”) but people almost always referred to the Russian - or indeed Soviet - term
selsoviet, the abbreviation of Selskiy Soviet (“village council”).
￿￿
sancak
in Shurcha and Hazarbog. Sometimes villages can be described as Tajik or
Uzbek, sometimes they were mixed. In other cases, two neighbouring villages
with distinct linguistic background were united and share one school like in the
case of Pinjon (a Tajik) and Kukishtuvan (a Turkmen village). In Chilongu,
Uzbeks and Tajiks also form the majority within selsoviet and dominate all
the villages in the centre.
Besides the “remoteness” of the settlements the insuﬃciency of the infras-
tructure is a major reason for complaining. In the old part of the village aside
from the main street the roads are not paved anymore. The main street is
also a potholed road and some asphalt rest just can be seen in the middle of
the road. Side roads sink in mud especially during spring and autumn, other
times dust covers the landscape. The regular bus connection to the tuman or
to the city has remarkably declined and car traﬃc is noticeable less than in
Ferghana. Although urban centres are also aﬀected and experience this type
of changes, shortage of infrastructure is more remarkable and drastic in the
countryside. Access to the services, which used to have only symbolic prices
or were free of charge, was taken for granted in the past. That is not the case
anymore. Because of the transport costs a visit to tuman for many families
nowadays is a luxury.
In other parts of Bukhara viloyat there were villages with Tajik schools but
even in Tajik dominated regions people were worried for the future of the lan-
guage. To use learning materials from Tajikistan is not allowed anymore. They
are no new materials and not enough for the number of the students and their
corresponding needs. Finishing a Tajik school according to families does not
open the doors for better job chances while university entrance exams requires
Uzbek proficiency at all. For the other minority groups, including Russians or
Russian-speaking minorities like Koreans or Armenians, command in Uzbek is
becoming more important. Like Tajiks or Russians who do not master bilin-
gualism, they scratch along but have no chance to make occupational career,
apart from that there are other things to be needed.
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￿.￿ The Ferghana Valley
Ecology
The second field site was located in the southern part of Andijon viloyat in
the Ferghana Valley. Since the early days of Soviet rule the valley is divided
among three republics, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. From a
historical point it has gained less attention and it has seldom been an important
actor in the history of Central Asia. Architectural reminders from the past
has not get as much as attention like Bukhara or Samarqand but it is one of
the most fertile regions in Central Asia, and within the Soviet Union was the
most densely populated part.
The geographic characteristics of the valley, however, are reason why it is
often referred to as the “pearl of Central Asia” (Thurman ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). The valley
is a almond shaped large hollow that extends up to ￿￿￿ kilometres east to west
and up to ￿￿￿ kilometres north to south, with a total surface of approximately
￿￿,￿￿￿ square kilometres (Barthold [Spuler] ￿￿￿￿; UNEP ￿￿￿￿, Thurman ￿￿￿￿).
The landscape is mainly flat, with an altitude of ￿￿￿–￿￿￿ metres above sea
level. In contrast to Bukhara, mountains surround the valley on all sides, the
Turkistan and Alai ranges in the south and the Kuramin and Chatkal in the
north. Plains and steppes occupy the heart of the valley (Bichsel ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
After ￿￿￿￿, with the independence of the neighbouring republics, accessibility
of the valley became more diﬃcult since passing through Tajikistan territory
is not possible anymore. This forced to find another solution in order to make
the connection between Tashkent and the western part of the country so that
a road with a mountain pass and the Kamchik-tunnel opened but in winter the
destination is not an easy drive at all and often closed after heavy snowfall.
As Bukhara, the valley has a continental climate with hot summers and cold
winters. Although there is some summer rainfall, overall precipitation is low
and the aridity of the climate necessitates irrigation for agriculture.￿￿Fortunately
the valley is richly provided with water by glaciers and snow-runoﬀs collected
by the Syr Darya and its tributaries. This contrasts the valley with many
other parts of Uzbekistan (Bichsel ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). People in other parts of Uzbek-
istan also often mentioned this peculiarity with enviousness. The proximity of
￿￿ In July average temperature is 27.3 ◦C and in January is −3 ◦C. Average pre-
cipitation is ￿￿￿-￿￿￿mm. http://www.andijan.uz/UZB/uzbobl.shtml (accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿)
Андижанский областной хокимият
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the water sources protects the valley from significant shortage and also implies
less ecological problems caused by salinization and desertification (Makhmu-
dovich ￿￿￿￿). The soil is considered very fertile, again envied by Bukharians,
and agrarian plans are regularly fulfiled and proudly broadcasted for the whole
republic. For cultivation unsuitable land in the centre has been opened up in
the last years as compensation for building sites in order to satisfy the demand
of a growing population.
The problems here are therefore not about water, but about the scarcity
of land and the intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides during socialist times
that contributed greatly to the exhaustion of the soil and a subsequent decrease
of yields (Thurman ￿￿￿￿). The major settlements are located at the foot of
the mountains, where agriculture was traditionally conducted. Further up in
the mountains, nomads and sedentary agriculturalists have long used pastures
for grazing livestock. The conditions for livestock rearing are much better
than in Bukhara. The grazing lands in the surrounding mountains provide
suﬃcient pastures for large herds of mixed species (including yaks). These
lands have become inaccessible since the closing of the border with Kyrgyzstan.
Even more important than the surrounding mountains for the history of the
Ferghana Valley has in fact been the semi-desert at its centre. This enabled
nomadic conquerors to settle and graze their herds in the neighbourhood of
their sedentary subjects. At the same time, they formed a military reservoir
for the Khanate in Qoqand thus (Finke ￿￿￿￿).
While in ecological terms, the Ferghana Valley seems in a much better po-
sition that other parts of the country, there are also salt crusts on the soil
along the fields. But it is remarkably less than in Bukhara. People in other
provinces believe that working the land in the valley is much less labour in-
tensive because the soil quality is significantly better and water is abundant.
Everywhere else, people asked in detail about land, water, food and the “civil-
isation of people” (madaniyat), all subjects where the valley was believed to
be better than. But it was always interpreted as a consequence of ecological
conditions.
“Do you see how diﬃcult it is for us? How hard working we are with
this lack of water and bad soil. Since many years water becomes an ever
more important problem both as quantity and quality. Look, how easy
it is for people in the valley.” (Axmat)
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History and Population in the Ferghana Valley
Since nomads and sedentaries lived closely together at earlier times this had
a profound impact on the ethnic composition of the valley. Due to intensive
interaction and close neighbourhood, nomadic tribes were able to settle down
in larger groups and gradually assimilate with the local population, and this
has shaped the contemporary ethnic composition (Finke ￿￿￿￿).
Similar to Bukhara, in the Ferghana Valley Sogdians settled and made up
the majority population. At least since the sixth century BC Iranian lan-
guages were spoken throughout most of the valley. With the expansion of the
western Türk Qaghanate during the sixth century here Turkification began
even more intensively than in Bukhara due to closeness to the Qaghanate’s
centres of power in Semirech’e and Jungharia (Barthold [Spuler] ￿￿￿￿). The
predominantly Iranian population largely assimilated within the Turkification
process. Immediate succession of Turkic groups and interrelation with them
formed the valley’s population (Golden ￿￿￿￿). With the Arab invasion dur-
ing the eighth century, the Islamization of the local population began. Islam
aﬀected primarily the sedentary Iranians, although revolts were not unusual
during the early period (Barthold [Spuler] ￿￿￿￿). With the mass acceptance
of the new faith by the Qarakhanids during the tenth century the conversion
of the Turkic groups in the region took place (Barthold [Spuler] ￿￿￿￿; Golden
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿; Paul ￿￿￿￿). Also many of the former Soghdian speakers switched
directly to Turkic. One reason for that unchallenged status of Qarakhanids
was their military dominance and their legitimacy through the new religion but
also the closeness of the region to other areas with a strong Turkic element,
such as Semirech’e and the Tarim Basin, which was not the case in Bukhara
(Golden ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿).
The Mongol period was as devastating for people in the valley as it was
for most other parts of Central Asia. During most of the following Timurid
period there was a quasi-independence of some of the smaller fiefdoms in the
Ferghana Valley. Andijon was one of them and Babur, its ruler by that time,
one of the most outstanding personalities among the later Timurids in Cen-
tral Asia. In ￿￿￿￿, he was defeated by the Uzbek Khan Muhammad Shaybani
in battle and fled to Kabul and later to India where he founded the Moghul
dynasty. He describes Moghuls and Uzbeks as destroyer of the civilization in
his important autobiography, the Baburnama (Babur ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿) but the in-
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habitants of the Ferghana Valley in general and those of Andijon viloyat in
particular admire him and consider him one of their own. Throughout most of
this period, Andijon was the political centre of the valley. It also became very
Turkic in character, although there were some settlements still dominantly Ira-
nian. Pastoralism continued to exist but many of the tribes became sedentary
and mixed with the previous population, creating constantly changing configu-
rations. This settlement of Tukis tribes was not a new phenomenon (Gubayeva
￿￿￿￿).
After the Uzbek Shaybanids invasion to Transoxania, the Ferghana Valley
was also quickly subdued. Under their rule, it was of marginal importance,
as the centre of power had switched to the Zarafshan region. Diﬀerent semi-
nomadic pastoralists came to the valley and that continued in later centuries
and contributed to the emergence of new tribal units (Finke ￿￿￿￿). After
the break-oﬀ of the Khanate of Qoqand, as it came to be called after the new
capital, the new state faced many problems from the onset. Apart from ongoing
tensions with Bukhara, it was divided internally, which added to the weakness
of the state. In particular the opposition between tribal groups, constituting a
large part of the army, and the old established sedentary population and elites
proved a serious obstacle to developing a stable political entity. The majority
of the population spoke eastern Turkic dialects, the basis for the future Uzbek
literary language. The central steppe region was inhabited by various tribal
groups, most of them of Qipchaq origin. Some of them had been there since
the Shaybanid period, but others arrived from places such as Samarqand and
Jizzak only after the Ming tribe had attained power. Still others came from
Kashghar and the Pamirs.
Similar to Bukhara in rural areas a sedentary cultural pattern was dom-
inant, contrasting sharply with tribal life in the steppe zone (Becker ￿￿￿￿).
Beside sedentary Turkic speakers, Tajik settlements were scattered through-
out the valley (Chvyr ￿￿￿￿; Bushkov ￿￿￿￿). The Tajik population either has
been descendants of an older Iranian stratum, or came to the region as a
result of several waves of migration from Samarqand, Bukhara, and other low-
land oases, after the fifteenth century. But also people from relatively poor
mountain regions such as Qarategin and Garm came to the valley, established
their own distinct villages and only gradually mixed with other Tajik groups
and the local Turkic populations (Gubayeva ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ﬀ.; Chvyr ￿￿￿￿, Finke
￿￿￿￿). Beside Tajiks Kyrgyz were also settling on the outskirts of the valley.
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From Siberia and adjacent areas of Mongolia and with the push of the west-
ern Mongolian Oyrats a group bearing the name Kyrgyz came to resettle in
Semirech’e. Later they moved further south towards Ferghana and Qarategin.
By the nineteenth century, these Kyrgyz had become subjects of the Khan of
Qoqand (Barthold [Hazai] ￿￿￿￿). With the Tarim Basin to the east there was
extensive contact into the nineteenth century, and a large proportion of the
contemporary dwellers descend from there. Other migrants arrived from re-
gions farther west, which had been conquered by the Tsarist Empire, and from
the Emirate of Bukhara. These movements continued into the early twentieth
century and contributed to the complicated ethnic mosaic of the present day
(Gubayeva ￿￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿).
Russians arrived in Qoqand in ￿￿￿￿ and soon took control of the whole
valley. Opposition and internal dissension here was stronger than in Bukhara.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries upheavals shook
Russian rule, the most famous of which was the so-called Andijon rebellion
(Babadzhanov ￿￿￿￿; Hisao ￿￿￿￿). In the region these events are proudly men-
tioned as a significant part of history, as a ‘national liberation movement’
(Critchlow ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿f.). Before complete Russian occupation, old internal
feuds in Qoqand broke out again in ￿￿￿￿ but this time not only the Khan but
also the Russian existence was aﬀected. For this reason, it lost its favourite
place among the central Asian khanates In ￿￿￿￿ Qoqand was annexed to Rus-
sian Turkistan as the Ferghana Oblast and thus lost its autonomy due to a
lack of domestic stability (Becker ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿). The short-lived autonomous
Qoqand Republic was brutally suppressed in ￿￿￿￿, not only the ordinary pop-
ulation suﬀered and many people lost their lives but also executions of political
and religious elites as in other parts of Central Asia happened on a large scale
(Critchlow ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿f.).
During the Soviet period, the valley was known for its religious activities,
as it had been in Tsarist times, and for many Western experts it was seen
as the nucleus of a mass movement against communist rule (Bennigsen and
Broxup ￿￿￿￿; Bennigsen and Wimbush ￿￿￿￿). At the same time, the valley
was home of many of the political and cultural elites. The strong economy
of the region and, as mentioned before, the highly appreciated local dialect is
some of the reasons. Although many members of the elite still originate from
the valley and the region has significant economic resources for the country,
in post independence context it is noticeable that the valley gained a new
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status. The political discourse, which is often related to the security and
stability of the country, is maintained and focused on Islamic fundamentalism
and border security, and in that context valley is the focus region. This made
its inhabitants look suspicious. I was told that especially young men do not
feel comfortable in Tashkent since during regular passport controls they are
asked and examined in detail (cf. chapter ￿).￿￿
During the national delimitation process of the ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s, the valley
was successively divided among three administrative units. The largest part
was attached to the new republic of Uzbekistan while Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan received the outer margins and much of the mountainous hinterland.
The Uzbek part of the valley has three provinces, Andijon, Ferghana and Na-
mangan. Kyrgyzstan has also three with Osh, Jalalabad and Batken, while
Tajikistan has one, today called Sughd. These provinces in each state contain
a large part of the population as well as of the fertile agricultural land. Al-
though especially in Uzbekistan the valley gives the impression of being more
urbanised still the rural population makes the significant part of it (cf. Buck-
nall ￿￿￿￿; Bichsel ￿￿￿￿). Coming from the valley and being from valley is an
identity expression. Being vodilik (from the valley) is not only a self-ascription
but also an external one. In Soviet times this also included the areas beyond
the border. People in Andijon still mention their close relationship and dur-
ing Soviet period their orientation was more towards the markets in Osh and
Jalalabad. But the closing of the borders has severely curtailed social relations
and aﬀected identification patterns.￿￿
As mentioned before, the Ferghana Valley was the most densely populated
part of the Soviet Union. Today, Namangan, Ferghana and Andijon together
are home to seven million people, which is almost thirty per cent of the popula-
tion of Uzbekistan. These provinces are also after Tashkent the second-, third-
and fourth-largest viloyat in the country. With a territory of ￿.￿ thousand sq.
km and a population of ￿.￿ million Andijon viloyat has the highest population
density in Uzbekistan with more than ￿￿￿ people per sq. km.￿￿ Andijon is
also after Tashkent and Samarqand the third biggest city in the country. It
￿￿ The Ferghana Valley has also been a major destination for field studies in post-Soviet
Central Asia (Abramson ￿￿￿￿; Zanca ￿￿￿￿; Rasanayagam ￿￿￿￿a, ￿￿￿￿b; Liu ￿￿￿￿; Megoran
￿￿￿￿; Reeves ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿ With the national delimitation process, three enclaves attached to Uzbekistan were
created in the Ferghana Valley. One is within the Kyrgyz territory; the other one is in
Tajik. After ￿￿￿￿ all of these areas are diﬃcult to reach (Reeves ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿ http://www.gov.uz/en/regional_authorities/￿￿￿￿ accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿
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is also one of the most industrialised regions of the country and recent state
investments have supported this in order to provide jobs to the large youth
segment considered to be potentially dangerous.
The vodi is widely identified as the ‘most Uzbek’ part of the country. The
local dialect is also the basis of the literature and highly praised for that. Sev-
eral Turkic groups are all summed up as Uzbek but Tajiks and Kyrgyz are kept
as diﬀerent category. In individual conversations people express themselves as
Turk, Qipchaq or Sart but the larger category Uzbek is the starting point. This
diﬀerentiation is based on a long history of co-existence and economic diﬀer-
entiation (as pastoralists versus agriculturalists) (cf. Zanca ￿￿￿￿, Finke ￿￿￿￿).
The term Turk is used for yet another category of Uzbeks. They call them-
selves and also referred by others as Turks (Gubayeva (￿￿￿￿). The Russians
are predominantly an urban population and have never settled in rural areas
in the valley (Gubayeva ￿￿￿￿). In contrast to Bukhara the Tajik population
is spread and forms no strongholds, settling in both rural and smaller urban
spots. The neighbouring provinces of Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan have
both a significant urban Uzbek population. The Kyrgyz settle more towards
the mountains.
Marxamat District
Within the valley, the major part of the research was conducted in the tuman
of Marxamat. It is located in the south-west of Andijon viloyat i, and has
borders with Ferghana viloyat and with Osh province of Kyrgyzstan. The
tuman was founded in ￿￿￿￿ and has ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ inhabitants living on a territory
of ￿￿￿ square kilometres. In the past Marxamat was unified with other districts
and in ￿￿￿￿ took the present form. The fact that the ￿￿￿￿ rebellion of Andijon
under Dukchi Ishon – according to Hisao one of the most significant events in
Russian Turkistan history (￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿) – had Marxamat as its centre, make
the residents proud of their resistance to Russians.￿￿ After this event the place
was repopulated by European settlers and accordingly named Russkoye Selo,
the ‘Russian village’. It was eventually renamed Marxamat (‘grace’), referring
to ‘the grace of the Tsar for the muzhiks [the Russian peasants]’ (Hisao ￿￿￿￿:
￿￿).
￿￿ The influence of Dukchi Ishan according to Hisao was not limited to the sedentary
population but also Kyrgyz were among his followers. It may also be mentioned that Dukchi
Ishan was a disciple of the Naqshbandiya order (which has its roots in Bukhara).
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The city of Marxamat is the administrative centre of the tuman, with some
￿￿,￿￿￿ inhabitants.￿￿ It is located approximately ￿￿ km south of the provin-
cial capital of Andijon. There are five rural communities and the semi-urban
settlement, the shaxarcha of Polvontosh with ￿,￿￿￿ inhabitants. All these ad-
ministrative units together contain forty-four mahalla, which, in contrast to
the Bukhara case, is a significant and noticeable institution also in the rural
areas of the valley. Within the selsoviet of Shukurmergen where most of the
research took place, there are two kolkhozes. Pakhtakor is made up of four
villages and the second one, Mashal, includes seven villages.
Oﬃcially, Uzbeks make slightly more than fifty per cent; about thirty-eight
per cent of the population are Tajiks while Kyrgyz as majority is also to find in
two mahalla. Both groups also live in other selsoviet within Marxamat tumani.
Not diﬀerent than in other places in Uzbekistan, Marxamat tuman oﬃcials
were proud of its multiethnic population and according to the xokimiyat more
than ￿￿ groups were living here, among them Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Koreans,
Ukrainians, Uygur, Azerbayjan and Russians. Nobody was able to count more
than these names and it took a while to remember if there were any other, but
the number of ethnic groups was more important than with how many people
this group is represented not unsimilar to the Bukhara case. In Marxamat,
however, in spite of the large number of Tajiks no school in this language
operated. There was only one Russian school in the centre, and one Kyrgyz
in Paxtakor out of ￿￿ schools.
Geographical and environmental conditions allowed not only farming in the
region but also livestock rearing was possible. The local Turks and Qipchaqs
have been engaged in this for centuries. The Soviet period brought fundamen-
tal changes to Marxamat as well. Many villages were reorganized, united or
completely removed. In the late ￿￿￿￿s there were many attempts to improve
the performance in agriculture but also to improve the infrastructure in the
densely populated region. At the heart of this mechanization and moderniza-
tion was also a huge irrigation project. In ￿￿￿￿, the Great Ferghana Canal
project was realised as a “long standing dream of Tsarist and Soviet engineers
(Thurman ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). Ferghana Valley with its more urban character has regu-
lar private minibuses, which operate more often than in Bukhara and regularly
run along the main street connecting the villages with the centre. Diﬀerent
than in Bukhara where the villages were founded within the inner oasis, in
￿￿ http://www.andijan.uz/UZB/xokimliklar/marhamat.shtml accessed: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿
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the valley most of the old settlements were scattered on the landscape. My
older informants were telling me that dispersed many small hamlets were uni-
fied only after ￿￿￿￿. The main reason for that was to make it easier to bring
development to the region like gas, electricity and water, which were available
along the main street. At that time ￿￿-￿￿ houses were often making up one
village. The merging of villages along a main street does give a somehow ur-
ban character to these settlements. Besides the main street unpaved roads and
mud in winter give another picture.
Existence and dominance of mahalla was clearly noticeable and formal-
ized my stay more than in Bukhara. These oﬃcial administrative units are
called mahalla fukarolar yigini, each of which employs several oﬃcials receiv-
ing salaries from the state (cf. chapter ￿). This had been the case already in
Soviet times but since then the mahalla took over other duties and its formal-
ization has increased (Massicard and Trevisani ￿￿￿￿; Sievers ￿￿￿￿). Another
peculiar issue is that the national border divided some of the settlements by
running through the garden or sometimes in the middle of a street. Families
were thus separated via “new “borders which did not play a role in daily life of
people during the Soviet period. The village of Yukori Rovot, for example, had
established a ‘colony’ settlement within Kyrgyzstan just a few hundred meters
away. Now, sons for whom during Soviet times no space had been left within
the village to build their house find themselves living on the other side of the
border. In another case the graveyard of one village remained in Kyrgyzstan.
￿￿

Chapter ￿
Changes in Property Rights
￿.￿ Introduction
Rural life in Uzbekistan is a peculiar mix of continuity and change in which the
actors develop their own strategies and seek solutions in these mixed structures.
Independence has opened up new chances and opportunities for some people
while excluding many others from access to necessary resources. Agriculture
is at the core of this. Especially the cash crop cotton has been the main
source of state revenue, as well as an income source for many Uzbeks. Arable
land is thus the key variable in Uzbekistan’s political economy and for the
people who depend on it. Beside that, water is a scarce resource and Uzbek
agriculture is heavily dependent on it. Water rights in this situation are of
outmost importance, maybe as significant as land rights.
What occurred in neighbouring countries, especially in Kazakstan and Kyr-
gyzstan, in relation to privatization was not the case in Uzbekistan. In the
agricultural sector, distribution or flexible long term leasing of land to for-
mer kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers did not happen. Land is a taboo object
in Uzbekistan; it cannot be “privatized, sold, mortgaged, given away as a
gift or exchanged“ (Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Therefore, in the Uzbekistan con-
text terms like privatization or de-collectivization could be misleading since
kolkhoz-similar structures continue to exist under Uzbek names (Ilkhamov
￿￿￿￿). These changes did not introduce private landownership or an end to
the planned economy.
The control of the land is thus under state monopoly but at the same time
the state must allow some possibilities without actually transferring ownership
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rights. In Uzbekistan land is not privatized but only personalized to a certain
extent. After independence, the agricultural sector was reorganized with diﬀer-
ent decrees, laws and resolutions. Today, diﬀerent forms of production units,
the renamed collective farms, semi-independent farmers with leased land and
household smallholders coexist, yet fulfil diﬀerent purposes ranging from cash
crop cotton production to private production for one’s self. Ilkhamov (￿￿￿￿:
￿￿￿-￿￿￿) thus described Uzbekistan’s rural economy as a “three-tiered” one (see
also Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). People can only enjoy quasi landownership in the
form of semi-private plots. While a fermer may register the land in his name
and be responsible for it, neither the land nor the end product is actually pri-
vatized. Actually, the semi-private plots, the dehqon farms, are the smallest
production units in agriculture but at the same time the most independent
one in comparison to other forms of production. Self-suﬃciency is the basic
principle and household plots can be used lifelong for this purpose.
This chapter aims to explain the agricultural developments in Uzbekistan’s
countryside with a focus on changes in property rights regimes. These were
accompanied by social transformations, which significantly reshaped the lives
of people. Starting with a brief look into the socialist period, the chapter intro-
duces the three major forms of property rights in arable land, and concluding
with a look at water rights. All these carry traces of the Soviet past. Follow
up economic institutions work almost as uncompromised parts of socialist plan
economy. In practice, the post-Soviet Uzbek economy continues to function
similarly to how it did during the Soviet period: depending on cotton export
revenues with a high grade state monopoly over agricultural land and decision
making processes, which are run and designed according to Tashkent’s decrees.
The implemented changes must be seen as a forced move in order to maintain
the cash crop cotton rather than as a real intention of change on the side of
the government.
￿.￿ Collectivisation and the Socialist Organisa-
tion of Agriculture
Stalin’s collectivization program in the late ￿￿￿￿s lead to collectivization being
implemented with full vigour. The confiscation of property combined with the
insuﬃciency of new structures such as collective farms led to famine and the
￿￿
Economic and Social Change in Uzbekistan
death of huge numbers of people in some places, mainly in pastoral regions like
Kazakstan (Olcott ￿￿￿￿).￿ For the sedentary population, collectivization was
less brutal because of agriculture’s importance to the economy, but it did not
prevent the deportation of many wealthy peasants labelled as kulaks (Fierman
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿f.).￿ Kenez sees that “[F]orcing the peasants to give up their way of
life was a turning point in Soviet history” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿).
In Uzbekistan, collectivization began during the late ￿￿￿￿s following the
￿￿￿￿ land reform. During that period, large landowners had been allowed to
keep a certain amount of land and the rest of it was redistributed. Accord-
ing to Kamp and Zanca, it often occurred that not only landless peasants
got land, but also people who already had small pieces of land and this usu-
ally became the private holdings of these individual farmers (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). This
period is described by the authors as one, in which kulaks or boi (uz. rich
man) were not always arrested and exiled. Some were allowed to live and work
on their remaining land. O’Neill describes land confiscations in the ￿￿￿￿s, in
which for instance farms of over ￿￿￿ acres in the Ferghana viloyat were totally
confiscated, and those between ￿￿ to ￿￿￿ acres were partially confiscated. Ac-
cording to statistics “across the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), some
￿￿￿,￿￿￿ acres of land were redistributed to ￿￿,￿￿￿ households, ‘adversely af-
fecting’ ￿￿,￿￿￿ households. A further ￿￿,￿￿￿ households received land in ￿￿￿￿,
by which time a total of ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ hectares had been redistributed” (O’Neill
￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
Land dispossession of kulaks continued, however, and rather than redis-
tributing it, new collective farms were established (Khan & Ghai ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿,
Spoor ￿￿￿￿:￿). Cotton producing regions were collectivized earlier than grain
producing and livestock raising regions. Kamp and Zanca mention ￿￿ to ￿￿ re-
gions in the Ferghana, Tashkent and Samarqand oblast, which experienced the
first wave of collectivization (Kamp & Zanca ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). By the late ￿￿￿￿’s, grain
growing regions, pastures, orchards and vineyards were under the collective
system. In ￿￿￿￿, collectivization concerned ￿￿.￿ per cent of rural households
in Uzbekistan, which was above the average of the USSR as a whole (O’Neill
￿￿￿￿:￿￿). At the end of ￿￿￿￿, almost ￿￿ per cent of all rural households became
￿ see also Robert Conquest’s book “ The Harvest of Sorrow” (￿￿￿￿), which provides more
detailed information about this period, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿.
￿ For the labour camp system under the NKVD (State security police ￿￿￿￿-￿￿) see Fitz-
patrick (￿￿￿￿). According to Bolsheviks tripartite classification kulaks were regarded as
exploiters and proto-capitalists. The other categories were poor and middle peasants.
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a part of the then ￿,￿￿￿ kolkhozes and ￿￿ sovkhozes in Uzbekistan (Kandiyoti
￿￿￿￿:￿). Until ￿￿￿￿, the kolkhoz and sovkhoz system determined the produc-
tion units of the Uzbek economy. In that year, around ￿,￿￿￿ sovkhozes and
￿￿￿ kolkhozes were operating in Uzbekistan. According to Ilkhamov (￿￿￿￿),
in ￿￿￿￿ there were ￿￿￿ kolkhozes and ￿,￿￿￿ sovkhozes in Uzbekistan.
Most of my interlocutors who were able to tell me about the past, gave the
year ￿￿￿￿ as that of the beginning of eﬀective collectivization in Uzbekistan. In
both regions, Bukhara and Andijon, I was told that well-oﬀ families were either
completely or partially deported, or shot. There were, however, amazingly few
comments concerning this period. People would or could not remember any
details or did not want to talk on it. For most of them it seemed like a history
of which they had heard from their fathers and grandfathers and that had no
relation to their own lives. It corresponds to the lack of genealogical knowledge
and interest that I will elaborate on in more detail later (cf. chapter ￿); the
past had little relevance for the presence. Even for older people, there was
not too much to recount about it besides land confiscation, famines and some
deported kulaks.
In the beginning, most kolkhozes and sovkhozes were very small consisting
of a few families or individual villages. However, in a short time they were
placed together and some of the kolkhozes were restructured as sovkhozes.
Nobody could tell me the reasoning behind the decision if a kolkhoz should
remain as that or be turned into a sovkhoz. They received names such as
“Marx” or “Engels”, “Lenin yoli” (the way of Lenin), “Ordzhonikidze” or “Shark
Yulduzu” („Star of the East“). Individual villages within the kolkhoz usually
formed brigades, which were named by numbers. Although after independence
kolkhozes got new names, village residents continue to use the earlier names
of the kolkhozes. Instead of village names, which were traditionally in Uzbek
or Tajik, people usually use kolkhoz and sovkhoz names saying, “today, there
is a wedding feast in Engels” or “they have a daughter-in-law from Marx”.
In the case of Chilongu, almost ten separate kolkhozes existed, each more
or less equivalent to one village, during the ￿￿￿￿s. They were later successively
amalgamated and finally united into one kolkhoz, named “Karl Marx”. Sim-
ilar developments aﬀected the neighbouring villages as well. The area to the
Northwest, which today forms one larger administrative unit with Chilongu,
was consolidated into one large kolkhoz as well, bearing the name of Friedrich
Engels. In Marxamat, one interview partner who was born in ￿￿￿￿ told me
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that in the ￿￿’s there were eight kolkhozes. After the war, more kolkhozes were
established and from the mid ￿￿’s and ￿￿’s on, they were put together, estab-
lishing a larger one also named “Karl Marx”. From then on cotton cultivation
also increased. Many people recalled that mechanisation started only after
World War II. This was also the period when the construction of Ferghana
Canal system provided water to new territories.￿
With the creation of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, control over production and
consumption was increasingly transferred to the state. The idea behind this
was that the communists wanted to turn agriculture into a branch of indus-
try, so that the peasants would cease to be property owners and become wage
earners. The same happened to other forms of property. In end of ￿￿￿￿, there
was no private ownership of tractors. The necessary technical equipment of
the farms was concentrated in the MTS (Machine Tractor Station) and they
supported the farms with technical equipment (Kenez ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).￿ Sovkhozes
were the preferred form of organization, which should contribute to the na-
tional economy with significant outputs. For this purpose, the size of land
under sovkhoz cultivation increased in the USSR. While in ￿￿￿￿ the sovkhoz-
sown area was ￿.￿ percent of the entire land, in ￿￿￿￿ it reached ￿￿.￿ percent
(Kornai ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).￿
In my field sites kolkhozes were the major form of rural enterprises. Humphrey
(￿￿￿￿) argues that the historical distinction between state farms and collective
farms gradually ceased to exist while the former “emerged on the basis of the
estates of large landowner” and labour paid by wages. In this case the state
became the landowner. Collective farms oﬃcially worked as cooperation of
many small peasant farms based on family labour. She also sees the individual
farming tasks as more decisive in the lives of rural workers than whether they
￿ The Great Ferghana Canal (which brought water from the Syr Darya) was constructed
in ￿￿￿￿ by the employment of “￿￿￿,￿￿￿ Uzbeks, ￿￿,￿￿￿ Tajiks, and about ￿,￿￿￿ supervising
engineers and technicians, presumably Russians, who finished the construction of this ￿￿￿-
mile long canal in forty-five days” (Matley, ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). Through that more land was put
under cotton cultivation. In ￿￿￿￿, additional small canals were dug.
￿ Kornai describes the MTS role in the Soviet Union as following „. . . it rented out larges
pieces of machinery (such as tractors and combine harvesters) to the cooperatives. For a
long time the cooperatives did not even have the right to purchase larger machines, because
ownership of them was monopolized by the state machine tractor stations. This further
increased the cooperatives’ dependence on the “openly” state-owned sector” (Kornai ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
￿ Humphrey for the year ￿￿￿￿ gives the number of the collective farms as ￿￿,￿￿￿ (except
fishing collectives) and that of state farms as ￿￿,￿￿￿. She also discusses in her work the
low eﬃciency of state farms and within time the increasing dependency from state inputs of
collective farms (￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿).
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worked in a sovkhoz or kolkhoz, although state farms as state property were
considered as superior and closer to communism. From an administrative as-
pect, kolkhozes were more regional than sovkhozes, which were directly linked
to the Ministry of Agriculture. While state farms oﬀered a guaranteed basic
wage and other benefits for the workers, collective farm wages depended on
the collective’s performance (awards in case of success) (ibid: ￿￿). Again, in
practice this diﬀerence was not as clear. It was interesting that when people
recounted the past there seemed to be an indiﬀerence towards whether some-
body had worked in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz since there was not a significant
diﬀerence in respect to life quality. The workload was the more decisive and
remembered aspect and not the type of farm in which one worked.
Irrespective of the organizational form, the production in general was firmly
integrated into a centrally planned economy. Plans and quotas determined the
production. The necessary resources for the production, from seeds to technical
equipment, were provided by the state (Kornai ￿￿￿￿; Humphrey ￿￿￿￿). This
“provider” role of the state in almost every sphere of life was an aspect, which
was very often mentioned as to “what was good during the Soviet period” and
what is missed in the present. As a production unit it must also be considered
that most of the members of the kolkhoz were the workers who were organized
in brigades. The rest of the labour force consisted of accountants, engineer
economists, and of course the head of the kolkhoz, the rais.
Expansion of agricultural production was a key concern for Soviet policy
makers. In Bukhara this was achieved by simply putting more land under cot-
ton cultivation. This was taken from surrounding desert areas in the Qizil-Qum
were some Kazak and Turkmen nomads contributed to the economy through
livestock products. In the ￿￿￿￿’s and ￿￿￿￿’s large irrigation canals were con-
structed. For instance, the ￿￿￿-mile long Qara-Qum Canal (channelling water
from the Amu Darya) brought water to the deserts of Turkmenistan and west-
ern Uzbekistan and significantly increased the cotton-cultivated area (Spoor
￿￿￿￿:￿, ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿, Matley ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). I will mention the ecological consequences
of this in the following chapter four.
Similar in Marxamat, especially in the ￿￿’s there was a land-gaining policy,
which saw the expanding of fields towards the mountain slopes and foothills
(atir). This expansion was at the cost of the livestock as it aﬀected the areas
in which they grazed. At the same time, steppes were also connected to cul-
tivation lands via irrigation canals as a part of land gaining program. Again,
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livestock lost pastureland in the name of cotton fields. Besides the demand for
cotton, population increase was another pressure factor leading to the open-
ing of new lands or to conversion for diﬀerent uses. In the Marxamat region,
livestock were sent to graze towards Kyrgyzstan to the Alay-Mountains as an
alternative. The conditions there satisfied the needs of livestock and the border
with Kyrgyzstan at that time did not play a role as it later would.
Collective farms of all types had failures despite all investments in them.
State farms were often even less eﬃcient than collective farms since the former
necessitated technical equipment and agricultural knowledge that the country
did not possess at that time. In sovkhozes work motivation was less than
in kolkhozes since the state paid the wages even if production targets were
failed in contrast to the kolkhozes (Kenez ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿). The problem of low
agricultural output was not specific to Uzbekistan but was embedded in the
overall command economy and its structures. Awards, nominations and other
means were not successful enough to create incentives in order to change this
situation (Humphrey ￿￿￿￿, Khan and Ghai ￿￿￿￿). Other well-documented
problems occurred as in all socialist systems. On the one hand, state inputs
did not always arrive in total or in time and therefore production targets
could not be met; related with that was the frequent complaint of a shortage
of labour. At the same time, the system provided incentives for kolkhozcu as
well as oﬃcials to defect. The appropriation of collective goods and hoarding
was not unusual as exemplified by the mentioned cotton scandal in the ￿￿￿￿s
(see also Kornai ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿, Verdery ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿).
￿.￿ The Founding of Shirkat : from Engels to
Guliston
The past reforms in agriculture, which focused on land and water rights were
aimed to establish socialized agriculture and production by all means. The
collective farm system in the USSR remained untouched between ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿, when the first changes occurred with perestroika. Without transform-
ing the existing property forms, i.e. introduction of private property, some
changes became inevitable. Farm eﬃciency and food production needed to
be increased, so Gorbachov’s reform initiative came to Uzbekistan in ￿￿￿￿
(Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿:￿￿; Schoeller-Schletter ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
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With the demise of the Soviet Union the Uzbek government started to re-
form agricultural structures, mainly, as aforementioned, in concern to names,
while collective or state enterprises were not actually disbanded. Sovkhozes
were the first to be changed. During the ￿￿’s, they were transformed into
kolkhozes and within time they took the form of other economic units such as
shirkat, private livestock farms or rental enterprises (Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿). Sovkhozes
were seen as being a burden to the state budget, not only because of the
wage payments of a large work force but also because of their dependence on
large amounts of capital and complementary resources. As mentioned earlier,
sovkhoz workers received their fix salary while kolkhoz wages were related to
the earnings of the kolkhoz as production unit. The transformation and renam-
ing of collective and state farms of the past into shirkat￿, fermerler uyushmasi￿
or jamoat xo’jaligi￿ helped to secure the new independence in the early years
and produce acceptance of the diﬃculties of this period with the expectation
that things will change in the future. Thus kolkhoz Engels became shirkat
Gulistan (uz. Land of the flowers).
Ilkhamov points out that at the end of the ￿￿￿￿’s, kolkhozes as production
units kept their dominant role, with more than half of the irrigated agricultural
land being under kolkhoz control. He also argues that the post-independence
reforms did not really touch the kolkhozes. Their direct dependence on the
government resources and control was left unchanged. The creation of tenant
farmers who were tightly connected to the kolkhoz in their production process
was presented as part of market economy and reforms. But the economic inde-
pendence of kolkhozes did not reach beyond the marketing of fruits, vegetables
and meat. Dairy products as well as cotton and wheat were taboo in that re-
spect and were cultivated under state planning on ￿￿ per cent of all arable
land (Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿-￿￿￿). Strong state control over agriculture and land
brought people to seek solutions similar to the Soviet period.
In the following part I will describe the operation of post independence
￿ Ilkhamov translates shirkat as cooperatives. He describes them using the following
words: “In practice, the concept of shirkat is applied to agricultural cooperatives or collective
enterprises created on the basis of one of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz divisions as they (kolkhozes
and sovkhozes) were being transformed into smaller structural units. In such cases shirkat
unite several former brigades which used to work within a certain division before the break-
up” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿) (emphasizes in original).
￿ Association of peasant fermer
￿ The term jamoat xo’jaligi corresponds like shirkat to the formal kolkhoz territory as
a cultivated land unit. Trevisani uses both shirkat and jamoat xo’jaligi as „ joint stock
enterprise“ (￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
￿￿
Economic and Social Change in Uzbekistan
production units under their Uzbek names. These names are placed at the
entrances to the provinces, districts and villages, and people have started to
be welcomed with these new names: “Welcome to Gulistan jamoat xo’jaligi ”.
Cotton cone carved out of gypsum consolidate this picture. When asked what
the diﬀerence between shirkat and jamoat xo’jaligi or, in fact, the diﬀerence
between shirkat and kolkhoz is, the answer was always: “the name has changed,
otherwise nothing” or “there were some changes but not significant ones”.
Two reasons were behind the idea of the transformation of the kolkhozes and
sovkhozes to shirkat. One of the reasons, eﬃciency, was not a new problem and
building smaller production units like those in the perestroika period aimed to
overcome that. The other reason was a post independence necessity. Ilkhamov
argues that after independence kolkhozes and sovkhozes were seen not as a
reflection of the reality but as remnants of the Soviet past which deserved no
place in the new organization of the economy. He cites Karimov with these
words:
“Both concepts (kolkhoz and sovkhoz) are remains of the Soviet epoch.
And these concepts do not fit into our life of today, do not reflect our
new reality, our national pride. Today there is a need to organize the
economy on the basis of absolutely new beginning that is practiced in
all civilized countries. I think, it will be appropriate to give names to
the enterprises transformed on the shareholding basis in accordance with
their essence-agricultural shirkat or agricultural cooperative” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
The existence of the kolkhoz under the new name of shirkat, with the
necessary adjustments and arrangements, started to shape the agricultural
landscape after the abolition of state farms. The kolkhoz remained as a roof
organization and provider, as well as a controller and issuer of procurement
contracts. What was new was that new types of employment were established
allowing families to work on kolkhoz land under a kolkhoz roof with kolkhoz
rules. The aim was to create more incentive for the producers while at the
same time giving more responsibility to them.
The conversion of agricultural cooperatives from kolkhozes and sovkhozes
into shirkat occurred in ￿￿￿￿. As agricultural cooperatives, shirkat got land
from the state and in turn were able to lease land to their members. Land
use was limited to the initially indicated purpose and was excluded from pri-
vatization, sale and exchange. Depending on performance, the land size could
be increased or seized. It was also possible to provide land for cooperative
￿￿
sancak
members as dehqon or farmer household enterprises – a step which would later
make up another form of agricultural production units. By contract and for
a limited time, families were able to get land from the shirkat for their own
use and without any transfer rights for a minimum of five years with the op-
tion of an extension. Families replaced brigades as producers and were tied to
individual contract agreements with the shirkat.
For instance, in Marxamat after the wheat harvest a kolkhozcu got five sot
land allotted to him to use for his own needs.￿ But in order to get this piece of
land he or she worked during the cultivation period on shirkat land according
to the shirkat ’s plan. Such a person is called pudratchi.￿￿ As a work unit, a
family was in charge of maximally one-hectare land.￿￿ I was told that this kind
of internal land allocation to families started only in the early ￿￿￿￿s. While
the whole process is administered by the shirkat, a main pudratchi makes the
contract with the shirkat. But numbers or statistics for that were not available.
As an example I was told that in one brigade in Marxamat ￿￿ members are
responsible for ￿￿-hectares of land. One person is the main pudratchi, six
were responsible for irrigation, one is the tractor driver, one the driver, four
are reserve pool employee, who also preformed some service job like cooking
or guarding the fields, and one tabelchi￿￿ who is responsible for planning and
collecting the picked cotton. The others, called pudratchi, were responsible for
a certain amount of land and in case of crop loss they too would carry the
consequences. For this job the payment was not mainly in money but rather
in products such as wheat or cotton oil.
In this brigade, ￿￿ hectares was reserved for cotton and ￿￿ for wheat. I was
told that last time the cotton plan was not fulfilled but there was a surplus
of wheat. This meant that, according to the agreement with the shirkat, the
brigade could keep the surplus wheat. But, in fact the chief of the shirkat
kept the rest of the wheat and bought cotton in order to fulfil the plan; at the
end he could claim a success when confronted by his superior. According to
the agreement with the shirkat, the salary for cotton pudratchi for ten months
￿ One sot is ￿￿￿m￿ (from the Russian word sto, hundred)
￿￿ Podryad is a Russian word, which means contract. Pudratchi with the Uzbek suﬃx
–chi means contractor.
￿￿ Trevisani mentions about ￿-￿￿ hectares as average pudrat size for his field site Khorezm.
He argues that the size depends on the family’s work capacity (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). I would, however,
argue that overall availability of land is at least as important a factor since Ferghana Valley
has a diﬀerent demographic structure than in Khorezm.
￿￿ From Russian word tabelschik, table/schedule maker
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work was ￿￿-￿￿,￿￿￿ sum; for wheat ￿￿-￿￿,￿￿￿ sum was paid for eight months
work. Cotton is more labour intensive. Therefore the division of labour within
the brigade or the distribution of people for certain tasks is diﬀerent than in
wheat brigades. For instance, much more people are needed for irrigation in
the case of cotton.
Of course the only decisive factor in this engagement is that the pudratchi
fulfils the plan and delivers the amount that is required by contract. The
kolkhoz pays the procurement price for the plan and any surplus left after the
quota has been filled can be kept and sold. Shirkat makes the contract with
the family (a member of the household) and depending on the family’s labour
force and availability the land is given for pudrat. The working hours must
correspond to the salary, which is usually not paid in cash but in products.
In general, while the shirkat accompanies the whole production process,
the contractor family is expected to do their best in regards to the quality
and the quantity of the product. From the family’s perspective, it is indeed a
fragile situation because the contract could be ended due to “bad quality” or
“too little” quantity anytime. Since pudratchi are at the bottom of the ladder
they are the first and easiest to punish. For the shirkat, the termination of the
contract with the pudratchi is hardly diﬃcult and since all local households,
with the exception of teachers and doctors, are members of the shirkat, there
is a labour force making a single household easily replaceable.
At the same time, the xokimiyat’s power over shirkat is indisputable in
every respect. One step down, the shirkat rais executes his power within
the shirkat while having many workers who are dependent on him – not only
his staﬀ but also pudratchi. The shirkat ’s accountant is also an important
person who works very close with the rais. The shirkat and the xokimiyat are
continuously in a mutual bargaining and dependency relationship.
In the view of Ilkhamov the existing system is no diﬀerent than that of
the Soviet period since the revenues made do not cover the expenses due to
the existing structures and further existence of collective farms. According
to him, although keeping kolkhozes alive was ineﬃcient, it was seen as the
only possible solution for reaching the necessary cotton and wheat output and
also for absorbing a large amount of the rural labour force (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿-￿￿). It
should be considered that huge amount of expenses were economized through
the poor salaries of the kolkhozcu.
Shoeller-Schletter describes this type of production in an agricultural co-
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operative as “planned economy by contract” since the contract obligations of
the family are assigned beforehand and the purchase price of the produce is
also predefined (￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿). The cotton gins, as an important part of the
post-production stage, stayed under state control just as the cotton export is
a state aﬀair. The machinery and technical support, which was regulated by
M. T. S’s (Machine Tractor Stations), remained untouched as a separate unit
and continued to serve the plan fulfilment. Inputs for the fields as well as
outputs from the fields were also under state control and plan. The point is
that the costs of the inputs were calculated according to market prices while
the output was paid far below that, which in the end was a very good deal
for the government not for the producers. The diﬀerence between the cotton
procurement price and the international market price is the profit of the Uzbek
government, regardless if the production unit is a shirkat or a fermer.
The kolkhoz or shirkat of today is thus purely an economic institution. It
does not exist as a ‘total institution’ (Humphrey ￿￿￿￿) anymore. The revenues
from cotton are not invested at an institutional level, which would make it
possible for kolkhozcu to get further benefits such as health care or vacation, as
was the case in the Soviet period. People talked about the kolkhoz and kolkhoz
fields in an indiﬀerent tone and implied that they were not directly relevant
for their existence. One’s own plot, however, which stands for “self suﬃciency”
does seem to have emotional roots. The private plots and the kolkhoz fields
are two pairs of shoes and the above-mentioned indiﬀerence towards the latter
has increased after independence.
“Soft budget constraints” are generally described as one of the main char-
acteristics of the socialist economy (Kornai ￿￿￿￿). In the year ￿￿￿￿, these still
existed in Uzbekistan leading to debts being written oﬀ in order to avoid a
potential bankruptcy of the cooperative farms – something the private farms
did not need (ECSSD ￿￿￿￿:￿-￿). Besides these debts being written oﬀ, other
subsidies, for example in the irrigation system, also showed continuing traces
of the past, resulting in similar problems of hoarding and padding. Rather
than the actual production, the input norms and output targets continued to
determine the subsidies. This creates no incentive to produce more or cheaper
than the government wants. On the contrary, it allows subsidies to flow to
other crops (ECSSD ￿￿￿￿:￿). In the end, the state supported this because it,
and not the average citizen, profited from the existing structures.
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￿.￿ Fermer : Privatising the Uzbek Way
These changes, however, did not prove to be of much help for the national
economy. The Welfare Improvement Strategy of Uzbekistan (￿￿￿￿) admits
the slow reform pace in the agricultural sector especially up until ￿￿￿￿. The
replacement of kolkhozes with shirkat did not bring the expected eﬃciency
and according to the oﬃcial data “the number of loss making shirkat was as
high as ￿￿% of the total” (Full Strategy Paper For ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
Since perestroika, the development of initiatives in the agricultural sector
was a topic. Besides cotton and cereal-farming shirkat, fruit and vegetable
producing ones were also aﬀected in this process. While the state is the owner
of the land, leasing became possible in diﬀerent forms. An expansion of “pri-
vate” access to land was one of the possible solutions to solve the eﬃciency
problem. For instance, the restructuring of a collective farm, which allows for
the “leasing” of some land and the contracting of state-grown production was
seen as a possible solution to the problem. Allowing more independence in the
farming sector was also seen as one of the possibilities.
In that respect, the Uzbek government introduced the option for individuals
to leave collective enterprises and establish “private” farms. These leasehold
farms and their registered leaser, fermer, were supposed to become the new
rural entrepreneurs. Fermer lands were originally kolkhoz or later shirkat
lands and after their restructuring and liquidation, they were given to fermer
enterprises. The purpose of the farm is written in the farm charter: these may
be animal stock, cotton and grain farming, wine or vegetables. Depending on
the farm type, there are certain regulations, e.g. as to the number of animals
corresponding to the size of the land (Schoeller-Schletter ￿￿￿￿).
Providing private access to land in the form of leasing is perhaps the largest
step in the privatization process in Uzbekistan so far. Moving from the uneco-
nomical shirkat to private farming was one of the government’s major agricul-
tural objectives for the years between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿. Thus, the change was
made in order to increase the revenues from the agricultural sector by creating
incentives for profit maximization. On the other hand, a reform in the con-
trol sphere and transparency of input-output levels did not accompany these
changes. According to my informants, fermer were seen as the replacement
of shirkat in the coming future since, ideally, shirkat are supposed to disap-
pear, while fermer units are expected to stabilize within time. This view was
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the one propagated in the oﬃcial discourse of the Uzbek government in the
rural parts of the country. During my research, however, many people were,
for a number of reasons, not convinced, nor did they see it as a particularly
attractive option.
These and other laws on land, tax, land and water use, on livestock etc.
were passed since the beginning of the ￿￿￿￿s but only in ￿￿￿￿ were recogniz-
able changes introduced through the law on the Agricultural Cooperative, the
shirkat, the law on the fermer Enterprises, and the Law on dehqon Enterprises
(Schoeller-Schetter ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). The numbers and size of fermer holdings contin-
uously increased throughout the years, but there were regional discrepancies
within Uzbekistan. Supposed to become the nucleus for mid- to large-scale
farming following western paradigms, fermer would typically receive between
￿￿ and ￿￿ hectares, although some received more. As a result of govern-
ment reforms, “. . . as of January ￿, ￿￿￿￿, the total number of active farms in
￿￿￿￿ was ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ against ￿￿,￿￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿. Private farms delivered ￿￿,￿% of
raw cotton and ￿￿% of grain and they produced more than ￿￿% of the gross
agricultural output. The average land endowment per farm is ￿￿.￿ hectares”
(Welfare Improvement Strategy of Uzbekistan ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿; Full Strategy Paper
For ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
My two field sites showed rather diﬀerent facets of rural Uzbekistan in
relation to land reforms or lack thereof. During my stay fermer and shirkat
existed in the Bukhara viloyat at the same time. Yet in the coming future,
fermer were to replace shirkat. Romitan tumani in particular was one of
the first in Uzbekistan to start a radical program of handing its entire land
into the hands of fermer. This already began in ￿￿￿￿ and by ￿￿￿￿ almost ￿￿
percent of the former kolkhoz land within the tuman was redistributed. It is
not clear to what degree this was a decision of the local level, which is what
a tuman governor suggested during an interview made. Given the general
attitude of the Uzbek government in this regard, however, one should expect
the president to have his word in this. This pioneer role of Romitan in the
establishment of fermer enterprises was explained by villagers as a success
and as the result of an initiative by the xokim. The reason he was able to do
such a thing was that he was simultaneously a member of the parliament in
Tashkent. Either his relations to Tashkent and his position there enabled him
to carry his initiative through or he was more obliged to fulfil the reforms –
something I am not able to answer and which may in fact be a mixture of both.
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According to information that I got from the xokimiyat, ￿￿￿ fermer enterprises
were established in the tuman. According to the village administrative council
of Chilongu, there were ￿￿￿ fermer all together, with ￿￿ being in Chilongu
proper, ￿￿ in Fayzi Kurbanov and nine honey fermer.
By contrast, in Andijon viloyat very little “privatisation” took place during
the first few years and shirkat were still the dominant and determining produc-
tion unit. Population density was seen as one of the obstacles to privatization
because it reduced the amount of land for the individual fermer. This argu-
ment seems to be in regard to the Andijon viloyat since I was informed that
more fermer were allowed in neighbouring Ferghana viloyat. People hoped that
in the coming years all shirkat land will be distributed to the fermer. However,
this wish is clouded by the high population density, which is mentioned again
and again by the xokimiyat as well as by villagers. For many people, alterna-
tive investments next to agriculture, such as in textiles or certain industries
may solve this problem.
“Here in Andijon, we have no fermer, in Quva in the Ferghana viloyat,
everything is given to fermer - up to ￿￿￿ hectares. People work for
fermer and also get paid. We get nothing here. Here we have approxi-
mately ten fermer, and they are all influential people; there is not one
kolkhozcu amongst them. Land should be distributed but if the land
were to be distributed here, maybe you would be able to get three or
four sot per head. That’s nothing; in Kyrgyzstan it is ￿￿ sot. On the
other hand, there is no other way. If there is not enough land, then land
must be gained from the desert.” (Akram)
But fermer are still obliged through contract to cultivate and to deliver
to the state according to central regulations. Land leasing in Uzbekistan does
not enjoy the same freedoms as in Kazakstan or Kyrgyzstan as the fermer is
not free to decide what to cultivate, how to cultivate, when to cultivate and
to whom to sell and at which price. He or she is involved in many agreements
with the state. The delivery obligations (quality and quantity) are compulsory
and fixed. If these are not met, and reasons were not accepted, the person is
punished or the land taken away.
As Schoeller-Schletter (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿) describes, according to the “Art.￿￿, Law
on Farms”, lease money is equivalent to property tax and the conditions of
production are defined in the contract. As stated in the law, land is only
leased and the user has no rights to it such as transfer, exchange or sublease
rights. He is not even allowed to decide what he wants to grow on the land.
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Since the enterprise is registered under the name of farmer, he carries the entire
responsibility of his farm - from funding to produce.
The independent juridical status of fermer gives them the right to open
their own bank account, which allows them to regulate their transactions re-
lated to their enterprise. This account is not really directly under the fermer ’s
control since he has to deal with lots of bureaucratic work. He does not have
access to his account whenever he wants to and in the end the account serves
a diﬀerent purpose than one might expect. Within the limited possibilities in
Uzbekistan this may be interpreted as freedom in that context. I was told that
a successful fermer needs first of all a good accountant (uz & russ. buxgalter)
as this is the person who has an overview of the financial issues. They control
and pass money from one instance to the other. What also happens is that in
the end more money is subtracted from the gain of the fermer and that his
account is not really opulent to draw money from. Besides the bank account,
having a pechat (stamp) completes his juridical status and shows his liability
for his obligations under his stamp. When non-fermer were asked about what
defines a fermer, they would occasionally answer in a sarcastic tone: “They
have their own bank account, and they have a stamp”.
Since the inputs for the fields come directly from state resources via the
local authorities a fermer does not get money paid to his account for the
seeds or fuel so he does not have deposit money that he can freely use. After
harvest, depending on the success of the fermer, his profit is calculated, and
then the expenditures are deducted from this gain and the left over sum of
money paid to his account. But in reality things often work diﬀerently. This
“having account at the bank” did not give the fermer the freedom to use this
money depending on their needs and plan.
Part of these inputs is the workers. Fermer had to take all the members
of the earlier brigade who worked that particular piece of land (but do not
necessarily pay them much of a salary). The number of close kin is considered
important as support for the success of fermer, as they count as reliable, willing
and ready to work. Not only do they profit themselves from the success of their
fermer relatives but it also allows them to be and stay part of an active kin
networks that open doors in times of need, such as concerning problems with
other bureaucratic levels or a bed at the hospital.
This point, “individual responsibility”, was often described as a part of
market economy, which was not present in the Soviet period, when everybody
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or nobody in the kolkhoz was responsible for the enterprise. Moving towards
individual responsibility was seen as part of a modern world in which the in-
dividual plays an important role. In the shirkat the liability of its members
stayed within the limits of their contribution to the cooperative, whereas in
fermer enterprises liability was clearly expanded away from collective and to-
wards individual risk.￿￿ Actually, handing the responsibility of production to
the individuals was seen as the key solution to old problems. Personal respon-
sibility instead of collective accountability was one of the major shifts from
the past. With the introduction of land leasing, the individual emerged as an
actor who was to carry the responsibility of the whole cultivation process. This
point was decisive for many people in regards to their economic and social sta-
tus – they were either bold or cautious when deciding on whether to engage in
fermer activity. Freedom of decision, on the contrary, was not mentioned as an
indicator of market economy. I think it is important to note that fermer never
used the word “private” (shahsi) for the leased lands, it was always referred
to as “registered under my name”. This expression points to the relationship
between land and fermer. However, owners of shops or tractors did use the
word shahsi, in order to indicate that he is the owner.
The procedure of establishing a fermer was described as follows: First, the
candidate must make an application to his selsoviet and present a number of
documents, his technical equipment, financial resources and available labour
power as basic requirements of establishing as a fermer. Another part of this
process is commission meetings and a series of communications among diﬀerent
bureaucratic levels ranging from the village administrative council to the tuman
xokimiyat. In theory, any member or non-member of the shirkat can apply and
this application will then also be reviewed by the shirkat rais. After checking
the labour and technical conditions, he then forwards it to the xokimiyat.
The commission in the xokimiyat then decides about the application. The
commission is made out of a chief of the bank, the deputy xokim and other
bureaucrats of the xokimiyat (land and water issues, cartography, economists,
agronomists etc). If the rais of the shirkat did not agree to the application, then
the applicant has the chance to go to the xokimiyat and negotiate his situation.
￿￿ Trevisani (￿￿￿￿) talks about “privatisation of risk” that fermer must face in the “pri-
vatisation” process. I would see it simply as a relocating of liability and those who engage in
fermer businesses usually consider it in advance. I think the use of the term privatization
is misguiding in the Uzbekistan agricultural context. But to be allowed to take the risk of
becoming a fermer is maybe the biggest privilege one can have in rural Uzbekistan.
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After the meetings and evaluations of the commission, it is then decided upon
whether the applicant gets land and on the size of it. In Marxamat, I was told
that village council is also involved. The village council provides information
on the potential fermer candidate in relation to his work records on his own
private plot. If he works eﬃciently then his application will be forwarded to
the xokimiyat.
While becoming, being and staying a fermer is not an easy thing, losing
the status is. If the contract crop is not cultivated or the land used for another
purpose, this can lead to an early end of a lease contract. Farm liquidation
can also happen due to other reasons that are not held in the contract but
may be even more important. If becoming a fermer depends on the xokim,
losing the land may also be his doing. Everything can be viewed as a con-
tempt of the contract. Many fermer either did not get their profits on time
or when they needed money from their account the bank had none to give
them. Sometimes it is helpful to bribe the bank chief in order to get money
from the account before other fermer get their money. Because of these delays
and obstacles fermer suﬀered lack of cash and could not pay their kolkhozcu
except in kind. There are fermer who have better access to their accounts and
get their payments depending on their networks in the local landscape. In this
sense, a good accountant, which one can trust in is essential. In Chilongu, out
of ￿￿ only ￿￿ were able to fulfil their target. Others had to pay a penalty (cf.
chapter ￿).
But if the whole cultivation process is accompanied with experts such as
engineers and agronomists, it is diﬃcult to imagine that somebody can fail
in the harvest process. And if only people with proven skills are eligible to
become fermer, it is diﬃcult to imagine that these people might fail. In reality,
most people that fail do so due to bureaucratic mechanisms. If a fermer does
not have enough resources to invest in these mechanisms, he may be able to
become a fermer, but there is a high probability that he is doomed from the
beginning. He will not get a good piece of land and soil of quality, he will not
have enough water for irrigation or not get the water in time, and the tractor
will probably not be available to him when he needs it.
No diﬀerent than in any other part of the world, the economic well-being of
people is strongly related to the location of the village. Availability of water,
quality of soil and the location of the fields are some of the determinants.
Some of the worst locations are in the desert zone. These are newly opened
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fields, which are not properly irrigated for lack of water. Fermer who got some
piece of land from “chul zonasi ” (“desert zone”) naturally suﬀer under these bad
conditions. If the land was allocated in the immediate vicinity of the desert
and the irrigation possibilities were limited, the obligatory minimum output
was less than other fermer whose land was not only of better quality but also
had better access to irrigation. So once again the kind of crop and amount
that is to be cultivated is predetermined.
This was more often used by livestock fermer. In the mid ￿￿’s “large state-
owned livestock complexes were privatized and broken up, the number of cat-
tle in enterprises decreased, while the number in rural households increased
sharply” (Lerman ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). In Bukhara the there were four livestock fer-
mer with each about ￿￿￿ animals (mainly sheep). During the Soviet time
each brigade had about ￿￿￿￿ animals. This expansion towards the desert was
manageable compared to the problems people were confronted with in Fer-
ghana Valley. During the Soviet time, livestock was moved to the mountains
in Kyrgyzstan. This option is no longer possible and livestock has started to
be transported to other regions in Uzbekistan.
So, who became a fermer? The usual answer started as “whoever wanted”,
followed by remarks like ”those who have the ability to work it”. Allegedly,
being experienced in agriculture and having enough labour force are the first
necessary criteria. But these were not diﬃcult to find in a rural area where
everyone had been doing this work for many years. Moreover, every step of the
planting and harvesting is determined from top down, which does not leave
much space for individual skills. Still, experience in agriculture is not only held
in the law on farms “(Art. ￿, Law on Farms)” as a necessary criteria but is also
continuously mentioned in the xokimiyat and by numerous people, especially
at the beginning of my field work, as a decisive criteria. Interestingly enough,
the minimum financial investment by the fermer is defined in “Art.￿ and ￿￿,
Law on Farms “ as “corresponding funds” which allows for a certain flexibility at
a local level but also provokes the question as to what “corresponding funds”
actually are. A leased piece of land, which is registered and headed by the
fermer founder, constitutes the fermer enterprise (Schoeller-Schletter ￿￿￿￿).
Oﬃcially, anybody older than ￿￿ with the capabilities to manage leased
land can be a fermer. In practice, the land allotment is in the hands of the local
authorities from the beginning to the end (see also Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿, Trevisani
￿￿￿￿). People previously in key positions, or their children, are often awarded
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with the scarce resource of land. The procedure of getting land is attached to
numerous diﬃculties, bureaucratic work and corruption, the latter often being
mentioned as the rule and not the exception.
“At the beginning we were told that anyone who could manage could
be a fermer. We thought that meant those who know about agriculture,
techniques, and cotton, and those who have an idea of administrative
work. But what they actually meant with ‘manage’ was who could fill
out all the paper work and has the material and moral power to do that.”
(Shukrat)
In the end, it is the xokim who decides who is to be given a leasing contract.
He also controls the agricultural, bureaucratic and marketing processes in order
to meet the quotes and deliver them to the higher levels. In fact, this is
the most important criterion for the local government in order for them to
keep their jobs. For this purpose, the aim is to fulfil the plan and to get as
much cotton as possible. The role of the xokim is more visible in this type
of production since the registration and also signing of the leasing contract is
done under his supervision. Leasing periods are, under his initiative, at least
￿￿ to ￿￿ years (cf. also Schoeller-Schletter ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿).
One day, I witnessed a man coming to the house of an acquaintance of mine
who had a high position at the xokimiyat. This man asked the friend if he had
made an appointment with xokim. The appointment was made and the friend
asked, if he should join them during their meeting. The fermer candidate had
an interest in his friend being there. While the candidate would answer all the
questions, whether he has a tractor, what kind of tractor, enough labour power,
and the answers to those questions would not be enough. The acquaintance
with somebody working in the xokimiyat, with knowledge of “how things work”,
was seen as decisive.
Many people who were not fermer told me about the diﬃculties of being a
fermer and regarded the entire issue as simply not worth it as it is quite risky
business. So, if it is so risky, then why do people decide to become a fermer?
People with agricultural experience like agronomists and agricultural engineers
– very often also the background of kolkhoz chiefs – have a good chance to
get into the fermer business and also be successful due to their experience
during the Soviet period. But they not only have professional experience and
schooling but also the necessary networks in the bureaucratic cadres. Getting
good and quick information in time, in other words having low transaction
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costs, not only helps to get into the new system but also to get a good piece
of land. According to Kandiyoti (￿￿￿￿), in Uzbekistan former cadre personnel
constituted ￿￿ percent of the new farmers.
It was also not unusual for many shirkat chiefs’ or fermer to have previously
been accountants. It is a vicious circle; usually only people in certain networks
and with certain relationships can become fermer and only being a fermer
can open other doors and business possibilities. Of course for a few people,
it carries more economic advantages than for others. Being a member of a
known, recognized family or a friend of the xokim is not always enough to
breast possible diﬃculties. Having a large family is not only necessary so as to
have a large labour force, but also so as to be ready for any possible diﬃculties.
Being fermer is like playing in another league, which necessitates specific skills.
According to many non-fermer, those who received land were all people with
money and social networks from the past. Clearly, many fermer got their
chance due to kin relations or other close connections. Otherwise, one cannot
be a fermer and cannot get credit. It is not something that one can manage
with one’s own resources. A retired kolkhoz economist remembers the first
days of fermer applications:
“At that time, when the first fermer appeared, if ￿￿ people applied to
be fermer, only one was able to do it. Only one person could actually
manage to run from one place to another, to pay the numerous fees, as
well as the bribes.” (Farshod)
I therefore decided to ask people if they would consider themselves good
fermer candidates. All of them had the necessary knowhow, labour force and
some links to the xokimiyat. The answer I got, tended in most cases to be
something like: “We do not want to get a headache. What we have is enough
for our needs. Maybe you get more money being a fermer, but that is not
without its price. At the end, if things do not work out as planned, you lose
everything you invested as well as your position towards the xokimiyat.” That
is why Daniyar did not try to be a fermer. He does not have enough family
to serve as a labour force. Therefore he instead invests more intensively in
his private plots and kitchen garden where he established his own green house
(teblitza), in which he grew tomatoes out of season and sold them accordingly
for a higher price.
In this aspect I find it useful to distinguish. There are fermer who are
welcome as such and accepted as part of the system, either due to their family
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background, their networks or their financial potential. There is another cat-
egory of fermer who are also in this business, but it is clear that they cannot
survive under the present conditions and that they do not belong to the main
core. However, they too get a piece of the pie, even though it may be tiny and
dry. Many factors determine the destiny of the fermer, but their proximity to
the xokimiyat is the decisive criterion. All key issues; the location of the fields,
the kind of agreement and the infrastructural support depend on this contact.
Being a fermer is thus a privileged category in comparison to those who are
not. But within the fermer there is a further hierarchy according to their
proximity to the xokimiyat. This relation is very important in order to get a
large and good piece of land. And the quality of land is determined primarily
by the availability of irrigation water, especially in a region like Bukhara.
For the future, becoming a fermer is seen as the only possible way to gain
access to the little remaining land left. In a few years, anybody wishing to
become a fermer will not have a chance anymore, as there will be no more
land left. If the xokim is, according to the president’s declaration, ready to
give land to fermer, then one should act and take it now. It satisfies a small
percentage of the population and that is all. There are no new fermer in places
like Romitan at the moment. The only alternative is an expansion towards
the desert. This may solve the land problem, but bringing water, which is
already scarce in the oasis, is another story. The chief oﬃcial told me that
people seeking to become fermer should wait, as there is not enough land.
I then asked him how long that should be. He responded that it depends as
some people may quit or have their land taken away from them. This however,
would happen only after three years if the fermer were not able to reach the
minimum production amount. “This year seven to eight fermer will have their
land taken away from them.”
￿.￿ Diﬀerent Types of Private Plots
Ordinary people have three options for access to land. Two of those are oﬃ-
cially registered private plots: small gardens in the yard and additional fields
outside of the village. In Bukhara and the valley the former are directly at-
tached to homes in the form of a courtyard. This is in fact the land plot on
which the house is built and the remaining land then turned into a plot. This
land is primarily used for basic consumption products like tomatoes, spinach,
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potatoes, onions and the like. Depending on the place and how the houses are
built there can be some place left for a cow and some chickens. Since kitchen
gardens are directly located in the courtyard, it serves the immediate, daily
needs of the family. Also a vineyard in the garden not only provides a nice
shadow for the hot summer days but also grapes. A few trees somewhere in
the courtyard, such as an apricot tree, complete this picture. These plots can
be inherited from father to son, and can be seen as private property, although
the land ultimately belongs to the state.
Actually, this land allocation existed already in Soviet times. Private plots
were not touched during the socialist period and were not put under cotton
cultivation. Since that time they played a key role of “relief valve” for the
people and still is today. Providing an essential part of the diet, the products
of the private plots were also easy to sell in kolkhoz markets with immediate
returns (Bacon ￿￿￿￿; Kitching ￿￿￿￿).
“In socializing fully all land holdings, the land immediately adjoining
the houses (vegetable gardens, orchards, etc.) shall remain for individual
use, while at the same time, where necessary and on the decision of the
management committee, confirmed by the general meeting, the size of
the garden can be altered” (Stalin ￿￿￿￿, cited in Rowe, ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
The second type of land is the tomorqa, the ‘land behind the building’,
which has also been given since Soviet times as a private subsidiary plot.
It can be located in the direct vicinity of the house or, more often, on the
outskirts of the village. Starting from late ￿￿￿￿, access and size to tomorqa
increased. This process continued after independence as the average plot size
per family in Uzbekistan increased from ￿.￿￿ to ￿.￿￿ hectares in order to secure
self-suﬃciency. After a decree by Karimov, by law all villagers are allowed to
get up to ￿￿ sot. Oﬃcially, the government declared that every household
should receive a certain amount of land in order to make a living from it. The
additional pieces of land got the name “koshumca tomorqa” or “presidentski
land” (see Trevisani ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Tomorqa also provides some freedom as people
perceive it as their land and have the choice to do what they want with it.
Finally, workers of the shirkat or of a fermer may get a piece of land after
the first harvest in a semi-legal way. This is like an underground tunnel to
the fields, which allows people to cultivate a piece of land. As mentioned, in
the Ferghana Valley, shirkat land was, similar to the kolkhoz period, divided
into brigades, which were responsible for a certain amount of land, which they
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are allowed to use for themselves after the harvest. In Bukhara instead of the
shirkat, fermer were in charge of growing centrally determined agricultural
crops and in a similar way kolkhozcu have some access to land after harvest as
complementary. This is basically their payment for the workload throughout
the year as they otherwise hardly receive any regular salary. There can be an
agreement with the shirkat that kolkhozcu are allowed to use the land after
harvest as a part of their work agreement. Since people must survive and in
order to do so have to have access to a piece of land this is condoned. But this
puts the kolkhozcu in a fragile situation in which shirkat and fermer are able
to exert pressure on them, either in the form of extra work on the fields or
delivering part of the cultivated produce. The stress of losing access to the land
is enough to control the kolkhozcu. Shirkat or fermer land can be given in this
fashion, as both enterprises are often not able to pay their workers in money.
It is both a form of payment and also oﬀers a possibility of self-suﬃciency.
In Marxamat, a kolkhozcu can get five sot of land from the shirkat and
use it until the next cultivation. I was told that if somebody wants more land
and it is available, one might rent it in addition. Renting land to kolkhozcu,
of course, is not welcomed by the xokimiyat. Every cultivation necessitates
an extra amount of water, so that mainly the lands, which are a little bit out
of sight and less easy to control, were used for this purpose. But again this
is a “known secret” and is tolerated since poor and irregularly paid kolkhozcu
should get some access to land for food security. After the wheat harvest the
land is divided between the kolkhozcu and they are able to cultivate what
they want within a limited time. The land has no fallow period but wheat and
cotton fields are used interchangeably, which allows a gap of a few months at
which point it is used by kolkhozcu. Most of them prefer to cultivate potatoes
and cabbage.
Thus today, a kolkhozcu, a person who settles all cultivation burdens, does
this in order to get access to the fields after or between the harvest periods.
Most of the people working on kolkhoz or sovkhoz lands did not become a
fermer but became unemployed and attempt to survive by investing in their
household plots as dehqon. This is not considered an agricultural business.
People either referred to themselves simply as dehqon, or by paraphrasing it
and saying, “we have some land that we cultivate”. But for fermer it was clear
that he calls himself as fermer and also that others talk about him as such.
The private plots are free from the state contract system. Farm products
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can be sold or consumed privately. The head of the family gets the land for
life and after his death, depending on the situation of the land in the region;
it may be passed to children for their use. Labour force is provided by the
family. This land is not allowed to be kept uncultivated and there is no fallow
time allowed. The dehqon is responsible for all issues related to his land. If he
does not pay the tax and does not start with the cultivation within a year of
allocation he can lose the land. As mentioned, a transmission of land to the
next generation is possible but depends on local circumstances, such as land
scarcity or the position of the xokimiyat, or how much land the family already
inherited from other sources. The land is provided by the shirkat and it is
registered under an individual name. A dehqon farm is thus also a registered
legal entity. While the shirkat provides the land, any person who was employed
in a rural area can ask for registration. The xokimiyat decides and registers
the land. This new arrangement brought new roles and.
Getting land is one part of the problem but to build on it is another chal-
lenge for a kolkhozcu family. The land of the first type, the courtyard, is given
after marriage and many people do that in order to secure their land and be
able to begin to cultivate crops on it. Because of the land scarcity, it is allo-
cated only after oﬃcial registration, leaving only a short time to construct a
house on it before the marriage. The only way to bypass this and have at least
a semi-constructed house before the wedding was to actually marry before and
celebrate the wedding later. A couple can oﬃcially get married, passing the
zags as it is called￿￿, earlier than planned and directly after that apply for the
land. But the wedding feast can be postponed until the house construction
is at least partially completed. During that time the couple can stay either
patrilocal or separately each with one’s parents. When the main components
of the house are built, the couple moves in. I visited several couples who had
moved into their newly built homes when they were only partly completed.
Often, one room was roughly finished, with toilette and cooking facilities. The
remaining construction work of the other rooms will be completed when enough
construction material, time and money is available.
In practice, the amount of land allocated to newly founded families inside
and outside the village has continually decreased in recent years (Ilkhamov
￿￿￿￿). Sizes of farms are limited, they are not allowed to be larger than ￿,￿￿
￿￿ zags is the ‘department for the registration of civil status’ and is used as an abbreviation
for oﬃcially registered marriages.
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ha on irrigated land, ￿,￿ ha on non-irrigated land or one ha in the steppe.
Juridical regulations on dehqon farms started in ￿￿￿￿ and were then amended
as “Law on Dehqon” in ￿￿￿￿ (Schoeller-Schletter ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).￿￿ The information
about land distribution in Bukhara was controversial. There were families,
which got ￿￿ sot, as promised by the president, but some only got ￿￿ or even
￿￿. Even in order to get it, people had to repeatedly ask and bring gifts.
Some are luckier. Botir has ￿￿ sot tomorqa in total. Since he lives with
his parents he also cultivates their plot together with his own. His own plot
is ￿￿ sot, his father also has ￿￿ sot. In addition, his mother also got ten sot
from the kolkhoz during Soviet time. How she got this ten sot was not really
clear to me. She claimed to have simply asked the kolkhoz and since she was
a teacher with a president’s degree at the time, she got more. At that time, it
was not so diﬃcult to get land. As long as his parents are alive Botir can keep
these ￿￿ sot, but after that he is not too sure, if he can keep their part as well.
His youngest son will get his piece of land and the house without a problem,
he was quite sure about that. In that respect he just needs to worry about his
older son, who will not inherit Botir’s house and needs to build his own. This
problem was already solved in Botir’s case since the old house of his parents
will be destroyed and this land was planned to use for his older son who will
live in a separate house.
In the Ferghana Valley people have to be satisfied with much smaller pieces
of land. According to my information people got approximately eight to ten sot
in the early ￿￿￿￿s and within time it became less and people got only six sot.
Towards the tuman centre the land size was even smaller and it was around
four sot. Of these, two or three sot are used for the house to build. Thus,
agricultural land and building land are also scarce resources in competition
with each other.
Since land is a scarce good there are not many options to accessing land
besides the ones already mentioned. Land without water does not have a
value for agriculture but at least in a limited way it can be used for livestock
breeding. Not only do plan and produce manipulations exist but there are also
hidden agreements on the land size and usufruct rights among local oﬃcials,
fermer and others. The remoter the new land, the poorer the soil quality is,
￿￿ Ilkhamov points out how in the Soviet period, the size of the personal plot was not
more than ￿.￿ ha in rural areas. After independence he places the size of irrigated land at
up to ￿.￿￿ ha. (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). See also Kandiyoti (￿￿￿￿).
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especially in Bukhara since the expansion is towards the desert. For a small
kitchen garden the availability of water is an important factor. In the Ferghana
Valley, an expansion towards Kyrgyzstan used to be possible but is no longer
since independence.
But even those who got land said it was a struggle. They were also aware
that the land was taken from kolkhoz land which is becoming smaller and
smaller. I was told that in Chilongu per year approximately ￿￿ new households
need land for their settlements and tomorqa. The problem for kolkhozes is that
if they give land, they will not be able to fulfil the plan. Kolkhozes let people
wait and give the land as late as possible, forcing them to share land with their
family and thus keeping many generations together on a limited space, which
they use for housing, kitchen plots and tomorqa.
Families that were not engaged in any work with the kolkhoz suﬀered from
this problem much more as the kolkhoz tended to be more conservative when
giving land to them. However, families with good connections to the xokimiyat
are able to solve this problem through their networks and exchange relations.
For example, I witnessed how a brother of a village cadre in Marxamat got land
with the help of his brother. Not only did this person have good relations to the
xokim, his skills as a recognized medical person were also of great importance.
In that respect, kolkhoz heads profited considerably, as did other oﬃcials, from
this non-privatisation, land monopoly and scarcity. It was no diﬀerent to the
fermer case. While oﬃcially land is rewarded to those who are able to work
and manage it, networks, kin and friendships actually lead to land.
One problem is that families with many sons have a diﬃculty to get land.
The youngest will stay with the parents and inherit their piece of land. But
the older brothers need ground on which they can build their own houses and
settle down. In the villages the ground is limited and expansion towards the
outskirts of the village is already happening. One family with several sons and
poor networks also shared this experience:
“After oﬃcial registration of the marriage, we asked for land for my son.
There is a commission in kolkhoz and they told us: Your father has ￿￿ sot. It
must be enough for you, divide it among your sons”. (Timur)
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￿.￿ Access to Water
Water was always of key relevance for the agricultural oases in Central Asia.
Olufsen describes the importance of water for Bukhara from his journeys to
the region in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ with the following words:
“The old saying that the weather is the real farmer, is not relevant
in Bokhara; here all cultivation is attained by irrigating the yellow or
yellowish grey loess, and if this is done well, the well known sentence of
Mohammed: ‘plant a stick in the yellow earth, water it, and next year
you will have a tree,’ may be said to hold good for Bokhara too. . . .
(one) only has to keep the canals in order, so that he can lead so much
water to each kind of plants as the latter require” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
Before Olufsen’s trip, Schuyler mentioned the high dependency of the region
on the water. “The worth of land is estimated chiefly by the amount of water to
which it has a right, and most of the lawsuits about lands arise out of disputes
concerning water” (￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]:￿￿￿).
Distribution of water had to be organized collectively at the village level
and administratively on a higher level in the Emirate. Because villages were
in competition with each other concerning the amount of water they could
re-distribute internally the final decisions were taken by the Bukharian Gov-
ernment. A central authority, the mirab,￿￿ had to establish quotas according
to which villages were allowed to take water from the canal and his subordinate
oﬃcials took care of the dams (cf. ￿￿￿-￿￿). These would be followed by similar
quotas on lower levels. Within the village, a junior mirab was responsible for
overlooking the internal distribution. He had to establish time and duration
for individual fields to be watered.
Parallel to the overall developments, a law was passed in ￿￿￿￿ on water
monopoly – a time in which the revolution on the countryside seemed to be
intensifying. Since ￿￿￿￿ water had been state property, although this was
actually the case even before. But now it could be used for the objective
of implementing socialism. “With the village-level “water authorities” – the
aqsaqal and mirab – now subject to oﬃcial approval, the government gained a
direct hand in village aﬀairs for the first time. Using the threat of withholding
water supplies as a sanction, they were able to force compliance through what
was becoming a “command” agricultural policy.”(O’Neill ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿)
￿￿ In Tajik and Uzbek it is the same word. Literally, it means „water master“ or „water
prince“ (Olufsen ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿) or „water ruler“ (Schuyler [￿￿￿￿] ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
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Irrigated agriculture and crops like cotton and rice with huge water de-
mands permanently increased the dependency on this scare resource. To de-
velop cotton production a further increase in the amount of irrigated land was
planned, which caused a greater demand for water. One of the consequences
was the shrinking of the Aral Sea. According to Wegerich, two explanations
can help to understand the reasons behind the Aral Sea catastrophe. One is
the “incorrect development strategy” of Soviet specialists and the other one is
the expansion of irrigation due to the emergence of large-scale enterprises and
collectivization of private land (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). During the Soviet period, rescue
plans were based on the redirection of Siberian water resources in order to
prevent or to stop the shrinkage of the sea but also at the same in order to
continue cotton production. This was, in fact, not a new idea. Already in ￿￿￿￿
such an endeavour was planned but only in ￿￿￿￿ did this project receive more
attention. It then became part of the “grossen Stalin-Plans zur Umgestaltung
der Natur” (Giese ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).￿￿ In the early ￿￿￿￿s and ￿￿￿￿s, this idea was held
on to and diﬀerent solutions were sought in order to realize the project. By
the end of ￿￿￿￿ this project definitely came to an end due to financial costs,
economic expediency and also ecological consequences.
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are the two countries severely aﬀected by this
catastrophe and critique against the Soviet period in this respect is also severe.
The drying up of the Aral Sea, a huge environmental crisis, made the water
issue, irrigation and crop combination an essential theme for many scientific
conferences. This did not become any better after the fall of the Soviet Union.
After ￿￿￿￿, those of the newly independent states with upstream rivers started
to use water according to their necessities, naturally changing the existing
distribution patterns and causing a dangerous threat to peace not only on the
transnational but also on the local level.
As mentioned before, the oasis of Bukhara owes its existence to Zarafshan
River. The amount of water, which Bukhara got, depended on the upper parts
of the valley and their water use. For instance, after Samarqand’s occupation
by Russians in the ￿￿th century, some districts of Bukhara did not get enough
water anymore and already at this period did the Zarafshan not reach the Amu-
Darya.￿￿ The construction of the Amu-Bukhara Canal started in the ￿￿￿￿’s
￿￿ Emphasis in original
￿￿ According to Urchinov (￿￿￿￿), the river today disappears ￿￿ km before reaching the
Amu-Darya.
￿￿
sancak
and was finished in the ￿￿￿￿’s. Through this the Bukhara Oasis had a reliable
source of water in spite of continuous increase of irrigated areas in upper and
middle reach of the Zarafshan (Urchinov ￿￿￿￿). In my field setting in Bukhara
the fields also got water from the Amu-Bukhara Canal. The famous Zarafshan
River had by now ended as a dirty puddle.
Two words are enough to describe the water in Bukhara; it is salty and
polluted. By the time it reaches Bukhara, it is not only polluted, but water
quality is further worsened through the return of irrigation water. Before
cultivation the salt crust is washed from the fields but it ends up, directly or
indirectly, in the irrigation water. Furthermore the washing of the fields uses
more and more of the scarce resource water.
In the Ferghana Valley water is neither seen as scarce nor of bad quality.
The amount of water, whether for domestic or agricultural use, is also not
seen as diminishing. The Southern Ferghana Canal provides the villages with
enough water and in both settings people are aware of that diﬀerence. In
order to provide enough water for the mountain foothills (atir) where cotton
and wheat fields as well as the orchards are located, water is pumped uphill.
I was told that ￿￿￿ litre per second can be pumped for this purpose. In the
village water was free, regardless of the purpose it was to be used for. In
spite of that there were people whose fields were at the lower end of the canals
and who were complaining about the lack of water. This was due to either
ignorance and waste of water or to the fact that more water was taken by
others then due to them.
Large irrigation canals not only draw physical borders between the set-
tlements and separate the kolkhozes from each other, but they also create
social borders. Which settlements get their water from which canal, are well-
known and important facts. Canals separate the settlements from each other,
but “drinking from the same canal” also lead to a sense of “belonging” and
“connectedness”, as one mirab in Bukhara told me. While his village in an ad-
ministrative sense belonged to Romitan, since they drank from the same canal
as a diﬀerent tuman, his village was in fact much more oriented to the latter.
Olufsen points to the importance of water, the fact that the canals have names
and that their building and maintenance was a commonly shared job (￿￿￿￿:
￿￿￿). The distribution of water via canals not only creates administrative
tasks, but also when they are cleaned and repaired the local people who use
them are brought together for these tasks.
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Depending on the amount of water and the individual need of the provinces,
water is accordingly distributed. Twice a year the plans are revised and the
situation is evaluated, once in spring and once in the fall. This revision also
acknowledges the situation of the fermer and their needs. Fermer do not get
water for free, it is added to their expenses. The private plots, however, are
not charged. In Ferghana, water is free not only for the private plots but also
for the shirkat lands where most of the cultivation takes place. However, the
agricultural fields and the crops do not share an equal rank when receiving
water. As a former kolkhoz present said shirkat land comes first, followed by
the fermer fields, making the private plots last in line. Furthermore, cotton,
rice and wheat productions precede fodder production.
In the case of the private courtyard fields, which are small yet not unim-
portant for a households’ food supply, the necessary irrigation water is for
the most part delivered by a manual or electric water pump. In Bukhara,
this underground water is further used for daily needs, such as washing and
cooking (sometimes with the exception of tea). The water was so salty that
Alisher took his old Zhiguly car out of his garage and went to buy water in
plastic cans from a vadaprovot￿￿ near the tuman centre. He was not only
proud that he could aﬀord such water for his tea, he also reminded me that
the underground water, and especially the water from the irrigation canal, was
extremely unhealthy.
Overall, the water was usually not suﬃcient in Romitan. Especially fermer
with large fields do not get enough. Some parts are irrigated suﬃciently, while
others not. Those fermer who have their land near the desert generally do not
get enough water. Yet complaints of having not enough water were widespread:
“Actually, cotton needs five times watering, but it drinks maximum
three times and not more. Because of the lack of water we often have
disputes, as the one at the head of the water source gets a lot of water
and the one the furthest away doesn’t get enough.” (Rashid)
As mentioned, the high soil salinity in Bukhara makes it necessary for fields
to be submerged by water once or twice before planting. The water reaches
a level of about ￿￿ – ￿￿ cm above the field and is then drained away to the
smaller irrigation channels. In Bukhara, where water is a scarce resource and
cotton cultivation demands a large amount, disputes about water being stolen
￿￿ Russian for fountain
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or cheating in line are not rare. In order to prevent this, people either end up
sleeping next to their tomorqa or they go on patrol.
As a valuable resource, when necessary, water can also be used as an in-
strument of punishment, which leads to the suﬀering of many people besides
the targeted ones. So, according to my informants, some of the villages in
Chilongu got less water than others, because this year the “xokim is punishing
them”. He was frustrated, so they said, by the low figures of cotton delivery,
in his understanding due to the fact that the villagers took more care on their
private plots and thus neglected the cotton fields. As Chilongu is closer to
Bukhara city than others, they prefer to sell vegetables and fruits on the town
market.
“He is very angry at Chilongu since the villagers prefer to grow carrots
and potatoes and sell them at the market. They have no time left for
the cotton. They do not care for cotton fields properly. So, xokim does
not give enough water to Chilongu and prefers to give more water to the
desert.” (Sancar)
It was clear that some villages did not get enough water, if they were located
oﬀside. It was not unusual to not get enough water for the minimum irrigation
of the cotton fields, I was told. Water is a means of political pressure and is
implemented for this purpose but people did not always know why there was
not enough water.
“Who knows, if there is really not enough water or if it does not reach
us. As the tuman xokim punishes our village, maybe the whole viloyat
is under punishment, after all, the whole viloyat did not fulfil the cotton
plan. ”(Sardor)
Conflicts over water have increased majorly since independence and people
take great care to prevent others from misuse. Disputes concerning water even
involve relatives. During my stay there were several conflicts amongst close kin.
Some of them ended up in court accused of attacking somebody with a shovel.
At least one case in Romitan ended with one person being dead. Disputes
among fermer for this valuable resource had another meaning since they were,
in the end, under pressure to fulfil their plan. They were not tolerant of
non-fermer, tomorqa owners and simply wanted to get enough water for their
fields. The accusations ranged from stealing water, cheating and irrigating
their tomorqa when it was not their turn. Nozim was telling me that in the
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past years he has taken the responsibility of watching the water distribution
since others do not respect the queue. Water is becoming a problem that gets
worse every year.
“Before, I sent the children to check and to water the tomorqa, but now I
do it myself. When I am there, they do not attempt to take my place in the
queue. There is a “norm” concerning water. The motor starts to work and
water flows for four or five hours. But there are people who at night secretly
turn the motor on. Now there are controllers and they shut oﬀ the electricity
so nobody can go there by night and water their own tomorqa. Of course, you
can come to an agreement by bringing them some food or paying them with
other things like with hay and get your water.”
￿￿

Chapter ￿
Economic Strategies: How to
make a Living in Rural Uzbekistan
￿.￿ Introduction
With the just described changes in property rights and the diﬃculty of having
access to key resources people are faced with a fundamentally new situation
that forces them to seek for new survival strategies. For most of them this
means a dramatically decrease in living standards and consumption. Only
a small minority can profit from the new opportunities created by moderate
reform politics. The fundamental problem for Uzbek households is that they
must pay market prices when consuming goods but do not get market prices
when producing them. A comparison of cotton world and domestic prices
in Uzbekistan shows that the former is almost ￿￿-￿￿ times higher than what
the Uzbek government pays domestic cotton pickers (SOAS Working Paper
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿-￿￿). Thus, Uzbeks are incorporated in the world system as their
bread prices are, dependent on world wheat prices, but their invested labour
on the cotton fields is measured with a diﬀerent yardstick. The income of the
produced cotton goes to the state budget and not to the producer. People
work for a salary (if they get paid at all), which is not enough to survive, not
even enough to buy the monthly needed amount of flour to make their own
bread.
This chapter focuses on how the economic changes outlined in the previous
chapter are perceived and experienced at the local level. I will describe how
certain groups position themselves within this post-independent system and
￿￿
sancak
which techniques and strategies they develop in order to cope with diﬃculties
and to manage their lives. This chapter also looks at the attitude of people
towards the state’s regulations and restrictions. While some actors adapt to
the changes and benefit from them, others attempt to stabilize their positions
or just try to survive. The chapter begins with a description of the produc-
tion system and the modified planned economy this implies. This is followed
by a survey of labour organization and an analysis of income strategies and
household budgets.
“[In a peasant agrarian economy] the household was perhaps the most
flexible and responsive social grouping. . . . The family household is an
institution sensitive to minor, short-term fluctuations in the socioeco-
nomic environment and a prime means by which individuals adapt to
the subtle shifts in opportunities and constraints that confront them.”
(Netting ￿￿￿￿, cited in: Netting et al ￿￿￿￿:xii).
Surviving in post-independent Uzbekistan is not an individual strategy. It is a
family or a household strategy within which resources are pooled and decisions
are made.￿ An Uzbek household is a production, consumption and reproduc-
tion unit in a physically shared place where diﬀerent generations live together.
In the post independence period, this social unit became more and more im-
portant for a number of reasons. While it also existed as such throughout the
Soviet period, some aspects became more important and visible and new tasks
emerged. Furthermore, gender and generation roles have become redefined
according to the needs of the post-independence period. In order to describe
the budget arrangements within the same courtyard, the terms “eating from
the same pot” are used (cf. also Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). It is diﬃcult to make
a clear cut as to when and why households separate their pots or to what
extent. After ￿￿￿￿ some families decided to change their “pot system” in one
or the other direction. For some of them, eating from one pot is something
new and had become necessary, for others it had always been like that, and
for yet others it was a burden as they now have to feed more people.
￿ A discussion of the diﬀerence(s) between family and household is not a part of this
work. I use family, household and the Uzbek word for house (üy) as synonyms as would
most of my informants.
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￿.￿ Production
Agriculture in the oasis of Bukhara has for a long time been characterized
by the growing of grain, vegetables and fruits. All of these have been used
for domestic consumption as well as for trade. Fruit trees can be seen along
roads, beside orchards or in courtyards. Lucerne, wheat, rice, sesame, cotton,
vegetables and pumpkin have been grown for centuries, as well as melons or
tree fruits like apricots, plums and almonds. They are consumed in fresh or in
dried form as a valuable part of the diet. Especially in Bukhara mulberry trees
are an important part of the landscape and its fruit (tut) is consumed in fresh
and dried form while the leaves of the tree are used in the silk production.
Although cotton cultivation has been done in the region for a long time and
already received special attention during the period of Russian colonization,
it was the Soviet time when it became the main agricultural crop. Older
informants mentioned that they remembered times when the cotton fields had
not been of such great importance and livestock had even grazed between
the fields (Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿, Olufsen ￿￿￿￿, Shuyler ([￿￿￿￿] (￿￿￿￿). For decades
cotton cultivation has penetrated the lives of the local households and since
independence it has continued, making it an even more essential part of their
lives. Some kolkhozcu, who had not seen any other crops as dominating, still
could not think in any other terms regarding a using of land. It is considered
useful particularly because of the side products (which were, in fact, not as
necessary in the past).
“You can get cotton-oil, you can use the oil cake for animal fodder,
you can use the stalks, the cotton bolls for heating, for the tandir.￿ We
also use cotton for our mattresses; it is very useful to cultivate cotton”.
(Zafar)
Cotton and the Uzbek economy are two inseparable components of one system.
But to make the country less dependent on the import of grain, primarily from
Kazakstan, the government decided to reduce the amount of land devoted to
cotton production in favour of wheat. By ￿￿￿￿, approximately ￿￿ percent of
the agricultural land that was formerly used by state and collective enterprises
was turned over to grain production. This percentage would even grow in the
following years and is today ￿￿ percent. This was done to become more self-
￿ Traditional clay-lined oven on the ground, which is used for bread and somsa baking.
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suﬃcient and prevent hunger, which might lead to huge anger especially in the
rural settings (Spoor ￿￿￿￿).
“Bread is very important for Uzbeks. If we do not eat bread we do not
feel satiated. For a few years now we have started to cultivate wheat
ourselves. Before that, during the Soviet times, we did not. We bought
flour from the magazine (shop), sacks full of flour from Kazakstan; it was
written on the sacks. There was a lot, but sometimes they had worms
and we fed our animals with it. We had white flour, the best quality,
more than enough.” (Abror)
Cotton and grain are thus today the main outputs of this economy. Data
from ￿￿￿￿ shows that the area under grain cultivation is more than ￿.￿ million
ha, out of that ￿.￿ million ha is used for wheat cultivation, while cotton is pro-
duced on ￿.￿￿ million ha. The goal of achieving national grain self-suﬃciency
(with winter wheat) and the indispensible significance of cotton for Uzbek
economy lead to a decrease of production of other crops (other grain crops,
fruits and vegetables) and does not make crop rotation possible. There has
been a decline in cotton productivity, namely a ￿￿% decrease between ￿￿￿￿
and ￿￿￿￿, but this is mainly the result of poorly irrigated land and lack of farm
equipment. Aral Sea related environmental problems, low land productivity
and salinity also caused a significant decrease since ￿￿￿￿ in high quality lands
(Khudoyberdiyev ￿￿￿￿:￿￿-￿￿).
Wheat as a crop is actually preferred by more people if they have the
chance to decide. Cotton is labour intensive and is seen as more risky as it
is more susceptible to the weather. Therefore even under state control wheat
is preferred over cotton. “You just have to harvest the grain once; that is all”.
For the kolkhozcu their labour in cotton production is not appropriately paid
and so it hardly seems worth to work so hard just to get some side products
and have access to a field after the picking season. Wheat harvest is in the
early summer and after that the fields are more or less free for the kolkhozcu
to use.
“Cotton requires good care. With less work it is not possible. It is im-
portant where the field is located, you need certain climatic conditions;
the soil of our fields is sandy. The quality of the seeds is important. The
European model is nice. If we keep our model, it will be quite diﬃcult
for the fermer. He works but he does not get what he invests in the
work. We should cultivate other things, wheat for example, so we can
have a life of well-being.” (Qasim)
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However, cotton continues to remain the main agricultural crop while wheat
and rice follow close behind. While paddy rice, according to Scott (￿￿￿￿:￿￿)
“helps to ensure that the population itself remain in place”, cotton does not
have this power for two reasons. For one, the state economic policy does not
see the hard work invested as valuable, and secondly, cotton is not a crop that
is meant to feed people. For the workers, the benefit of cotton is limited to its
side products such as cotton stalks or oil, and has no nutritious or nourishing
value for humans. In Andijon, a limited amount of rice cultivation was allowed
and people did in fact prefer rice to cotton for the same reasons. It is eatable in
the form of plov, the national dish, it is not as labour intensive as cotton (there
are diﬀerent opinions on that but it is accepted because of the first reason),
and it is possible to sell or barter it since it has a “market value”. Direct self-
suﬃciency is not possible through cotton. Uzbek hospitality, which is strongly
expressed through food, especially by oﬀering plov, is directly related to the
economic resources of the family. The quality of the feasts and ceremonies were
also measured by the food served but especially by the amount and quality of
plov.
Other crops such as vegetables and fruits are mainly grown in private plots.
These constitute the main diet of households and are also necessary fodder for
the livestock and poultry. Small-scale agricultural production is quite diﬀerent
than the one described above. It not only involves diﬀerent products but also
timing and specific procedures. The most important produces are potatoes,
carrots, onions, and various types of beets. In addition to that, some melons,
tomatoes, chives, coriander, spinach, pumpkin and cabbage are also grown.
Most people have also started to grow their own wheat in the last few years.
In the past, this was unnecessary because flour was aﬀordable and bread in
the shops was much cheaper than homemade one. This oven bread (duhovka
non) is very popular but since it is expensive and not available in the village
it is rarely consumed – it is brought from tuman as a variety to homemade
bread.
Cotton and wheat can be cultivated in rotation, although this is not seen
as the best option for the fertility of the soil (ECSSD Working paper ￿￿￿￿:￿).
In Bukhara, wheat is cultivated for two years in a row and then, without any
fallow period, cotton for five years. In the valley too, after cultivating cotton
for two years the fields are once used for wheat. According to many informants,
especially in Bukhara, the soil quality is not very good anyway and has become
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worse after too much cultivation, salinization, lack of water and the intensive
use of pesticides and herbicides in the past. Today, the usage of the latter is
diminished, especially on private plots, as people cannot aﬀord to buy them.
On the private plots the crop combination needs a thorough plan. Fields
are always in use and never left uncultivated – after one harvest comes the
next planting. Crops are always rotated. Alisher for example uses ￿￿ sot of his
tomorqa, which is free after the wheat and carrot cultivation, for fodder and the
remaining ten sot for turnips (Brassica napus L.), carrots and radish. Wheat
is grown between October and June, and in June after the harvest, he uses the
￿￿ sot from the wheat and seven sot from carrots for maka zhügeri (sorghum
cernuum) which looks like maize without cobs and is used as fodder. The
stalks, and leaves are all used for fodder or as burning material. Actually after
sorghum cultivation, which ripens in four to six months, the wheat plantation
can start again (see also Olufsen ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿).￿ After the wheat plantation, the
rest of the land is used for diﬀerent vegetables such as turnips.
Sowing fodder is inevitable if one wishes to keep animals, which is seen as
a lucrative business and also lends a certain financial security to the owner,
making it a kind of survival strategy. Since independence, people have tried
to keep as many animals as possible. Space and fodder are the main concerns
besides profit. Keeping livestock is significant on the one hand because of the
households’ milk needs and on the other it is an investment, which may come
in handy in the case of expected or unexpected expenditures or in diﬃcult
times when a considerable sum of money is suddenly needed. Although it has
become a coping strategy, the freedom to have such livestock is seen as one
the major positive aspects of independence. One milk cow can cover the daily
needs of the family for dairy products.
Keeping sheep is complementary to cattle. One sees a few chickens and
geese along the street, but they are not awarded any particular care. They
find their food while roaming around and are otherwise easy to feed with
corn and leftovers. According to the oﬃcial statistics, since ￿￿￿￿ the number
of cattle has increased significantly, by ￿￿% percent, sheep and goats by ￿￿
percent. While poultry decreased considerably by ￿￿% in the first half of the
￿￿￿￿s, their number has been increasing since ￿￿￿￿ (Khudoyberdiyev ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
Very few also raise pigs. Although they are a good income source, they could
￿ It is quite interesting to see that the observations of Olufsen from ￿￿￿￿ have enormous
similarities’ to my stay in ￿￿￿￿’s.
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not be consumed within the households themselves but have to be sold on the
market in Bukhara (cf. chapter ￿.￿).
“It is true, they stink a little, which is why I keep them isolated, but
they bring a good profit. One kilo is ￿￿￿￿ sum. Here, (in the village)
many people do not eat pork; mostly just young people do. It is quite
tasty. Of course, the people who pray do not eat pork.” (Amir)
Sharzod keeps some livestock; he thinks that cattle breeding is easier than
sheep breeding since the latter needs more space. The desert zone can be
one place for sheep breeding but in the winter it is cold and there is no real
functioning infrastructure with wells and veterinary care as in the past. Still,
some nomadic households of Kazak and Turkmen ethnicity use this desert
zone of the viloyat and, in spite of the almost broken-down infrastructure, try
to survive with their animals. Sharzod’s household started to keep livestock
in ￿￿￿￿. They wanted to have their own milk for consumption and at that
time it was also seen as profitable. They slaughtered the animals at home and
then sold the meat. They continued this until ￿￿￿￿, but later decided not to
slaughter anymore and started to sell the fattened livestock. He explains why:
“Since ￿￿￿￿, money doesn’t have any value anymore. Before that, we
used to slaughter the animals and sell the meat. ￿￿% was paid imme-
diately and ￿￿% was paid in rates. Because of the high inflation some
people could not settle their outstanding debts. It was diﬃcult and un-
pleasant to get the money and also it lost its value not only because
of the inflation but also because people paid how much they could and
when they could.”.
Sharzod now has four kara mal￿, two cattle and two calves, three goats
and three sheep. According to his plan, one of the kara mal, a calf, will be
fattened and later sold. He can get up to ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ sum for it and plans to buy
a milk cow with the money. He keeps the mayda mal for small expenditures.
For instance, if he needs ￿￿-￿￿ thousand sum at once he can sell a sheep or a
goat and get up to ￿￿,￿￿￿ sum. However, he prefers sheep to goat as the latter
don’t have much meat and don’t have a fat tail, which is enjoyed for cooking.
They also produce more oﬀspring than kara mal, which carries longer. Sharzod
provided one example of how lucrative it is for him to keep a certain amount
of livestock with his resources and calculations:
￿ Large stock (literally: black livestock). Goats and sheep are referred to as “mayda mal ”.
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“I bought an ox for ￿￿￿ thousand sum. I needed fodder for three months
and it cost me ￿￿,￿￿￿. I don’t pay for water and I prepare the fodder
myself and thereby can save some money. I sold the ox for ￿￿￿,￿￿￿,
giving me ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ profit. If the meat prices increase, then it is certainly
worth it. Next year, if I have ten or eleven oﬀspring from these six
mayda mal, I will sell one of them. You always need a reserve amount
of money for health care, for the car and other things.”
Sharzod was planning on having more kara mal in order to buy a new car
since his old Russian zhiguli breaks down a lot. For this purpose he wants to
get a milk cow and later an ox. According to his calculations, he needs four
well-cared kara mal for a new car. The costs for the livestock caring did not
scare him. Firstly, as already mentioned, he uses his tomorqa for fodder as
chaﬀ and husts of wheat, cotton capsules, rest of pressed cottonseeds or grass
on the fields after cotton harvest. Thus, he has to buy little fodder in addition,
so that it is lucrative to keep livestock. Of course, any kind of organic kitchen
leftovers is also used as fodder; nothing is wasted. The fodder is prepared and
stored for months next to the courtyard under the ground digging a large and
deep hole that is evened with a tractor so as to preserve the fodder throughout
the winter period.
In the Ferghana Valley the problem of space also became a problem for
livestock rearing. After independence, with the border drawing, grazing pos-
sibilities in Kyrgyzstan are no longer an option. While some people still bring
their livestock to Kyrgyzstan by bribing oﬃcials, it is not safe and only done
on an irregular basis. For instance, if livestock is stolen, the people have no
right to ask for help from the Kyrgyz oﬃcials. One alternative to taking one’s
livestock to Kyrgyzstan is transporting them to the mountain pastures on the
way to Tashkent for grazing but that is lucrative only for larger herds.
￿.￿ Plans and Procedures
As explained above, no matter what kind of crop is grown and where it is
grown, the state is the ultimate owner of all land and produce, and most agri-
culture continues to function with plans, restrictions and regulations. Under
these conditions the aforementioned three types of agricultural producers carry
the agricultural output; shirkat, fermer and private plots. Each of these has
a special law regulation. The last two provide ￿￿% of the gross agricultural
￿￿
Economic and Social Change in Uzbekistan
output according to ￿￿￿￿ data. While state orders apply to shirkat and fermer,
they do not to dehqon farms.
Fermer sign a contract with the xokimiyat every year concerning what
(cotton or wheat), when and how they will cultivate. The harvest is sold to the
state at fixed prices and once the target has been reached, the rest can be kept
by the fermer and he is able to decide what to do with it. At least, this is the
oﬃcial version. Fermer are not able to bargain or convince the government to
change the crop combination in favour of other crops that were seen as more
profitable.￿ Any cotton related instance is under state control even though
they are formally independent. Fermer, as the new agricultural entity, were
shown to me as a symbol of “privatization” and independence, since it did not
exist under the previous Soviet regime. However, it was clear that the fermer
lacks all aspects of being “independent” or “private”. In particular, the strong
shirkat and fermer linkage, the power of the shirkat over the fermer and the
fermer–xokimiyat relationship, briefly the power of state and state institutions
on the one hand and the lack of freedom to decide what to cultivate on the
other hand were the points which had not changed. It is interesting that for
everyone freedom of decision seemed to be more important than to be the
owner of the land. Ownership in itself does not create any monetary income,
and it is not secure anyway. While this freedom of decision is applied to private
plots, also without being “owner”, fermer were far away from this right. The
lack of active decision-making and the freedom to set prices for the crops are
two of the main points which made people decide not to become a fermer.
In concrete terms, the cotton producer – either a fermer or a shirkat –
strikes an agreement with the nearby cotton factory, the paxta zavod. This is
not really an actual factory, but more a collection point at which some pre-
processing tasks are completed. The factory is responsible for sorting, cleaning,
weighing, registering and then delivering the cotton further. The decisive point
is whether, at least on paper, the contract or agreement has been fulfilled or
not. How suitable the words “agreement” or “contract” actually are in this
context is another question. The state calculates, based on the size, location
and seed type, the expected output. While the plan is determined according
to these calculations, the fermer tries to minimize the targets in the plan. The
actual agreement is made behind closed doors.
￿ In both regions, Bukhara and Andijon, there are mainly cotton producers. In Romitan
￿￿.￿￿￿ ha land were set aside for cotton use and ￿.￿￿￿ ha for wheat in ￿￿￿￿.
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State support exists by providing infrastructure and other inputs but they
are not as strong as in Soviet times. While the state subsidizes the main
harvesting costs, input costs are kept as low as possible. Besides providing
seeds, diesel and other necessary things, the fermer are left to themselves to
meet other expenditures, in particular labour force. For this reason, they often
use family labour or recruit people ready to work for low and delayed wages.
The fermer actually function similar to the Uzbek state, simply on a smaller
scale, in respect to the input-output relations and expenditure cuts.
The state provides fermer with subsidized loans for inputs, which are done
by bank transfer but additional costs are not covered or compensated com-
pletely. The bank, xokimiyat and shirkat are all involved in this process that
the fermer struggle through. As part of the agreement, fermer get a tractor
from the shirkat as part of the infrastructural support and pay for the emerg-
ing costs. It is not unusual for a fermer and the tractor driver to come to
an agreement among themselves, which would be more favourable for both
parties. It is favourable for fermer who otherwise have to wait their turn in
order to use the limited number of tractors so that he can manage his agri-
cultural activities at the optimum time. It is favourable for the tractor driver
who can earn some additional money. It is less favourable for the shirkat and
certainly not possible to do this without the knowledge of its authorities who
may demand additional money or services from the fermer. Moreover, it is
quite diﬃcult to perform this task on the fields without being seen. If a trac-
tor driver secretly uses the tractor, for instance in the night for ploughing the
tomorqa, it can cause real anger. Still, this is the way things work. A fermer
described it with these words: “In the end, everything is done for the cotton
plan and success of the fermer is the success of the shirkat in every aspect”.
This dependency of the fermer on the services of the shirkat and the shirkat ’s
dependency on the crops of the fermer put them in a continuous bargaining
relationship. Not only are extra payments made in that process, but personal
relationships also play a role (having relatives or school friends). The old tech-
nology causes additional stress. One fermer expresses his worry as follows: “if
the tractor breaks down while on your field, you are in trouble and have to
pay for it.” (Sabir).
The independence a fermer or shirkat has is that they are allowed to sell
the rest of their produce after the target is reached. At least this is the situa-
tion on paper. It may be sold according to “contract” prices which are meant
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to create incentives to produce more than in the plan. Similar to the So-
viet period, reality and the state’s plan do not match and “. . . the produce
sold by collective farms significantly exceeds the share defined as “state order”
(Ilkhamov ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). In practice, the tuman authorities try to persuade or
force them to deliver the entire produce at fixed prices to the local collection
points. This shall insure that the tuman fulfils its total plan quota (levelling
other enterprises that were not able to make it).
The hope that individual farming would bring more profitability and in-
crease the yield did thus not come true. Fermer decided to stay non-transparent
in order to protect themselves and be prepared for the worst case, for example
if they have to pay a fine for an unfulfilled quota or lose the land lease. There
is no guarantee that any promises written in the contract will be kept in the
future if the wind starts to blow in a diﬀerent direction. In ￿￿￿￿, Romitan
tuman fulfilled ￿￿% of the cotton plan. In the entire viloyat of Bukhara, only
two tuman were able to reach ￿￿￿%. Since the performance of last year was
more or less the same, rumours circulated as to whether the xokim would lose
his position. While, in the end, he did manage to keep it, several shirkat rais
lost their positions after the first meeting. I was told that the xokim, who is
at the same time a fermer, also did not manage to fulfil his plan.
Among other things, insuﬃcient water is a good excuse for not fulfilling the
cotton plan. People often complain about the lack of water and that there is
not enough to irrigate or wash out the fields. If the kolkhoz fields are concerned,
then these complaints were often heard, partly as a mirror of reality and partly
as justification for not fulfilling the plans. Weather is another reason for failing
to fulfil the targets. Sometimes the wind blows the ears of the grain away. The
fermer were waiting and worrying about their targets, but at the same time
more meetings were converged.
“This year it did not work well with cotton anyway, since we were forced
to plant with plastic strips (pilyonka). I did not have any experience
before, but the rais forced us to use them and we had heard good things
about it. But the weather wasn’t good; we had lots of rain and the
seeds rotted under the pilyonka. We had to start from the beginning
again. Furthermore, I had to pay for everything from seeds to fuel. It
is not simply a financial problem – you also have to make the bank, the
xokimiyat and others understand.” (Gulshod)
While oﬃcially, the reasons for this are given as water scarcity and bad land
quality, in reality many fermer simply grow less cotton in order to use their
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fields for other crops.￿ This land misuse, although it is risky and allegedly there
is no tolerance, is not uncommon. I was told that some people actually take
this risk, while in other cases the xokimiyat and shirkat would turn blind eyes
as they also profited from the arrangements. How is it that nobody complains
about these relatively large divergences? The answer is actually simple and
similar to other situations in which people neglect to seek their rights. “If you
want to complain that you are in a disadvantage or there are misuses, who
are you going to complain to? All the chiefs are involved in it and you’ll lose
everything you have.” (Xalil)
“If you are a fermer, you are seen as a private entrepreneur, and your
problems are also seen as an entrepreneur’s problem. Nobody cares.
You pay ￿.￿￿￿.￿￿￿ sum for one year’s leasing. Nobody cares about
the inflation or thinks about the fermer. If a thing costs ten sum and
you have to sell it for six sum, what kind of market economy is that?”
(Sardor)
Land and water are two significant resources for the plan fulfilment but
unless there is “good” cooperation with the xokimiyat, the plan cannot be
reached. There were fermer that were able to reach the determined target,
but lost their land due to other reasons. In the case of a dispute with the
xokim, he may recall the land or provide less water for the irrigation in the
next season. While these punishment methods also hurt the xokim, as the
productivity of the fields decreases, he hopes that the intimidation will have
some pedagogical eﬀect on the other fermer according to the motto “avoid
conflict and do what you’re told.” Cooperation with state oﬃcials at diﬀerent
levels is thus another significant factor of success. In the eyes of the local
government, the fermer and the kolkhozcu do not show enough commitment
to the common aim, namely, to fulfil the tuman’s cotton plan:
“Many kolkhozcu go to the bazaar close to Bukhara and sell vegetables
and some other stuﬀ. They did not show the necessary insight into the
importance of cotton, so the cotton plan is not fulfilled, and the xokim
is very angry now. In Chilongu, only half of the fermer fulfilled the
plan. The reason behind that is that the fermer do not work properly.“
(Maxmut)
It does not matter how good fermer are linked to the xokimiyat and how
cooperative they work, there is still a large amount of pressure on them due
￿ See also Trevisani (￿￿￿￿:￿￿) for unoﬃcial land use.
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to the plan. A fermer, whom I knew well and who had good connections
to the xokimiyat, was asked every evening by his children, if he had fulfilled
the plan. “Tomorrow, tomorrow, definitely tomorrow”, was the usual answer.
The children were worried since everybody talks about the plans and they had
heard stories about fermer who had lost their lease in one or two years. In
that respect families not only lose an income resource, they also, due to failed
investments, have debts to repay. This puts them in a highly insecure situation.
The failure or the success of fermer is something known by everybody.
In order to cope with plans and other bureaucratic diﬃculties, fraud and
under-the-table arrangements were a very common practice. One way to do so
is that the factory can sign the paper that confirms the plan-fulfilment even if
it is not the case. But doing that is of course not without a service in return.
To cover it up, either additional cotton is sought on the free market (if the
price is lower than the bribe) or a similar agreement is struck by the factory
with the next level up (again, only if the costs are less than the bribe). One
informant felt uncomfortable to talk about it but he started to tell:
“If we talk about truth and reality, the plan is bought. You pay and
buy the plan with dollars if you cannot fulfil it. It means the agreement
is not accomplished. Sometimes it is not possible to fulfil, and one then
buys it from the zavod by paying dollars. You can cheat and then on
paper the plan is fulfilled. In that case you do not get the other benefits
like cotton-seed oil or oil cake, but if you actually fulfil the plan you also
don’t always get the benefits which were guaranteed in the agreement.”
(Xalil)
The positive or negative performance of a fermer thus cannot always or
maybe not even primarily be explained by his land quality or access to water.
Although contractual agreements do determine everything on paper, there is
room to manoeuvre for some people. But how can unfulfilled plans actually
be fulfilled? How can this fraud continue? One possibility is to buy the
missing amount from other fermer who are selling some of their cotton on
the black market in order to make some money. While the fermer is allowed
to keep the surplus amount, any missing amount has to be compensated as a
punishment. Those fermer can compensate the amount by selling cotton on
the black market and using that money to pay their punishment. Depending
on the amount bought and sold, it can be a good deal for both sides as the
other party can thus fulfil his target. The other option, as described above,
is to bribe the zavod and get the document that proves the plan is fulfilled.
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Numbers are then manipulated back and forth up to the highest level. I was
told that this is a system in which cotton is “cheated” and shifted “underhand”
from top to bottom.
“Cheating starts at the very bottom, of course. The kolkhozcu take
cotton to Kyrgyzstan, where they can sell it at a considerably better
price. At the middle and upper level, they take and give. Every year
the plan is fulfilled on paper. Either the missing amount is bought or
the people are bribed. At the upper levels the profit is bigger than at
lower levels”. (Firdausi)
The question remains of how this all can work out. Do the president and
other top oﬃcials don’t know that the cotton export is lower than the amount
oﬃcially delivered by the various provinces? This was usually answered by
the following simple statement: “Of course the top people know. But they
profit from it as well, otherwise it would not work, just like in Rashidov’s
period.” People were thus referring to the infamous cotton scandal. Starting
in the ￿￿’s and continuing into the early ￿￿’s, fake statistics of cotton plans
were made and large quantities of cotton were paid for that had never been
produced (Spoor ￿￿￿￿, McCauley ￿￿￿￿, Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿). In ￿￿￿￿, Gorbachev
described the situation in Uzbekistan, as one in which “negative processes
have been manifest in their more acute form” since Moscow’s directives and
authority had been seriously eroded by ethnic and local-interest networks while
“nepotism”, “bribery” and “cheating” were seen as some of the reasons that
perverted the personal policies. The dimension of the charges led some local
Russian oﬃcials but mainly indigenous personal to have to leave their positions
or being arresting like the then general secretary of the Communist Party in
Uzbekistan, Rashidov. Many oﬃcials in diﬀerent cadres were involved in this
scandal at that time by bribe taking and padding reports. “According to the
prosecutor of Uzbekistan, in that republic alone the state paid more than one
billion (￿,￿￿￿ million) roubles in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿ for cotton that was never produced,
according to the ”most modest” expert estimates” (Critchlow ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). Similar
methods of problem solving existed during my stay. The toleration in the past
helped to make the system work. And although some of the reasons may be
diﬀerent today, I think the idea “making the system work”, continues to exist in
post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The diﬀerence today is that it is a national problem.￿
￿ See Fiermann (￿￿￿￿) for the attitude of Karimov after ￿￿￿￿ to undo things related to the
scandal like rehabilitation of some convicted people. The most famous of these is certainly
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It is not Moscow’s policy anymore.
In reality, plans and agreements are just one part of the story. One day,
Gulnoza was complaining about the kolkhoz rais and others. A new decree
informed the fermer that the wheat plan had changed and that they now
have to submit more than mentioned in the contract. And that was not all.
Gulnoza and other fermer could not start with the wheat cultivation because
the viloyat xokim held one of his unexpected visits to the kolkhozes in order
to check the fields and the course of work. As usual in these situations, he was
not satisfied with the way things were. For instance, necessary places were not
cleaned up and prepared for the coming work. He used a common method of
sanctioning and punishing the fermer by sending the reapers to other tuman,
in this case to Karakol and Olot. For the viloyat xokim, it does not matter as
to which tuman is more successful as his political survival is dependent on the
success of the entire viloyat. This is not the case for the tuman xokim.
The case of Gulnoza is an example, although not necessarily typical, of
the treatment of fermer by the xokimiyat. She is a widow in her ￿￿’s and the
only female fermer in the kolkhoz. She lived with her son, daughter-in-law,
grandchildren and mother. She has the attitude and the reputation of being
strong and able to manage things. This reputation was more than confirmed
after her conflict with the tuman governor.
“They told me at the beginning that once you have fulfilled the wheat
plan, you are to give the rest of the wheat to them, who then register
it and give it back to you. But they did not give it back. They kept
my surplus. I gave the amount of wheat the contract said I had to and
I was supposed to be allowed to keep the rest. I sued them and won
the case in the tuman. But the xokimiyat appealed and the case went
to a higher court in Bukhara, which confirmed the tuman’s decision.
The entire process went eight months. I won, something that nobody
believed to be possible. Once again we signed the agreement this year,
although many things are not clear. The xokim has one month’s time
to withdraw the agreement, otherwise it is valid.”
Gulnoza got her wheat back from the kolkhoz and she distributed some of
it to her kolkhozcu. She organized a common meal at the school; she bought
books, pens and other things for the school children. This behaviour of her
the former general secretary of the communist party in Uzbekistan, Sharaf Rashidov. Since
the same native Uzbek cadres were involved after independence, pardoning them was more
important (Cavanaugh ￿￿￿￿). It is also not unusual to name squares and streets after these
people like Sharaf Rashidov Street in Tashkent.
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was much appreciated by the village inhabitants and it was a message towards
the tuman and especially to the xokimiyat. “What the xokim took away from
me was not only mine but also it was taken away from others”, she said. Her
struggle and dispute with the tuman was greeted with mixed feelings in the
village. Even if she was right, what she did was seen as risky for her as well as
for the other fermer. Some fermer were scared that because of her they would
suﬀer from the xokim’s bad mood. For some, however, her fight and struggle
for her rights and her success helped others who could also profit from it.
“There are other fermer who also suﬀer. The procurer of the tuman
told me to find someone in a similar situation and bring him or her with
me to sue the xokim. I could not find anybody who would take that step
with me. The xokim threatened and harassed me. He sent people to
check my fields, if I had planted anything besides that in the agreement.
He also cut the amount of water I got. He also threatened to take my
land from me if my target wasn’t reached. “
Gulnoza had become a fermer in the first place with the help of the kolkhoz
rais who had settled the arrangements with the xokim. While they are related,
he was also involved in disputes with Gulnoza. Her court case success was
out of the control of the local government and it wasn’t possible to sweep
it under the rug like many other things. For a woman, she was loud and
used her situation of being a widow and being vulnerable as a weapon against
the xokimiyat. Otherwise, being humiliated by the xokimiyat is not something
unusual. As a woman, Gulnoza was, verbally and physically, treated with more
care than a man. In fact, being a widow helped Gulnoza more than having
a husband would have. As a widow struggling for her livelihood, she enjoyed
more respect. If she had a husband he would have been the person that would
have been harassed. She is proud of herself as being the only woman in this
men’s world. Her success in the past in suing the xokim made her braver and
this attitude led others to talk about her in a negative manner as if she were
mad.
“Last year, out of ￿￿ fermer (in the Bukhara viloyat) I was the only
one seeking my rights. The xokim said that I would be confronted with
all kind of diﬃculties, I told you all. However, the judge was a woman.
I think that was good for me. Do you know why? If she were a man, it
would be easier to buy him. The whole time they would have told him
“let’s go out for lunch or dinner” or “take this as a gift”. That was my
luck.“
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What Gulnoza points out here are the well-known and never ending meet-
ings of state oﬃcials and fermer. These meetings, especially the evening meet-
ings, started in the xokimiyat and ended in a restaurant or chayxona, where
shashlik, plov and vodka is served. If somebody wants to be a fermer or al-
ready is one and needs problems to be solved, then he or she covers the costs of
the entire evening. This also explains why people think they have good reasons
to cheat because the conditions are highly unfair and the system supports it.
This is true for all levels of society.
“The kolkhozcu do not want to pick cotton other than the first or
second sort (grade of raw cotton). They are right; it is diﬃcult to pick
the other sorts. They are small and diﬃcult to reach. The xokim asked
the viloyat xokim to send him ￿￿￿￿ people to support him during the
cotton picking. The answer he received was: get things done yourself,
you should manage, it is your tuman. Our xokim actually did not want
to send the children to the fields, but he has to.” (Shukrat)
￿.￿ Technology and Labour Organisation
Besides a tractor, which is needed for the preparation of the fields for certain
crops like wheat, no other machine is used. Most of the work is done manually.
After independence the amount of machine picked cotton, which was almost
two thirds of the production, dropped radically and is at present only ten% of
the total harvested in Uzbekistan; the rest is picked by hand.￿ The case of the
private plots is similar, not only because of its size but also due to its layout
and the sort of crops planted, which do not allow or need any mechanical
equipment. Manual labour is available and suﬃcient. If a fermer family owns
its own tractor, it is usually also used in their tomorqa; otherwise tractors have
to be rented either from a private person or from the kolkhoz. But the other
solution, which is illegal but cheaper, is to pay the kolkhoz tractor driver for
his time and for the petrol needed. A long term and eﬀective solution to the
problems of Uzbek agriculture necessitates financial investments in technology,
labour and water. The decline in mechanization is one of the main problems.
After independence, MTP’s (Machine Tractor Parks) came to be diﬀerent than
￿ EJF Report (Environmental Justice Foundation).
http://www.ejfoundation.org/page￿￿￿.html visited in: ￿￿.￿￿.￿￿￿￿
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in the Soviet time.￿ There were fewer machines in use and new technology was
limited.
“You need zapcha (spare parts) for the tractor. We do not get the
Russian parts any more or only irregularly. They have to be ordered; if
you order them, you do not know if you will get them in time. And after
you replace one part, you’ll have to replace another. Nobody discusses
the problem; the chiefs just want the things to work.” (Xalil)
Most people are still partial to Russian technology. Not only do they know
how to use it, but it is also seen as more suitable for the present conditions.
This is especially the case for people who learned to work during the Soviet
period. Skills and knowledge of Russian tractors or technology exist in abun-
dance. Shifts from acquainted technology are seen as challenging and make
people uncomfortable. The Russian tractors have a sprocket system, which
was seen as robust and as best suitable for Uzbek soil, especially for places like
Bukhara. They have power that American tractors do not have. In contrast,
the new tractors produce more dust and don’t penetrate deep enough into the
soil. However, for people who depend on technology for their fields, such as
the fermer, a regular availability is more valuable than the place of origin of
the tools.
“The new tractors destroy the ground and break easily. Maybe the new
technologies can be eﬀective but in the end how and where do you get
the spare parts from? These are not only expensive but also hard to get
in time. In agriculture, things must be done in time.” (Ali)
In the valley, the kolkhoz attitude towards the new tractors was not diﬀer-
ent than in Bukhara. There were ￿￿ tractors in the kolkhoz and nine of them
were new. These new ones were from the Tashkent tractor factory and had an
American motor. Ali’ was not particularly enthusiastic about these tractors,
as they raised too much dust. He preferred the old Russian tractors but they
are slowly breaking down and can not be replaced completely. The kolkhoz is
in charge of small spare part replacements; kolkhoz and fermer together when
it comes to larger ones. Ali worked in MTPs before independence and also dur-
ing the economic restructurings. He misses the past, before the emergence of
new production units like the fermer, when MTPs were more powerful. “. . . in
￿ During the Soviet period these were called MTS (Machine Tractor Station). Today,
they give farms heavy equipment in return for pay. This is arranged by contract and is paid
out in products or cash (cf. Butterfield ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿; Takao ￿￿￿￿).
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the past, we were independent; we did not beg the kolkhoz for our needs. We
were a separate department, but now things have changed”.
Technological dependency is especially relevant in larger-scale farming.
Only a few of the fermer have their own tractor. I was told that in the entire
Bukhara viloyat, ￿￿ fermer leased tractors and eight of those were in Romitan
tuman. If a fermer were to decide to buy a tractor, he would probably buy a
Russian one, as they are cheaper than the American ones but better than the
Uzbek-American ones. Money was therefore a more important issue than any
of the other ones mentioned before. A fermer could buy an Uzbek-American
tractor for four million sum, pay ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ immediately and pay the rest oﬀ in ￿
– ￿ years. A Russian tractor costs about ￿ – ￿￿ million sum, while an American
one costs about ￿￿ – ￿￿ millions.
Besides new versions of the already existent technology, a new cotton culti-
vation method with plastic film is also used. This new technology, however, is
controversial and not particularly welcomed by kolkhozcu. While it was first
used in Romitan during my stay, it was in fact more common in the Ferghana
Valley. The cottonseeds are planted under plastic strips, called pilyonka, which
keep the seeds warm so they begin to develop quicker and sprout. The holes
in the pilyonka are widened by hand so as to create space for the growing
shoots. After a month, the pilyonka is taken away and the young plants are
thinned out by removing some of the leaves, five shoots in one meter. When
they reach the size of a hand span, the pilyonka is completely removed for
weeding, fertilizing and watering.
Since the cotton fibre maturity is reached at an earlier stage than by the
conventional method and the water does not evaporate that easily, less water
is needed and the quantity of the crop can be increased, which are arguments
by the shirkat who prefer this method. Further, the possibility that the fields
can be, due to the pilyonka, used for other crops after the cotton season makes
the pilyonka also be preferred by some kolkhozcu. However, if the pilyonka is
blown away by the wind, it has to be replaced. There are also more worms
under the pilyonka, which can damage the cotton. However, since there is
enough labour power to remove the worms, this does not serve as an adequate
argument against the pilyonka. Cotton is not cultivated under pilyonka in
all places; it is mostly used in the Andijon viloyat, but not in the Ferghana
viloyat.
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“Here in Andijon, pilyonka is dominant, that is, however, not the case
in Ferghana. Cotton cultivation is done according to the order of the
xokim. It is probably done in Andijon since the owner of the pilyonka
factory is a relative of the xokim.” (Axmat)
Pilyonka as a new technology is not welcomed in Bukhara, as it was per-
ceived disadvantageous. If the amount of water is not correctly managed,
especially if too much water runs under the pilyonka, everything rots as the
plastic mixes with the soil and cotton. According to kolkhozcu, using pilyonka
ripens cotton ￿￿ days earlier than the conventional method, which is not worth
at all.
“It may work in the valley, but not here. Our soil is pure loam. When
it rains, the pilyonka mixes with the loam and you lose the cotton. Last
time we started earlier. The tuman told us to start with the cottonseed
planting, although we said it was too early. It turned out to be a mistake,
of course, as it rained heavily and we had to remove the pilyonka and
everything else and start from the beginning again.” (Shukrat)
Another problem with pilyonka nobody seemed to worry about are its
ecological consequences. The used strips were lying near the fields, blowing
away and found hanging on trees. Also. the pilyonka made the reflections
of the sun stronger and I was told that “Chinese quality” sunglasses do not
protect the eyes from complications. Many kolkhozcu also complained about
how expensive it is to buy good sunglasses and some are even skeptical as to
if they even really protect the eyes.
While the current period is thus often described as “time of work”, partly
due to the de-mechanization, the socialist era is also depicted as harsh. More
cotton meant more fields; more fields meant more water and a greater demand
for labour. Cotton is labour intensive and needs more water than any other
crop. Omida, who is in her late ￿￿s, remembers the pressure of the Soviet
era. Her husband was a brigade chief who forced her to work in the fields even
though she had just given birth to a child. He did this so people would see he
was doing his job and would also feel responsible enough to work in the fields.
It was not uncommon for people to avoid labouring in the fields and simply
work on their own plots. Children were also forced to join cotton-picking teams
so as to meet the targets, which is no diﬀerent today (Carley ￿￿￿￿, Gleason
￿￿￿￿, Spoor ￿￿￿￿, Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿).
As became clear in the preceding section, decision-making is a top down
aﬀair. One part of this is the regular meetings (yighilish) concerned with the
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fermer duties and administrative orders, as well as information updates and
“reports” about the progress of the harvest. An interlocutor complained about
being very tired because of these meetings, not only due to their frequency, but
also their length. These meetings always deal with the same contents, namely
planning and observing the stages of agricultural activity. They would often
take place in the early morning or late night.
“You continuously have sessions and meetings. Sometimes there are
meetings every day, hours after hours. And for what? For Nothing.
You spend time waiting. The kolkhoz rais or the xokim will tell you
that the plan must be fulfilled. It is about finding a scapegoat for the
problems, to make somebody responsible. . . . They need two or three
hours for things they could say in an hour, and it is always the same
things: ‘Clean up and prepare the fields, water the plants’.” (Akram)
At the very bottom, the kolkhozcu decides nothing himself, he is told ev-
erything. While they play a very important role in the production process,
they are the farthest down on the cotton cultivation hierarchy. If things don’t
turn out as planned the kolkhozcu is reprimanded and told to think and care
more for the cotton.￿￿
Around the ￿￿th of March, cottonseeds were planted in Bukhara. Before
that the ground had been prepared – usually in January depending on the
weather. The soil is cleaned and watered two to three times depending on
the amount of water available.￿￿ Olufsen describes the salty soil using the
following these words:
‘One thing is very injurious to the agriculturist in Bokhara, namely the
salt which is everywhere apt to the appear, and in the mountains the
wide grass-fields often shine and smell of salt which fills the grass-tufts
like hoar frost.” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿)
￿￿ to ￿￿ cm interval holes are dug and three to four seeds are placed in
it hoping that one of them will grow. The seeds are kept in water. Seeding
is done by tractor. The dust caused by the tractor makes the work on the
fields diﬃcult and exhausting for the kolkhozcu. When I was on the fields, it
was explained to me that health problems caused by pesticides and herbicides
￿￿ In ￿￿￿￿, employment in the agricultural sector was ￿￿.￿% of the economically active
population; this is nearly three million people (Khudoyberdiyev ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
￿￿ Kandiyoti describes the same procedure for the neighbouring province Khorezm
(￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
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during the Soviet period don’t happen anymore, as the former are forbidden
and also too expensive. I was, however, also told the opposite by others.
In August and September the cotton bolls mature and the picking season
starts. This must be done as soon as possible before it rains, which would lead
to quality loss. The quality of cotton balls picked at later points decreases.
First grade cotton is harvested in the first few weeks. In later periods, mainly
children still work in the fields. With their small hands they can pick the
last small cotton balls, while the adults are at that point already engaged in
other activities. The payments to pickers also decline parallel to the cotton
grades. I was told that the payment diﬀerence among the first and third grade
is almost half. But it is not unusual for fermer to pay the corresponding
amount of money to cotton pickers. In that respect, kolkhozcu talk about the
fermer according to his or her personal experiences, and whether promises are
kept making him or her being a “good” or a “bad” fermer regarding a proper
payment in time.
This is the most labour-intensive period for the entire village. Mobilizing
the village’s population, including the children, for the harvest is not uncom-
mon and was also done in Soviet times. It is seen as a “national duty” of
everybody to join the harvest. It is not a question of choice; people are obliged
to provide labour support in the peak periods. Not only is this the duty of
the kolkhoz, but also of many other institutions able to provide additional
labour, especially schools. Several months are spent with watering and weed-
ing (roughly from until August) and the fruit – the cotton balls – is waiting
to be picked according to the motto of “hamma paxtaga” (“everybody to the
cotton fields!”), written everywhere. Government buildings also seemed to be
empty as the personnel was either in the fields themselves or at a meeting –
but definitely engaged in some activity that had to do with cotton. After a
few vain attempts at visiting the xokimiyat, I was told not to come back before
the work in the cotton fields was finished as nobody were to be found in their
oﬃces.￿￿ “Cotton stress” can continue until November and December until
nothing is left unpicked in the fields so as to fulfil the targets. The quantity
￿￿ I was happy to get this information since at the beginning I was given a diﬀerent
answer every day. I was not told that people do not appear at work during the picking
season, but simply that the person was “not here today” or would be “coming later”. I was
even sometimes asked to sit and wait by somebody, who later disappeared, until I was told
by someone else that I should better leave. “Wait” or “now” in the Uzbek context is always
associated with a later point in time than the word would actually imply, or may not indicate
any specific time in the foreseeable future.
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and quality of this cotton is low by then because of the rain or first snow.
The teachers are also brought to the fields by their duty to supervise the
children. While the school year starts in September, nobody was at school
at that time during my stay, as all students and teachers were absent picking
cotton. I was told that starting from seventh grade children were subject to
compulsory cotton picking. The number of children and how many days they
were employed varied from one place to the other. Under the heat of the
sun, without enough food and breaks, cotton picking is an exhausting and
exploitative work. Sometimes children were sent for two or three months from
one place to another, where the necessary labour force was missing.
Another important person in the fields, in the past and present, is the
tractor driver. The mentioned tractor driver Ali has a heavy workload from
March to August. In March he starts ploughing and prepares the fields for the
cotton planting. After this, the entire field is filled with water to wash out the
salt and the water then drained out and re-routed into the canal. He would
then plant the cottonseeds by tractor and after ￿ – ￿ days the first sprouts
could be seen. The tractor is then no longer used as the cotton balls could be
damaged and manual labour intensifies. He ploughed around ten hectares a
day. After the cotton season, he would work in the wheat fields from August
until September or even November and then has “free time” between December
and February, which he uses for small repairs needed by the kolkhoz tractors.
As agriculture is the main income source for the state and the people, it be-
came very normal to meet people on the fields or see them preparing something
related. Furthermore, peoples’ private plots are also extremely important and
cannot be neglected. Doctors, teachers and others not directly related to the
kolkhoz or shirkat also spend significant time on their own plots. Child labour
or in the case of family internal work organisation – the help of the children – is
indispensible on the private plots. After school, the children help their parents
in the fields for many hours depending on the season. For instance, in summer,
when they do not have school, the children get up early and help their parents
before the summer heat makes it diﬃcult to work in the fields. During the
noon heat, they have lunch and relax at home before continuing. Sowing and
the harvest period keep the whole family busy. Children are very often used
also to bring things here, to bring things there. They carry information and
goods from home to the fields and back again. While post-independence chil-
dren learned things from their parents, in the past children received practical
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training in the eighth and ninth grade and worked in the kolkhoz – whoever
did not, was not allowed to attend an institution of higher-level education.
Since this system no longer exists, the children’s family is the most important
knowledge transmitter.
The work on the plots needs any labour available. Only the sick or very
young members are allowed to stay away from the fields.￿￿ Observing the
weather, calculating available resources and technical support, organising the
division of labour among the family members according to their other duties
and capacity; everything is thoroughly organised. Work in vegetable gardens
is based on family labour and the necessary manual work is done by diﬀerent
family members. While sowing is mostly the work of an adult male, women
and children do weeding. When fields needs water, the man give orders but
the children do it under his supervision. All family members participate in the
harvest of the crop. Mostly men make the decisions and make time planning
on what to cultivate, although in many cases other family members will be
consulted. It is a routine but a serious work to plan the usage of kitchen garden
as well as the tomorqa. The care of domestic livestock is also organized. If the
children are young, they are told how much fodder they should give to which
animal and what they should do and what not.
For children, working on the cotton fields and helping their families is part
of their daily life. Families are dependent on their labour power even if it
is used on their small family plots. Alisher told me that if the children learn
things during their childhood, they get used to the work and are able to manage
their lives easier. He tried to show and to teach them how, what and when to
plant, how to irrigate crops and how to organize their work. Besides helping
him on the field and at home, they got other jobs to do as a part of Alisher’s
education philosophy and preparation for the future life. Iskandar, the elder
son, sometimes left home at ￿.￿￿ am in order to sell onions on the neighbouring
village bazaar. Onions were normally transported by tractor with other loads
of people from the village. But Iskandar took the bus from the village since he
did not have a heavy load with him (ca. ￿￿ kg of onions). His younger brother
joined him at ￿.￿￿ am. The bazaar is closed at ￿￿ am so it is necessary to
be there early and sell the produce as quickly as possible. After the bazaar,
Alisher sent his sons to pluck weeds and grass for the animals, which grow in
scattered areas along the canals and between the fields where everybody has
￿￿ For more information on this subject see Wall & Evers ￿￿￿￿:￿
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free access. But at that point his mother intervened and said:
“You should also go and join them, otherwise it is a shame (uyat), if
only the kids work”. (Gulshat)
Private plots were also a place of knowledge transmission from one gener-
ation to another. Irrespective of the job and status of the person, these were
seen as a guarantee for reliable income and as a survival resource. Therefore
to teach children the necessary knowledge was seen as an essential part of their
education. According to Alisher, on the bazaar the children learn many dif-
ferent things. It is not only about money but they also need to occasionally
fight for their rights, for instance to get a good place where all the onion sellers
are, or not to be ignored or treated unfairly by others, especially by adults.
Waking up early and doing all these things, of course, costs them quite an
eﬀort and as a father Alisher recognizes and appreciates this. For Alisher their
schooling comes first, but knowledge of agriculture and animal keeping, as well
as dealing successfully with money were necessary to be successful and survive.
“Now the circumstances are tougher than when we grew up. Even when
they study and get a job as a lawyer or a procurer, they should know
these things. They need to know how to calculate and know the value
of money. If they earn some money by themselves, they will appreciate
it.”
In contrast, Alisher’s fifteen-year old daughter helped primarily at home
and occasionally in the fields. He managed to keep his daughter at home and
not send her to the fields for cotton picking thanks to his network since he
works at the school. According to him any work is better than on the cotton
fields. “Her work load at home is nothing to compare” he said.
“I do not want to send my daughter to other places for cotton picking.
Early in the morning they get merely a cup of tea with sugar and bread.
For lunch and dinner they get plain noodles. No bath and bad sleeping
facilities. They have their fixed daily ratio of how much cotton they have
to pick. She is not used to this kind of work and under these conditions,
it is really heavy work.”
The absence or downscaling of mechanization, as indicated, leads to more
labour being needed at the peak of the season. According to a survey coor-
dinated by Kandiyoti, the Uzbek case has some quite distinctive features in
this respect (SOAS Working paper ￿￿￿￿). Cheap labour is provided especially
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by children and by people who have no alternative. This intensively used and
very cheap labour force allows the Uzbek government to make huge profits
on the world market. The cotton producers like the fermer are also not the
ones making the major profit, but the “nominally state-controlled joint-stock
trading companies” gain wealth with their non-transparent operations (SOAS
Working paper ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Because of the violations of signed agreements on the
protection of children’s rights, some international companies have started to
ban products with Uzbek cotton. Also, with the help of a new technology, re-
tailers can trace the blended cotton, which originates from diﬀerent countries,
leading to companies like Tesco in the UK to withdraw their contracts.￿￿
A simple look at the child labour practices, as described above, shows the
reality in the cotton sector in Uzbekistan. It is one of the most problematic
aspects of cotton growing. Although Uzbekistan signed the ILO Convention
￿￿￿ there has been no improvement in that respect.￿￿ The cotton work during
the Soviet time was no less important than today. Continuous dependence
on cotton exports in present Uzbekistan and the recruitment of child labour
for this purpose has its roots in the Soviet command economy, according to
experts.
“Global patterns suggest that it is generally families and/or employers
who tend to be the major initiators and beneficiaries of children’s work.
Uzbekistan represents a rare instance of state-sanctioned mass mobiliza-
tion of children’s labour. The principal beneficiaries are not households
or primary producers but state-controlled trading companies higher up
the value chain. Their exclusive control over cotton export revenues
and their ability to appropriate the profits generated by the disparity
between domestic and international market prices gives them a stake in
the maintenance of the current procurement and labour control regime
(SOAS Working Paper ￿￿￿￿ p:vi).
￿￿ For instance, Tesco, Marks and Spencer in the UK and Wal-Mart in the USA banned
products containing Uzbek cotton.
http://www.rferl.org/content/Seeds_Of_Child_Labour_Lie_Deep_In_Uzbek_Cotton_Industry/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.html
(visited:￿￿.￿￿.￿￿)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/￿￿￿￿/may/￿￿/retail-ethicalbusiness (vis-
ited:￿￿.￿￿.￿￿￿￿)
￿￿ “The government of Uzbekistan appears to be in breach of several ILO Conventions to
which it is signatory. These include the ￿￿￿￿ Minimum Age Convention, No. ￿￿￿; the ￿￿￿￿
Worst forms of Child labour Convention, No. ￿￿￿; the ￿￿￿￿ Forced Labour Convention, No.
￿￿￿.” (SOAS Working Paper ￿￿￿￿:vi).
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￿.￿ Diversification of Income Sources
The hard work in the Soviet Union had its benefits; wages were suﬃcient and
products were aﬀordable. This even though, according to some sources, Soviet
Central Asia was described as being poor and backward in comparison to other
parts of the Soviet Union and having a high population growth, unemployment
and lower wages than elsewhere (Rywkin ￿￿￿￿; Fierman ￿￿￿￿; Patnaik ￿￿￿￿).
Today, the only people paid by the state are teachers, medical personnel
and administrative staﬀ. Being employed by the state means having a regular
income. Although the salaries are diﬀerent than in the past, a job is still seen
as a certain guarantee of security, not least because of the various networks
and other possibilities it enables. This is not the case for kolkhozcu who
form the bulk of the rural population. Very few people work outside the
kolkhoz. One person I knew worked at the airport in Bukhara. Another
worked as the operator of a gas station near Marxamat. He had previously
been working in the state neft (petrol) company and later received the license
for the gas station. In the countryside another important private business is
transportation. People drive others around in their cars or mini buses, or work
as a hired driver. A regular bus connection, which existed in the past, basically
disappeared as the Uzbek state withdrew from this sphere of responsibility.
At the time of my research, state employees made ￿￿ to ￿￿ dollars a month
and were, with a few exceptions, paid regularly. Other salaries are in a similar
range, although less reliably paid in time. On the contrary, pensions were
always paid regularly. A young family without job and wage security of the
past and working as kolkhozcu does not have it easy; not only because of the
low and irregular payments, but also because they have much less opportunity
to make additional money. However, having an older generation as part of the
household provides a small, yet steady and reliable income source. Tomorqa
of the retired generation can also be cultivated additionally.
In ￿￿￿￿, his family had, according to Shukrat, a total monthly income of
the following. He as a schoolteacher earned ￿￿.￿￿￿ sum. His wife Zaynab, as
a medical assistant, received ￿.￿￿￿ sum. His parents together had ￿￿.￿￿￿ sum
pension, which was well above the average. These were the oﬃcial payments
without any additional income source. They were altogether seven people,
living and eating from one pot. I should admit that in my visits to families with
limited income possibilities, like young kolkhozcu family with small children,
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talking about the income and the expenditures was not an easy subject. The
house, furnishing and other obvious indicators not only make it diﬃcult to talk
about hard numbers, but also unnecessary. As an ethnographer, who enters
their lives, observes and asks questions, it is not necessary to ask things that
are obvious. When talking to people of other, higher income levels, it was,
in fact, much easier to talk about concrete numbers.￿￿ I had the feeling that
even visiting them and talking to them at all, being a guest, was a burden
since it forced them to be good hosts and cook for me, which signified a major
expenditure in their household budget.
The life of the kolkhozcu was aﬀected by more radical changes than any
other people in rural Uzbekistan. In the past, the kolkhoz oﬀered them a
regular job and suﬃcient wages. It had, as Humphrey (￿￿￿￿) pointed out, many
more functions beyond employment. In spite of this, the collectives remained
state production units and many workers kept their ties to the kolkhoz or
sought employment with the new established fermer. As mentioned, fermer
were usually forced to take all the workers previously employed in the brigade
on his land. However, these workers often do not receive their salaries, as
their employers also do not get their compensation in time. The cash payment
is highest during the cotton-picking season; otherwise most of the time there
is a struggle with the shirkat and fermer in order to get some money. As
elaborated above, unpaid salaries are compensated not only in products but
also by allowing kolkhozcu to cultivate for their own needs after the harvest
on the fields (see also Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿). Still, the kolkhozcu lost more than
anyone else in the restructuring process in agriculture. They work the land
given to them by the shirkat and deliver their target in the hope that they can
use the land afterwards for their own basic needs. The saddest thing is that
the benefits of the kolkhoz disappeared and left the kolkhozcu with nothing.
How much he or she works doesn’t matter to the shirkat or fermer, as there is
enough labour supply available.
“It was good in the ￿￿’s. We had a monthly salary plus an additional
payment (yearly). After the cotton season we got cotton seed-oil and
other benefits. Now, in this new way of thinking, we cannot manage.
You get what you work for on a daily basis, however, only if the fermer
gets his benefits, such as oil. First the fermer must be paid and only
￿￿ I do not claim that only low-income group hide and others speak frankly. What I try
to say is that it is easier to show and talk about income if somebody has enough to live oﬀ.
Of course, the reality in that aspect is still hidden.
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then can he pay.” (Timur)
On the other hand, fermer and shirkat complained how unreliable the
kolkhozcu were. It was not rare that kolkhozcu would stop going to the fields
and the fermer would try to get them to start work again. What also happens
is when a kolkhozcu urgently needs money he may disappear and go to work
in Bukhara as a daily labourer (merdikor) and then return to work for the
fermer again. The salary of a kolkhozcu working for a shirkat is merely paid
for five months. As mentioned, throughout this period he cares for a piece of
land (between ￿.￿ and ￿ ha) and it is his responsibility. In this time period
cottonseeds are planted, the field is cared for and irrigated. ￿,￿￿￿ to ￿,￿￿￿ a
month is paid making a total of ￿￿,￿￿￿ to ￿￿,￿￿￿, in most cases to be paid
in flour. During the picking season there is no salary and money is earned
depending on the collected amount of cotton. One of my interlocutors had ￿￿
sot and for ￿.￿ tons of picked cotton he got ￿￿,￿￿￿ sum. The rest of the time
there is no work and no payment. Whether working for fermer or for shirkat,
the burden of the cotton plan rests on the shoulders of the kolkhozcu.
It is impossible to survive with a salary that low even if paid regularly.
The expenses people have, whether as a kolkhozcu, a teacher or a fermer, are
much more than their income. The Uzbek puzzle thus is, how it is possible
to regularly spend more than what one earns, with life-cycle ceremonies being
so expensive. Talking about oﬃcial employment and salaries is not a diﬃcult
subject and people talked freely about how poorly they are paid. However, it is
obvious that people could not aﬀord their living simply with their state salaries.
A definition of what the main income source and what the supplementary
income sources are, is diﬃcult. State salaries may not actually be the main
income source(s), but simply open doors for other income source(s).
The decisive point is often not what they actually earn, but what they
can make through their positions. Significant parts of their income come from
unregistered work and payments. For older people the possibility of alternative
incomes are more limited, which makes them even more dependent on pensions.
This led many households to seek new income sources, which were strongly
based on the informal sector, household plots and the second crop economy.
For many people there were no longer many alternatives if they decided to
stay at home and not move to Tashkent, Kazakstan or Russia. One should
not think that there are no other alternatives for additional income sources –
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based on activities of a legal, illegal or mixed character.
Of outmost importance here are the private plots. As mentioned before,
land is a scare good and without water it has little use. During the Soviet
time, the small plots were seen as more important than the collective fields
or one’s job. They were not the main provider of a households’ income since
the salaries were regularly and suﬃciently paid, but they were supplementary
to the income. After independence they did not lose any significance. On
the contrary, for many households they became the main source of income
and livelihood. Today investing more time in one’s own plot is the often
only possibility for having access to the market so people can get fair prices
and money necessary for immediate needs. As with pensions, additional plots
of one’s parents are highly beneficial. For everybody, for every occupational
status, private plots oﬀer an essential income source. A young doctor in the
valley who was working in the tuman centre, did not even earn enough for
his livelihood. Once when we were talking in the courtyard of his house, he
showed me the grapevine and a hanging bunch of grapes.
“By keeping these grapes for winter I can earn more money than my
entire salary. We try to cultivate whatever we can; watermelons, toma-
toes, potatoes, fruits, vegetables. Besides our plots, we have two pieces
of land for constructing a house for my brothers. Until we begin with
the construction, we also use that land.” (Akram)
Another source of income available to everybody is, as mentioned, animal
keeping. Although Uzbeks are not nomads and animal husbandry is not the
main economic activity, today it has become more and more important for
economic welfare. Unless one urgently needs money, for example in the case of
a sickness, the money will be re-invested in livestock without any interruption.
If this works, it brings a certain amount of relaxation and security to the family.
This is a kind of general recipe, which serves as a possibility to improve one’s
living standard. Rich and well-oﬀ families have often ten and more kara mal
and some sheep. Middle-class families come along with two or three kara mal
and a few sheep.
“A poor person is a person without mal. If you are intelligent, you know
how to get cattle unless you are sick or lazy. If you manage to increase
the number of animals, you are fine. . . . Do you see, this one will be
fattened and then we will sell it. It is important for the house, which we
are going to build for my son.” (Axmat)
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People who have no mal are either not able to buy one or have to sell what
they have. The reason can be immediate need for cash, e.g. due to health
problems, or for other large expenses like house construction or a wedding
ceremony. Animal husbandry is the main source of money for these kinds of
expenditures. Ideally, one buys animals and fattens them before being sold.
But many kolkhozcu have neither the money for fodder nor other cash money
resource, so that usually they sell the livestock before they get fat.
„If you have one million sum in your pocket, you can do business with
livestock. In the village, there are perhaps a few people who can do
it. Buy from the poor, fatten them and sell them. That’s how you can
make money in the market. “ (Shukrat)
The search for additional income sources is not something new in indepen-
dent Uzbekistan. During the Soviet Period there was also an informal sector
that was very important. Earning money additional to one’s oﬃcial salary or
even more than one’s salary was not unusual. The second economy is seen as
“an integral part of everyday life in all socialist societies” (Sampson ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿)
and there was a co-existence of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial sectors. Sampson classifies
under second economy, ”the informal or illegal activities that enterprises use
to fulfil their plan; underground factories; paying bribes or tips in order to buy
something in a store or to induce planners and controllers to revise plans; buy-
ing and reselling goods obtained from shops for foreigners; and selling scarce
or rationed goods taken from the sate” and he sees these activities as ”nei-
ther typically capitalist nor universally illegal” (￿￿￿). “[S[econd economy made
quasi market arrangements” (Kurkchiyan ￿￿￿￿:￿￿) like ‘islands of capitalism’
in which the spirit of free initiative thrives in spite of stifling bureaucracy”
(Sampson, ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
Trade is one major source of additional income. Few people work at the
bazaar permanently or engage in regional and long-distance trade with other
parts of the country. But this type of employment is based on non-regular
and insuﬃcient payments. Many kolkhozcu try to sell parts of their crops at
the market and get some cash. In addition, some collect the crops from other
households to bring it to the market and keep the profit. Zafar, for instance,
had some carrots, which exceeded his own consumption. Instead of making
the eﬀort to bring it to the market, somebody from the village came to him,
paid him ￿￿ sum less than the market price and sold the carrots at the market.
If he knows the person well and he is trustworthy, the person is allowed to pay
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the money after returning from the market.
In most villages, there is a number of private shops and few state shops, a
remnant of the past, which had a much smaller variety than the private ones.
Why and how these shops continued to exist is a puzzle I did not manage
to solve. Business trips are usually done at night and traders return to the
village in the early morning. The owner of one shop told me that coming soon,
they would not be allowed to sell foreign goods; they should merely sell Uzbek
goods. Another and very common possibility is to buy one thing here and to
sell it somewhere else therefore making a profit.
“What can we sell, if we don’t sell foreign goods? Are there Uzbek
products; are there Uzbek textile products for example? Everything is
from China, how can it work?” (Ulugbek)
Other sources are of a less legal nature. Often, these activities can be
directly related to the main job. For instance, a garage worker doing repairs
would receive a salary and a certain percent of the money but his main income
came from his engagements after working hours on a private basis. In the
sector of higher education, giving private lessons is an especially good source
of income (see also Rasanayagam ￿￿￿￿b). Many people would talk about
“buying diplomas” and the view that students could get their titles without
attending classes is widespread. Similarly, doctors can charge extra money for
their services, for providing beds in the hospital or by asking for money for
an operation. This additional income is, of course, diﬃcult to separate from
bribes. Payments can also be given in form of gifts.￿￿ A good bookkeeper can
work for another institution and get some additional money although oﬃcially
he can only be employed at his first workplace.
“Everybody gets extra money aside from their salaries. Teachers, doc-
tors, drivers, they all ask for extra money in order for them to do their
jobs. The only people without any money and not able to ask for money
are the kolkhozcu.” (Rashid)
Complementary incomes are not always directly linked to people’s main job,
at least not at first glance. One state oﬃcial in Chilongu, who was working in
the xokimiyat responsible for the payment of the pensions, also had a flourmill
in the village. His son was in charge of the mill and so they got some additional
money for the entire household. Out of ￿￿ kg wheat they got ten kg bran and
￿￿ See Werner (￿￿￿￿) for the case of Kazakstan.
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￿￿ kg flour, and for each kilo the mill owner received four sum. Another family
in the valley owned a separator, which is used to make cream from milk. A
group of families would come together and everyday one of them give milk and
gets cream. The payment is also made by allowing the owner of the separator
to keep a portion of the cream and milk. Another case is that of the caretaker
of a water pump in a village near Romitan. As a widow of ￿￿ she is living
with her son, daughter-in-law and three grandchildren. She is responsible for
the water pump and the needed equipment. Together with her son, she gets
￿￿.￿￿￿ sum for this job and was hoping to get ownership rights of the water
pump.
”If it were private, I could sell the water. Just like other people get land
for cotton, I want to get the pump. If I don’t take care of the pump the
cables, other people will take metal and iron parts of the motor away.
During the Soviet time nobody cared and nobody needed these parts
but nowadays they can be sold on the market for a profit.” (Gulnoza)
It is especially welcomed and favoured by parents if their daughters earn
money by sewing and baking. In every village there are some women, who,
as tailors, contribute to the household income. These jobs are regarded as
especially useful for her and the family as it is considered a suitable engagement
for a young girl to earn money. It is also not necessary to travel for this work.
In fact, they do not need to leave home and they can still manage their duties
at home. Moreover, a woman with this qualification is also presentable as a
“skilful” and good marriage partner.
“A woman is a good woman when she manages her house and takes
care of her children well. . . . They learn how to sew in the village. It is
possible to earn some money through that, and if not, it is useful anyway
for herself and for the people around her. In contrast, if she goes oﬀ to
study, during the holidays she should go to the fields for cotton picking
at least for two or three months. It is diﬃcult; you are worried the whole
time about how they are doing.“ (Firdausi)
Like sewing, baking tortes per order can also help to provide an additional
income source. This is also not without an eﬀect on the chances and ambitions
of young girls. For the parents, acquiring this kind of domestic and gendered
skills is more preferable than sending them to university. Azoda is ￿￿ and after
school she takes a baking course in the neighbouring tuman. She either gets
her orders, bakes at home or people take her to their place and she prepares
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pastries there. She gets ￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ sum or more depending on the individual
request. Her mother is a tailor and the whole family profits from the additional
financial support of these two engagements.
The question in such a situation is why do people work at all? It is not
unusual for people to continue to work even though after transport costs almost
nothing remains of their salaries. To be connected, to be informed and to be
close to certain institutions is more important than a suﬀering from a lousy
salary. Where one works is more important; not because of the “real income”
but for the connections, networks and corruption possibilities. Maxmut was
one of a handful of people in the tuman who has access to certain resources
thanks to his position in the xokimiyat. For people like him, the situation after
independence either remained the same or even got better. He claimed that
“￿￿.￿￿￿ sum is the monthly salary, it is just enough for two sacks of flour.”
Then how can he aﬀord the living standard that he has enjoyed? Simply by
being a fermer? People in his position are able to keep the rest left over after
plan fulfilment and are allowed to do whatever they want with it. They can
even make money without fulfilling the plan. Another aspect of how people
work and deal with the current situation was described with following words:
“I work according to my salary. It is just not enough; therefore I do
not work hard. I work on my plot, do my things or relax. Actually,
telling you that the salary is not enough is a state secret, I should not
tell you something like that since I work for the state, I am an employee
of xokimiyat, but I will still tell you.” (Sabir)
For some fermer, even in the present conditions it is not as lucrative to
be a fermer as they expected, but it is necessary and important to be a part
of the system if and for as long as they can. Furthermore, some fermer who
have good relations to the local government enjoy their status since they are
included in the small elite circle, which gives them influence and through that
other benefits. It is a part of the fermer ’ job to spend many hours with people
of decision-making power, either in the tuman centre, in the xokimiyat or in
other localities such as restaurants. Also, fermer who belong to this narrow
circle get the chance to be updated and well prepared for coming regulations.
Becoming a fermer allows them to have a better living standard or the other
way around, a better living standard (which usually also implies broader social
networks) allowed them to become a fermer. On the other hand, fermer often
complain about their situation. One day the wife of a fermer was telling me
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how unpleasant and diﬃcult it is to be a fermer.
“One of the kolkhozcu’s children is sick, so he came to me and asked
for money. My husband gave him ￿.￿￿￿ sum. What can we do? What
should we do? If we are not paid, we cannot pay them either. Everybody
thinks, if you are a fermer and fulfil the plan, that means you have
money.” (Iqbol)
The majority of people, however, agreed that worst is the situation of the
(former) kolkhozcu who are now dependent on either the shirkat or a fermer.
“The people who are really poor are the kolkhozcu. During the cotton
season they collect cotton. During other periods, every two or three
months, they get ￿-￿ thousand sum. The whole family works together,
men, women and children. At the end of the picking season they will
have picked, let’s say five tons. For one kg, ￿￿ sum is paid. That makes
￿￿￿ thousand sum. He can buy cattle, goat or sheep with that money.
. . . It is hard for them, most of the time neither their ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ or ￿￿￿￿
sum salary is actually paid, nor is there a place where they can claim
it or ask for anything. If they do, it doesn’t make a diﬀerence. A ten
sot piece of land or the opportunity to pick cotton after the season ends
is the only profit they make. The problem is that kolkhozcu do not get
their oﬃcial salaries or payments and they were not supposed to ask for
it. Since they unoﬃcially used the land of the fermer and the shirkat –
state property - they could not and did not ask for their salary. What’s
forbidden, allowed or tolerated is entangled.” (Nazim)
￿.￿ Consumption Patterns and Household Bud-
gets
From the above, it is clear that it is quite diﬃcult to calculate a family budget
and display the income and the expenditures. An Uzbek social scientist, who
was working in a research institute in Tashkent producing surveys for foreign
institutions, confirmed my impressions and the diﬃculties of getting people to
talk about the subject. If the oﬃcial salaries are so low and the expenditures
that high, then the significant part of a family’s income originates from not
registered work. He estimates that ￿￿% of income is unoﬃcially earned.
Expenditures are diﬀerentiated and planned in daily, monthly or on a more
long-term basis. Money is spent on a daily basis in order to buy food, while
clothing is a more seasonal or occasional (school, wedding) expenditure. The
household diet is more or less planned and the food prepared is strongly de-
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termined by agricultural products. However, one or the other ingredients may
be missing or an unexpected guest may arrive and it becomes necessary for
additional food products to be bought. Flour is the main diet product, es-
pecially for home baked bread and noodles. Tea, rice and meat are bought
regularly while candies and biscuits are for special occasions and for guests.
Vodka consumption is high during the weddings or circumcision feasts but also
consumed at private gatherings such as birthdays or meetings amongst friends.
It is not unusual for a bottle of vodka to be put aside for unexpected guests,
or the children are sent to the village shop to buy one.
“In the past, we did not know and did not really think about how
much flour we consumed per month. It was cheap and abundant, and
there was always enough. What we did not consume we used as fodder.”
(Azoda)
The two most important diet products, flour and meat, are also taken as
a benchmark for inflation and the value of things. One kilo of meat was ￿￿￿￿
sum (or ￿.￿ $) in ￿￿￿￿ and a ￿￿ kg sack of first quality local flour ￿￿.￿￿￿ sum.
Rice is also one of the basic staple foods since it is the main ingredient for
plov, the most prestigious meal that all families try to prepare at least once
a week and whenever guests are around. Rice is produced primarily in the
regions of Khorezm and Karakalpakistan, which are both particularly aﬀected
by the crises of the Aral Sea and the lack of suﬃcient water supply, but also
in the Ferghana Valley.￿￿ The production has therefore decreased and prices
have risen to ￿￿￿-￿￿￿ sum per kg. The price of rice is, like meat and flour, an
important indicator for people to measure the overall economic situation.
As a traditional dish, plov is highly appreciated.￿￿ Preparation methods
vary regionally and there exists a kind of plov competition within Uzbek-
istan. I was regularly asked how I liked the taste of plov in Bukhara, in the
Valley or in Khorezm. Depending on the province, the taste as well as the
visual reputation is diﬀerent, depending on the seasoning with carrot, pep-
per and others. Karakalpakistan has an “aq paq” (white and, according to
other Uzbeks, flavourless) plov while in the valley it is too “spicy”, at least
for Bukharians. Plov is also the main dish in any kind of ceremony or rit-
ual (wedding, circumcision, mourning), for special guests and for all kinds of
￿￿ Rice from Özgen (Kyrgyzstan) is also highly appreciated.
￿￿ The term plov derives from Persian while in Uzbek the national dish is usually just
called as plov (meal).
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gatherings. Because of the high rice and meat prices many families prepare
this dish only on certain occasions or only on weekends to compensate for the
whole week’s hardworking. How often people could aﬀord plov was also taken
as a measure of their standard of living, which sank drastically after ￿￿￿￿.
“We could cook plov whenever we wanted” was one of the expressions used to
describe the high living standards during the Soviet time. The type of rice
used as well as the amount of meat added are also important indicators. For
more on the subject, see Glenn & Surina (￿￿￿￿) and Zanca (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿).
In daily life, the basic diet is based on soup, sometimes served with stuﬀed
vegetable pastries. Bread is always eaten and usually baked at home. Meat is
expensive but a small fatty piece with bones accompanies every soup. Turnips,
carrots, cabbage and potatoes are the other main ingredients. Tea is consumed
everywhere, but diﬀerent types are preferred regionally. While in Bukhara it
is green tea, in the valley mostly black tea is consumed. I was told that the
climatic conditions determine whether green or black tea is consumed, although
I saw no decisive climatic diﬀerence in these two places. The explanation given
was that black tea is not good for one’s blood pressure and green tea is healthier
in the summer heat of Bukhara. Cotton oil is the most commonly consumed
one; it is cheap and easily available.￿￿ It is also popular, and alternatives like
sunflower oil are more expensive and sold only in the bazaar and in shops.
For breakfast, tea, bread, some homemade marmalade and left-over food from
dinner is eaten. In the summer, tasty fruits are available and salads are made
with tomatoes, onions and cucumber.
The following example shows how Amir uses his tomorqa for the needs of
his seven-person household.￿￿ He estimates how much land to use for which
crop and how much yield this will lend. Sometimes, depending on the market
prices, he changes the amount meant for sale. He will then, making sure not
to cause severe diet changes, sell more carrots for example and keep more
potatoes in reserve. Depending on the prices, he consumes more or less of
his own products. Amir uses ￿￿ sot for wheat cultivation so the household’s
annual demand for flour is covered. This will get him ￿.￿￿￿-￿.￿￿￿ kg wheat,
which in turn provides some ￿￿￿ kg flour after grinding it in the neighbour’s
mill. twelve sot is used for vegetables: seven sot for carrots, three sot for
￿￿ It is often given as a compensation of salary by the shirkat or the fermer. Before it
is ready to consume, it is heated and boiled with onions. After that, according to my host
family, it is suitable for cooking.
￿￿ Four adults and three children aged ten to fifteen.
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onions and two sot for potatoes. From seven sot land he gets ￿,￿ - ￿ tons of
carrots but lately there has not been enough water and the yield was less. He
keeps ca. ￿￿￿ kg carrots for his consumption and the rest is sold at the local
market. From three sot used for onions he gets one ton and from that ￿￿￿ kg
is for his own consumption. From two sot of land he gets ￿￿￿ kg potatoes,
which is more than enough for his own need. Therefore, the rest is either sold
or kept as seed potato for his household. Thus, everything is neatly planned
but still allowing the necessary flexibility.
The current hardships are, again, compared to the previous period and
described with a certain amount of caution, also to make it clear to me that
they had had better days. This is, however, done without defending or naming
the socialist system but rather the state they lived in. “In the past, during the
Soviet period, it was better”, is the expression. In contrast, the contemporary
period is one of destitution. The way one interlocutor described the Uzbek
currency shows how she valued it; “. . . the sum has a name but in itself it does
not exist” (sumun adi bor ozi yoq).
“During the Soviet time you could have a reasonably good life with ￿￿￿
sum. Fine, with Karimov we have independence, order and peace but
it is not enough, the salaries are not high enough. We work the entire
month for a few kilos of meat and flour. Today, if I buy sugar, I cannot
buy meat. I don’t buy many cloths anyway. I do care more about food
and spend money for this. We save on garments, if we do not have a
salary. In one month five kg rice, five kg flour and five kg cotton oil is
all you get. During the Soviet time I wore things once or twice and then
gave them to the poor or to orphans, now I am in that same situation.
I would like to have better clothes but I cannot aﬀord them.” (Yulduz)
I received a list of goods and how expensive they were in the past, before
independence, and how much they cost today. Even then the kolkhozcu earned
less than a driver in the past but it was enough for a decent life. Interestingly,
people do not compare themselves to well-oﬀ people after independence. The
living standards of the past are compared with the present, and not with other
people of the same time.
Larger expenses are on life-cycle ceremonies, the construction of houses,
higher education and specific medical treatments (operations). The most seri-
ous expenditures are life-cycle ceremonies. Weddings and circumcision parties
with several hundred guests can easily add up to ￿,￿￿￿ $ or more. When set
against the average incomes of $￿￿, if even that, this appears to be an impos-
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sible task and jokes about how Uzbeks manage to conduct ceremonies on such
a small budget are common all over the country.
“There is no other way, you must do it. If we could keep them small, it
would be better but üy (houses) and toi (feasts) demolish us. Otherwise
we could save some money to buy a car and enjoy it. If you get sick, if
you need to go to the hospital, if you have a coming toi, or you need to
build a house, these are the most important expenses, where do you get
money for them? As a kolkhozcu, it is diﬃcult.” (Rustam)
Alisher was planning to start with the construction of a house in which
his older son would move in after his wedding and for that reason he bought
construction material bit by bit and put it aside. After he bought the construc-
tion material, he was planning on putting some money for Iskandar’s higher
education expenditures aside. For both these events, first studying and then
marriage, his son has at least five to seven years before him. If he does not
finish the house on time the married couple can live with them until a hab-
itable part of their house is finished. After that, he also wants to renovate
his own house, which was built in ￿￿￿￿ but looks much older. I was told that
for a kolkhozcu the average cost of a house is approximately ￿.￿ million sum,
the costs for houses of the chiefs have no upper limit. In contrast to ordinary
workers they may also be able to build their house within a year.
“Wood has become so expensive. During the Soviet time we got it from
Russia, from Siberia. It was cheap, now it costs so much. I have to
start buying it, because I cannot aﬀord it all at once. First wood, later
cement and so forth. Relatives help you and you can pay them back
when you get some money, but until then you are abased.” (Akram)
The wealth of families was not always restricted to their four walls and
number of livestock in their barns. There were families whose houses and
kitchen gardens gave the impression of tidiness, well maintained and of a rea-
sonable standard of living. There were other families for whom it was not
easy to know at first glance how aﬄuent they are. Since land and space in
the village are a problem, some investments are done outside of the house. It
was also not unusual for some people, especially for high-level oﬃcials, to give
their livestock to other people for care taking and grazing.
Investing money and time in the education is another major challenge but
to do so for unknown job perspectives leads families, especially in the case of
girls, to think twice. In the past, the cost of education was not one had to
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worry about. After the demise of the Soviet Union, not only the tuition fees
but also the living costs in the cities play an important role in this decision
making process. There is also no guarantee of getting a job after finishing
university and the salaries are not enough on which to survive. As mentioned,
appropriation of practical skills is therefore seen as a better alternative to a
university diploma, at least for girls. On the other hand, for most families
who can aﬀord it, a major wish is for a son to get a university degree. The
study costs are not limited to the tuitions and living costs in the city but also
include gifts or assisting the teaching stuﬀ in other ways. Bahodir as a doctor
and his brother as a pharmacy worker had easy access to medical resources.
He provided the dean of the faculty, at which his son studies, with expensive
and not easily available medicine, as the dean’s father was sick. Since Bahodir
did him this favour, the dean is now in debt to him and will help his son to get
his diploma if there were to be any diﬃculties. Getting diplomas this way is
not unusual and people talk frankly about it. Some people, however, expressed
their concern that people have diplomas but nothing in their head.
“You go somewhere and ask for a document, and the person tells you:
write it yourself, I will put my signature and provide the stamp. Since
they get diplomas with money, they do not learn anything. This was
not the case during Soviet period.“ (Shukrat)
At the same time, I was told that bribes were a problem in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakstan and that because of that, the Uzbek government did not accept
diplomas, e.g. from the Uzbek-Kyrgyz University in Osh. It is not seen as
having any quality. The same person contradicted his earlier expressions about
Kyrgyzstan and told me that he could not send his son to study in Tashkent
since the director was not satisfied with ￿￿￿￿$.
In order to be able to finance all this, income and expenditures are closely
calculated and planned in advance. Alisher’s strategy was to plan and divide
the larger necessary expenses overtime so that there would not be a huge
burden at once. The amount of money needed for specific occasions was clearly
defined. He decides and plans the costs, but often consults his parents. While
his wife knows about the calculations, Alisher is the one actually making them
and keeping an overview. He is equally proud of his household management
skills, i.e. how much flour the family needs until the next harvest, when to
start constructing the house and the like. Thus, long term planning became
more important in the post-Soviet period. However, many families simply do
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not have enough produce from the plots to sell larger surpluses. Most they
consume by themselves or have to sell immediately since they need money for
other needs. Others can aﬀord to store onions or potatoes and sell them later
when prices start to increase after the first post-harvest sale wave. This kind
of thinking is seen as part of the market economy and many people say that
they are in a learning process. The following “carrot story” was recollected to
me as an example of this process.
“A few years ago, carrots were expensive, the prices were high, then, a
year later, we all put more land under carrot cultivation, and that year
everybody had carrots and the prices fell.” (Sharaf)
The most important place for selling produce is the farmer’s bazaar, dehqon
bozori. Most people try to sell and buy here. The market has diﬀerent parts.
All vegetable sellers are in one part, meat sellers in another, clothes vendors
in yet another. You can find almost anything in the diﬀerent corners of the
market. Female dominance of both salespeople and buyers is not to be overseen
in the market. Women also think they are better than men in that respect, a
view commonly accepted. Bargaining, reconsidering and comparing prices is
part of market life (Geertz ￿￿￿￿). For some goods people are regular customer
of some sellers whose stall is exactly described and recommended. I was also
told I should not go to another stall or avoid a particular one because of the
price and the quality.￿￿ On big shopping occasions, families invest time and
energy in order to get an overview about the prices and diversity of the goods.
In pre-independence Ferghana Valley, before the borders became reality, the
market’s orientation was towards the city of Osh. This bazaar is not only close
to the tuman but also long in existence and the biggest in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Some people still cross the border to visit the market, but it is tedious and
today the prices are higher in comparison to Uzbekistan.
In addition, in every village there are a few small shops, often located in
private houses, that sell some foodstuﬀ, clothing, sanitary products, sweets,
soft-drinks and alcohol. Meat is also bought in small portions according to
ones needs, either in the market or at the village butcher. Prices are higher
here than in shops in Romitan or Bukhara, but most villagers cannot aﬀord
to go to town very often. Furthermore, unexpected guests often force one to
buy some sweets or alcohol on the spot.
￿￿ Ethnicity was not a criterion in that respect. See Baykal (￿￿￿￿) on gender and ethnicity
aspect in Samarqand.
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In many regards the “shortage economy” (Kornai ￿￿￿￿) of the past has
thus been replaced by a period of “un-aﬀordability”. The past is, however,
not remembered as a shortage of garments but rather as a time of availability
and aﬀordability of goods. As consumers, the rural population had limited
access to certain goods since some consumption goods were available only in
the cities (and in special shops). Because of this, villagers perceive themselves
as better prepared and adjusted to the present diﬃculties than the urban
population, especially in the early years of independence with food shortages.
Self-provisioning in rural areas was of course better than in urban settings.
During the Soviet period people did not need to think about how and from
where they would get their daily bread; its price, production costs and other
issues were outside of their knowledge, thoughts and interest. The shortages
of the past were not existential for daily life since the basic consumption needs
were satisfied.
“Indeed, throughout the former Soviet bloc, the postsocialist scenario
highlights aspects of socialist abundance￿￿, not only of consumer goods
no one wanted, but of sometimes lavish subsidies for food and drink; for
cultural events, books, and vacations; for health and childcare services,
and for basic utilities such as heat-making warm and cozy apartments
in mid-winter Hungary.” (Fehérváry ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿)
I believe memories such as the ones of abundantly available white flour,
which was even used to feed the livestock, shows what makes the Soviet time
unforgettable and keeps it as a positive, lively memory in the minds of many
people. Shortage or poor quality of goods in the past, in the Uzbekistan case,
are not mentioned or may not be remembered so vividly as the markets of the
present time are perceived as full of bad quality goods, which are furthermore
unaﬀordable. The price and quality relation of something did not play an
important role in the past since the replacement of a good was not a problem
in respect to aﬀordability. The significant criterion was its availability and the
chance at having something diﬀerent than standard socialist supply (see also
Kuehnast ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
“Now we have things to buy but no money, during the Soviet time we had
money but nothing to buy” was a frequent expression of this perception. The
good quality of products, and especially of garments, during the Soviet period
is very often mentioned in talks. Today, earning money and getting salaries
￿￿ Emphasis in original
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in time is one problem, and the bad purchasing power of the sum is another
problem. In the past the flow of objects – although within the closed socialist
system – gave Uzbeks the feeling of being a part of a world system, much more
so than today. In the present, there is a strong negative attitude particularly
towards the garments, which are mostly in poor quality and produced in China,
Iran and Turkey. This topic was very often mentioned and products of that
time were shown and the memories told.
“Look at this coat, which this child has, it was mine. It is German;
GDR made. I used it for many years and now we tailored it to use as a
coat for my grandchild. Do you see the quality? After so many years, it
is still good.” (Abror)
On the other hand, the creation of consumption incentives does not play
an important role since Uzbeks’ income, purchase power and consumption is
not “the fulcrum of economic growth” (Livingston ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿: cited in Fehérváry
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). With its economic policy, the Uzbek state develops and deter-
mines the consumption possibilities of the average citizen and these goods are
correspondingly available and in circulation in the market. With the existing
incomes and purchase power of the money, Uzbeks cannot, in general, sat-
isfy their consumer desires. People substitute their needs with available and
aﬀordable goods. This is no diﬀerent than in Soviet times.
State socialism or planned economy is described by Kornai (￿￿￿￿) as an
“economy of shortage”. The present Uzbek economy is constructed similar so
that it creates mainly a demand for poor quality goods. Corresponding to this
demand, a dominance of “supply of poor quality” in the market can be seen.
Again, no diﬀerent than in Soviet times, what people buy in order to satisfy
their basic needs is determined by the state. In that respect there is still no
consumer power that could change the flow of quantity and quality of goods in
the markets. For well-oﬀ people, mainly in urban areas, there are more options
to gain access to garments of better quality than in the province.
The ‘Shortage of quality’ has another aspect to itself. After the demise of
socialism, the opening of markets to international goods with “inferior quality”
did not make Uzbeks a part of capitalist consumption world. As Fehérváry
points out “. . . how objects come to be evaluated in terms of ”quality” continues
to be very much tied to cultural and historical contexts that include shifting
economies” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿).
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“Emblematic goods of state socialist production as well as their settings
came to be seen as evidence of the failure of a state-socialist-generated
modernity, but more importantly, of the regime’s negligent and even
“inhumane” treatment of its subjects. In contrast, select commodities
imported from the West (including socialist goods produced solely for
export) were encountered as prized valuables and icons of a diﬀerent
world. The properties of these goods – designed, it seemed, to make life
easier and pleasurable – were not just evidence of a better production
system, but served as icons of a more humane political and economic
system, a place where living a “normal” life was possible.” (Fehérváry
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿)
Today, no diﬀerent than in the past, products, commodities or garments
from other countries, not only from the West but also from Russia, get the
same amount of enthusiasm. In that respect, this is a step back from the
socialist generated modernity. Today, a garment from Russia gets the same
attention that was special for western products in the past. Today, the socialist
products have become “icons”, “legends” and are perceived by many people as
“valuable”. Of course, there is a certain amount of nostalgia in this, but they
are mainly missed because they were durable and aﬀordable.
“My shoes were made by Salamander. They are German. We got things
from Bulgaria, Russia, the GDR. They were good and of high quality.
Now, the market is full of Chinese goods; you pay a good amount of
money and after a short time they are torn.” (Akram)￿￿
While Western products were seen as symbols of rebellion or symbols of
being diﬀerent in the socialist system, today in Uzbekistan, interestingly, gar-
ments started to lose this meaning and clothing became less meaningful “as
an expressive medium” (McCracken ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿). They do not send any message
to the other side anymore because, given the limited options in the bazaar,
people have become rather uniform in that respect. While women compare
the quality of fabric and shoes to that of the Soviet era, men compare that of
suits, shirts and shoes and boys that of shoes and t-shirts. McCracken argues
that “. . . it is possible to undertake the study of change and history through
clothing. . . . clothing can be used as a historical operator which serves not
￿￿ Fehérváry’s points out in her article (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿) that: “Some goods of socialist produc-
tion were noted for their quality and good design . . . ” She writes that during the socialist
period in Hungary “. . . East Germany was known for, among other things, the quality of its
toys - which were proudly displayed in the windows of the GDR cultural centre in down-
town Budapest”. Definitely rural Uzbekistan had less access to these products than urban
dwellers but people did know about it.
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only to reflect chancing historical circumstances but also as a device which
creates and constitutes this change in cultural terms” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
In daily life, clothes worn outside are completely separated from those worn
inside. Anybody coming home from the public sphere immediately changes
their clothes to house garments. When children come home from school, they
are told, to “change your clothes”. Again, when going to the fields they change
their cloths and wear older ones. In the public sphere, having good and fash-
ionable clothes is very important. An appropriately dressed man usually wears
a suit and women a tailored dress. This is expected from men and women when
they enter the public sphere and is seen as “civilized” (madani).
After my iftar visits or after weddings, when a crowd of people would take
oﬀ their shoes in front of a door, it was almost impossible to diﬀerentiate
them from all the other pairs, which were mostly all the same. There were so
many red slippers or black galoshes in front of the door, that it was almost
impossible to find one’s own. Of the same slipper there were two diﬀerent
colours available to buy (red or blue), and the most preferred one was red.
There are two diﬀerent qualities of galoshes concerning the thickness of the
plastic. The better (thicker) ones were the Russian (russkiy) produced ones
and the cheaper ones were made in Iran (iranskiy). Nobody wants to go home
again with the same but more worn out slippers. Under these circumstances
there are only two possibilities for someone to find his or her own shoes or
slippers again. Either, when a person takes oﬀ their shoes he or she puts them
in a certain place or hides them in a corner with the hope of finding them again.
The other possibility, which Azoda did for me after I bought russkiy galoshes
at the market (they did the same for their russkiy galoshes), is to sew buttons
on the front of the galoshes. Of course, many people did the same thing, but
by using diﬀerent buttons and sewing them on with diﬀerent coloured threads
at diﬀerent places, this problem of “sameness” was solved with some creativity.
If there were gatherings with large numbers of people, buttons or hiding the
shoes was not always a successful strategy. A good solution to the problem
was to wear old shoes since their loss would not be as expensive as that of a
new pair.
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Chapter ￿
Social Strategies: Networks,
Identity and Solidarity
￿.￿ Introduction
The described economic changes have forced people also to re-organise their
social life. The withdrawal of the state from many spheres it had covered in
socialist times has led to local communities and kin-based networks having to
take over these functions. They provide the basis for relations of solidarity and
reciprocity as two significant and central factors in the maintenance of social
and community relations. In the post-Soviet period they help to ensure not
only economic but also social and cultural survival.
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the social relations and how
they are lived in daily life. This covers many themes, from kinship, ethnic
relations and neighbourhoods to rituals and feasts. It is necessary to first look
at kinship and community relations and in that frame then try to understand
ethnicity and its role in the diﬀerent spheres of life in diﬀerent regions. Kin-
ship is an important and in fact the outstanding social category, which brings
people together. In Bukhara in particular, kinship, neighbourhood and village
community are almost overlapping. When I visited people, they would send
me to their neighbours, who were treated as neighbours, only to find out they
were kin.
But in the Uzbek case, kinship may often include other ethnic groups,
namely Tajiks. As previously mentioned, both field sites are multi-ethnic.
The residents were usually very proud of this and expressed themselves in that
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manner to me. The peaceful co-existence of diﬀerent ethnic groups for many
years was seen on the one hand as an inheritance of the Soviet Union and
on the other as the generosity of their own ethnic group. After independence
some ethnic groups left the region for their respective states (Ukraine, Russia
or Germany), yet some of them came back again and this was always seen as
a symbol by the titular nations of how “hospitable” they are and that people
appreciate this. Within the local settings, there are multiple combinations and
generational jumps from one ethnic group to another: in the same generation,
brothers, sisters and cousins can belong to diﬀerent ethnic groups. Ethnic
boundaries are remembered or forgotten in daily life according to the particular
situation. If neighbouring households happen to be of a diﬀerent ethnicity, this
does not aﬀect the willingness to provide help and support.
￿.￿ The Local Community
The key social unit is in fact the village. It is also, to some degree, a unit
of solidarity and identity. Although they do not form endogamous entities,
villages are the social environments for the individual’s life cycle. They are not
identical with kinship groups because all families also have ties to neighbouring
villages. Rather, the village community is an institution in addition to kinship.
All fellow villagers, irrespective of the existence of kin relations, will attend
diﬀerent types of ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals.
In both field sites, villages do not have a central place where people meet,
sit and discuss things together. This is mostly done in front of house doors
or in courtyards. The mosque is also no such meeting point, except for when
people would pray together. Some villages in the Ferghana Valley have an
area where several small shops form a kind of central place. This does not
exist in Romitan. There is no drinking fountain as a possible meeting point
either, which would especially concern women and children. Usually children
are responsible for carrying water from the ariq, the small irrigation canals,
which flow either through or on the upper side of the village and it was possible
to get water from many diﬀerent parts. Ariq are not only good for providing
water for households for cleaning and cooking but they were also the places
children could refresh themselves in the hot summer months.￿
￿ Quite often I would see girls and boys playing and swimming in the canals together.
While girls were only allowed to swim there up until ￿￿ or ￿￿ years old, boys were allowed
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Villages have their own property for important social events, which take
place in the village. This includes things such as cooking facilities, chairs and
tables, benches and the like. These can also be borrowed from neighbouring
villages if needed. In Bukhara, the mosque basement houses tables, benches
and chairs and huge kettles (kazan), which the villagers commonly use during
feasts or other occasions. A person from the village voluntarily takes respon-
sibility of this common property. Villagers replace old or broken materials by
contributing money.
As much as the village is a social unit, it also restricts interaction. This
partially excludes some people from the social life of a village, especially in
Bukhara. For instance, people whose houses are located on the outskirts of
the village, where new land pieces are available, are aﬀected by this. These
people are invited to gatherings but the response is less enthusiastic.
“It is such a long walk, it is too hot to walk that far; it is also dark, there
are no lights when we go back and the roads are muddy”. (Gulshad)
This has, of course, also to do with an understanding of living “far away”.
The issue of darkness and the mud are a fact, however, and relevant for the
entire village. There are indeed only a few streetlights and the one paved
road was the main street where much of the pavement does not exist anymore.
More generally, contact outside of the village – or anything in walking dis-
tance – is rather limited. This occurs, for example, when there is a wedding
in the neighbouring village. People go to the ‘tuman’ (Romitan) or the ‘city’
(Bukhara) only on certain occasions. People employed by the village adminis-
tration or kolkhoz have more intensive contacts to the tuman and are called in
for accounting, for documents, for gatherings about new laws or for fulfilling a
cotton plan. There are also a few people living in the village who work in the
tuman, while there is nobody known to me working in the provincial capital
in the both field sites. For some families, visiting Bukhara a few times a year
involves sightseeing and shopping, sitting in a chayxona (teahouse) and eating
shashlik, and it is a chance to see something other than the village. This is
especially relevant for children and female members of the family. The Soviet
generation had the chance to enjoy this kind of activity as members of pio-
neer or komsomol￿, much more than the post-independence generation. The
to enjoy it longer.
￿ Komsomol was the youth organisation of the Communist party of the Soviet Union
starting from age of ￿￿, following the pioneer stage starting from age ￿￿.
￿￿￿
sancak
tuman centre is not a place to go for this purpose; for villagers, it is strongly
associated with xokimiyat and bureaucracy. The city is seen as more pleasant
and relaxing and as something special. Other occasions for going to the city
are either weddings or funerals of relatives, even when there was little contact
to them. The workload, lack of time and costs of going there make these visits
a rare and special occasion.
This lack of mobility in Bukhara stands in sharp contrast to the valley
where people and goods move beyond the border. In the valley, similar to
Bukhara, the villages are also merged together and the main street, leading
to the tuman, passes through the villages where houses are located on both
sides of the road and in the hinterland. However, diﬀerent than in Bukhara,
where villages are isolated by side roads, travel is made easier due to the main
road. Transport possibilities are provided through microbuses, which regularly
travel between settlements. Travelling back and forth is expensive, however,
and people usually have to have a good reason to travel.
Beyond the village, the next larger unit is the former kolkhoz or shirkat.
Parallel to that the other major institution is the selsoviet, the kishlok fukaro-
lar yigini. In parts of Uzbekistan the shirkat as an economic unit often corre-
sponds to another administrative entity, the mahalla or neighbourhood. As a
residential unit, the mahalla is a very often brought-up subject in post-socialist
Uzbekistan. Traditionally it was a primarily urban institution later adopted
by the Soviet state that regulated both residence and social conduct within
cities. Today, the mahalla is a governmental structure as well as an informal
institution. It can be interpreted both as a return to pre-Soviet institutions
and also as an attempt in the post-socialist nation-state to tighten control over
its citizens (Abramson ￿￿￿￿; Koroteyeva and Makarova ￿￿￿￿; Massicard and
Trevisani ￿￿￿￿; Petric ￿￿￿￿; Geiss ￿￿￿￿; Sievers ￿￿￿￿).
I was very often asked if in Turkey or in Germany there are also mahalla
and if they have the same structure and similar duties. The role and strength of
mahalla, however, diﬀered remarkably within Uzbekistan. In Bukhara viloyat,
it was not an institution recognizable in daily life and one did not notice its
existence while in the valley it was not possible to overlook or ignore it. I
recounted to villagers in Bukhara how strong the mahalla is in other parts of
the country, particularly in the valley, and some people argued that it could be
good to solve the problems at the mahalla level before the tuman interferes.
It was astounding that mahalla, which is so strongly identified with Uzbek-
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istan and generalized for the whole country, did not really have any meaning
for the people in Bukhara. While “our village” and “our kolkhoz” were the
reference points in Bukhara, in Ferghana “our mahalla” was used in everyday
discourse when addressing the local community and administration. Abramzon
describes the importance of mahalla not only as an “important form of com-
munity identification but also as a social organization” in Qoqand (￿￿￿￿:￿). In
the Marxamat setting there were eleven mahalla fukarolar yighini that formed
two shirkat, namely Paxtakor and Mashal.
All residential units not only strongly overlap with kin relations in rural
areas but also serve as administrative entities to consolidate political control
and supervision. The tuman governor and the mahalla committee work so
closely with each other that Sievers describes the latter as ‘grassroots state
agencies’ (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). Positions in the mahalla committee are filled by tuman
authorities and administrations. In the valley, the mahalla has a rais (chief),
a katib (clerk) and a mahalla postpon. The postpon has, according the rais,
existed in the valley since March ￿￿￿￿. He is responsible for the order and
control of the village. All together they build the mahalla committee, which
during my stay got a new fourth member, the “terbiyeci ” or educator. These
were the people who had a salary.
Below that were the mahalla aqsaqali (mahalla elders) and kucha aqsaqali
(street elders). The latter emerged only after independence along with the
mahalla postpon and is responsible for everything happening in his sector.
These were also people who worked in the mahalla but did not get any salary.
As the other village personnel they were usually found sitting and spending
their time in the selsoviet. The aqsaqal are elected for ￿,￿ years and again the
tuman nominates the candidate. A meclis (council) representing the mahalla
and its members then elect the aqsaqal. There is also a supervising committee,
which is elected from the meclis. When the rais leaves, all personnel who
worked with him also quit. In Bukhara, the aqsaqal was called as village
aqsaqal and was not part of any hierarchical mahalla organisation.
The main duty of the mahalla committee is responsible as a first instance
for oﬃcial documents and applications no matter what the occasion. Mahalla
aqsaqal must have some specific characteristics enabling him to succeed in his
job. He must be somebody who knows how to talk to people, to make people
do what he says and thus be somebody well respected in the village. According
to villagers, President Karimov likes themahalla aqsaqal since he is responsible
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for “tertip” (law and order) at the bottom, where it should begin, and he is also
a helper for people who are in hardship or neediness. His social competence
is very important but also his own family must be intact, and people must
be able to go and ask advice. His responsibilities vary from intervention and
mediation of family quarrels, coordination of people for cleaning up the streets
to the controlling of wedding feasts. If he cannot solve the problem in his
street, he asks for help from the mahalla aqsaqal or the selsoviet.
The main duty of the postpon is the keeping of public order by controlling
the documents of unknown people and questioning them about their purpose
of stay in the mahalla. They are unarmed but militarily dressed. “The last
time an unknown person was in the mahalla he wanted to sell honey here.
Our postpon asked him to show his passport, everything was alright and he
was allowed to sell”. Actually, by asking for and checking ones passport, the
postpon does not get very much information but it demonstrates the power
and control mechanisms of the state, and also its presence. These positions
can be summed up under “law and order” and represents the first instance of
state surveillance at the local level. The presence of the state, using traditional
institutions at a local level, varied. Its presence is not only guaranteed by the
postpon but also by the aqsaqal. In the end, depending on the problems or
wishes of the villagers, the aqsaqal is also the person who goes and talks to the
selsoviet or to the tuman. Most of the time, nobody in the xokimiyat shows
enough patience, interest or respect to ordinary citizens and their diﬀerent
types of problems. That is why mahalla aqsaqal has a kind of double role,
as well as a burden, moderating between residents and state authorities. His
deputies, the kucha aqsaqal, do not necessarily have the same features he does.
Providing poor families with food and other things is also responsibility of
the mahalla committee.
“Since ￿￿￿￿, we have helped poor families. During the Soviet period,
nobody ever asked who was poor and who was rich. The person in the
committee who was responsible for finance knows who is poor and who
isn’t. Nowadays, our rais talks to the mahalla committee; in my mahalla
I have a needy family and soon they have a toi. They need help. I have
to look around, who can donate a sheep or some rice. The rais asks the
kolkhoz for cotton oil, he finds out who can provide a car for driving the
couple to the tuman for the niqah. If somebody well oﬀ does not provide
his car, the militsiya does not allow him to drive at all in the next few
days. If the rais does not get enough support he can isolate the people
from the village community. People respect the mahalla aqsaqal, what
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he says must be done.” (Azim)
Surely, the Uzbek government treats themahalla as part of its “Uzbekisation”-
program following independence. The ideas about mahalla and its place in the
Uzbek culture and identity is also stressed in written form on walls or panels
and signed with the president’s name.￿ Aphorisms, which praise the mahalla
as an ideal way of living and which state that “without mahalla a person is not
a person”, are written on walls and signboards dominating the landscape. The
mahalla is thus also an institution proudly presented to others in order to show
the solidarity and support among its residents. It is a model of the strength of
the Uzbek culture which cares for others and whose residents pool resources
for diﬀerent purposes and cherish the peace starting at the micro level. While
most Uzbeks are quite proud of having mahalla, yet there are exceptions. Some
people argue that there is no need for a mahalla committee, since “they just
take their money and do nothing”. But what are the expectations? It seems
to be more about the power concerning the institution. As Abrahamson also
put it, ” [M]ore power to the mahalla committees really means more power to
centralized bodies” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). The following words by a mahalla rais show
his opinion of himself and also of his power:
“I say: in this mahalla, I am Karimov. I am the Karimov of this
mahalla. I have worked eleven years and put the residents in form and
order.” (Zafar)
Lately, the mahalla committee has increasingly controlled public order in
a “civil way” using social means such as isolation or discrimination. As an
extended arm of the state but without the coercive powers used by the milit-
siya, the state can, in the framework of traditional Uzbek values, breath down
people’s necks. According to some people, this was perceived as proof of “how
caring the state is for its citizens”. Others interpreted it as “how the state
restricts people and fails to work in other spheres, where it would actually be
necessary“, such as through providing infrastructure, transportation and the
freedom to celebrate as long as one wants. I was also told that the mahalla
committee occasionally checks the cleanliness of some houses. In the spring-
time, the mahalla starts to clean the canals, streets and flowers planted in
front of people’s houses. There were contests between mahalla or within the
mahalla for the cleanest streets and most beautiful front gardens of the houses.
￿ ￿￿￿￿ was designated the „Year of Mahalla“ by President Karimov.
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The winner is then awarded an extra budget. I was told this has started since
independence and that during the Soviet period these things were not taken
into consideration. These contests contribute to a strengthening of local iden-
tity at the mahalla or village level, which continues with the tuman and the
viloyat and beyond, in the case of the Ferghana Valley.
The common identity of being a Bukharian is of similar outstanding im-
portance and brings residents of the viloyat together in some way. At other
levels the diﬀerence between two villages, for example Chilongu and Fayzi Kur-
bonov, is also clearly expressed in everyday life and has its implications, e.g.
concerning marriage. Equally, the distinction between (tuman) like vobkentsha,
gizhduvansha or romitansha (“the way we do it here in Vobkent, Gizhudvan or
Romitan” respectively) can, depending on the occasion, be significant. This is
even more the case with the “Turkmen” districts of Olot and Karakul in the
southern part of Bukhara viloyat. But none of these come anywhere near to
having the meaning that the boundaries between oases have. The Bukharian
way encompasses all of the most important elements of what is considered
appropriate. Within this there may be diﬀerences, but these re-enforce rather
than threaten the common identity. It is more like the various members of one
family who all contribute to its distinctiveness from other families.
Out of all the other oases or provinces in Uzbekistan, the only one that can
be considered reasonably close to Bukhara is Samarqand. Still, the diﬀerence
is tremendous and it would be impossible, it is said, to make Samarqandians
adapt to family life in a Bukharian village. The same is apparently true the
other way round. Students from Bukhara studying in Samarqand meet each
other rather quickly and do things together such as cooking, travelling home
and finding partners. When I asked a couple from Bukhara, who were originally
from diﬀerent villages, how they met, they answered that:
“In Samarqand, he studied veterinary science and I studied medicine.
Relatively quickly everybody from Bukhara found each other and we
established our own community there. My husband also went back to
Bukhara on weekends and, like everybody else, we got to know and like
each other on the bus rides home and then married. Our first daughter
was born in Samarqand. If you are from Bukhara and in the Bukharian
community, the latter will take care of you. We are from the same
tuman and travelled the entire way together. Others from other tuman
had their own groups.” (Sharifa)
This importance of locality and its continuous mentioning in diﬀerent con-
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texts was not unusual at all. When I returned to Bukhara from Tashkent or
from the Ferghana Valley, I was always questioned about how the food, in
particular the plov, was and if people there were as “mexmandost” (hospitable)
as in Bukhara. However, the answer was also directly given. “It cannot be
possible, they do not invite you to eat by repeatedly saying ‘olin, olin’ (take,
take). They bring non (bread) but do not break it into pieces (sindirmeydi).￿
And what about the taste of fruits? Nowhere are they as sweet as here. It’s
not possible, they have less sun, so they are less sweet.” Other arguments had
less with ecology but with human greediness to do. “Did you ever try somsa
(stuﬀed dough with onions and meat) in Samarqand? They cheat you; they
put almost no meat but fill it with fat and onions. You need reading glasses
in order to find a piece of meat. It is expensive and when they sell it, they tell
you how good and famous their somsa is. In Bukhara, we in Bukhara don’t
do like that.”
The significance of locality as an identity marker within Uzbekistan is also
regularly defined and mentioned through food and its preparation. According
to Mintz and Du Bois, if ethnicity is based on diﬀerence and contrast, an
ethnic cuisine is also related to “a geographically and/or historically defined
eating community” such as nationhood or ethnicity. “[O]nce imagined, such
cuisines provide added concreteness to the idea of national and ethnic identity”
(￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). In the case of Uzbekistan this is more about locality and may then
unite various groups against their co-ethnics somewhere else. How and how
much food is oﬀered to guests as a symbol of being “civilized” and “hospitable”
is defining.￿ Food and food consumption is very often used as a measurement
of social and economic change, and also as “social construction of the memory”
about the Soviet period.
Actually, mostly men tell stories about food. They, more so than women,
made their own experiences abroad, especially during the Soviet time while
serving in the Russian army or while going to other parts of Uzbekistan for
occasions on komandirovka (business trip).
“In the army, I was in the Ukraine and there was a person from the
valley with me, he cooked plov once, but it was so hot, I could not eat
￿ This is interpreted as a symbol of the host’s generosity and cordiality. In particular,
people in western Uzbekistan, in Khorezm and Karakalpakistan, are blamed for not breaking
the bread.
￿ Here again, the (former) nomadic-sedentary dichotomy is of particular relevance and
Kazaks or Kyrgyz are seen as „meat“ consumers, not being able to cook properly.
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it. And once I visited a friend of mine whom I knew from my student
time in Samarqand. He cooked for us, but it was distasteful, he mixed
the carrots with rice, we do not do like that. Although we have hardships
like the soil being salty and having not enough water, we have tasteful
food and sweet fruits. In the valley they put so much red pepper in plov
that you can not eat it. Could you eat it?” (Ismoil)
These were frequent comments made by people. They were directed against
all other places within Uzbekistan but usually the Ferghana Valley is concep-
tualized as a particular contrast. In the valley, to the contrast, quite distinct
issues were believed to be of prime importance when judging various provinces:
“In the valley, we have many educated people. Other places are not as
civilized as we are (madaniyatlari pas); they are crude. Doors are always
open in our place, we greet unknown people, we ask about people. This
is the way we do things.” (Nazim)
￿.￿ Kinship and Marriage
Besides common locality, kinship is the major issue in Uzbek society but under-
standing who was related to whom was relatively bizarre and confusing. After
my first interviews and visits to the village in Bukhara, I started to see the
same people in diﬀerent households again and again. They were not guests, as
I was, but were coming and going as they pleased and doing household things.
In the beginning I did not understand who belonged to which household and
had which ties. When I mentioned that “I saw the same people in diﬀerent
households and I did not know that they were relatives”, I was told, “Yes, they
are”. When I asked in which way or how close, the answer was “oh, from here,
from there, close or far, they are relatives”. “And exactly how?” “You see, my
sister got married to a relative of theirs and we are also related to them via my
mother’s aunt.” In the end, the entire village was more or less related to each
other and I was prepared for the next time when I again see the same faces in
diﬀerent houses. Sometimes, when Alisher provided examples like “look, he is
a relative of us”, even his children were completely surprised.
Anthropological literature describes Uzbek kinship as inherently patrilineal.
In fact, while men have clearly a privileged position in society and inherit most
of the property of a family, kin networks include relatives from both sides
similarly. This is reflected in terminology, which is more of a bilateral type.
Thus, diﬀerent kinds of cousins as well as other collaterals form equally part
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of the kin network. As such they are approached for help during weddings
and on similar circumstances. As marriage is usually arranged within close
physical distance most relatives also live close by, no matter if the relationship
is patrilateral or matrilateral.
The terms, which are used, for kinship are avlod and karindosh . They are
occasionally used interchangeably and following and figuring out when which
term is used was not easy. When I asked who a person was, the answer was in
most cases “karindosh ”. “Why not avlod ? “Well, she is also avlod ”. “So, what
is the diﬀerence?” “There is no diﬀerence”. “But you use them diﬀerently?”
Alisher was then, as always when the rest of the family could not help, called
for help. “Alisher, you can explain the diﬀerence between avlod and karindosh
to her.” However, when Alisher was trying to explain the two terms, others
would disagree about who belonged to which category and if there was in fact
a diﬀerence. While the term(s) for “kin” are flexible and not selective along
paternal and maternal lines, the knowledge concerning genealogy was quite
weak. Most people only knew two generations back and were not able to name
any ancestors beyond their grandfather. Vertical knowledge was weaker than
horizontal one. In that respect there was also no diﬀerence between Tajiks and
Uzbek who also share much of the basic terms or use them indiscriminately.
Settlement patterns reflect kinship relations quite closely both in Bukhara
and in the Ferghana Valley. It is a must that one builds houses for ones sons,
except the youngest one who inherits the house of the parents and also takes
care of them until their death. In the past, new houses were constructed
near the parents’ house and daughters would move into the houses of their
husbands. The aim is to keep sons as close as possible. The same is true for
girls but the planning procedure is not made with the same eﬀort as the sons.
If a girl marries, it is wishful that she not only remains in the village but also
moves in to a house as close as possible to her parents. This desired settlement
pattern is, however, not always possible anymore; there is simply not enough
space left. If an old house is destroyed and a new one constructed, it may
be possible to build a new one for two families, but new settlement areas are
only available on the outskirts of the village. The youngest son stays within
the village, where there is also a better infrastructure than the new settlement
areas.
In everyday life, the family is the basic production and consumption unit
and after independence it became even more important in many respects. The
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family size and the household composition actually did not change radically
after the end of socialism but only until substantial migration from Central
Asia started to take place in the last couple of years. For that reason, child
and woman labour became more intensively used and regularly allocated as
“help” by close kin. Families started to unify more and more and the conjugal
independence of new married couples was often postponed for unlimited time
due to economic reasons or for lack of construction land. The middle generation
started to spend more time away from home in order to make ends meet while
grandchildren were supervised by their grandparents or other relatives.
The extended family also plays an important role in the daily life of Uzbeks.
This usually includes all descendants of one couple that are two generations
away, i.e. all siblings and paternal first cousins. These will tend to meet very
frequently; on an almost daily basis if they live in the same or neighbouring
villages. There is, of course, certain variability to that and some families have
closer mutual relations than others. Extended families do not always form one
household but if possible, they tend to settle very close. However, relations
are not always smooth.
When the household consists of an extended family, this is as indicated
usually the youngest son residing with his family in his father’s house, which
he is later inheriting. This arrangement provides more advantages than in the
past. Being married to the youngest son of the family, which means living
with in-laws, used to be not very attractive for many girls in the past. But
after independence, the families of brides started to see this marriage in a
more positive light and did not see it as necessarily being accompanied by
disadvantages. The pensions of elderly people, although not very much, are
seen as positive as is having a house and piece of land. There are also examples
of the youngest son moving out and the parents staying with another son. This
decision depends not only on the relation to the son but the daughter-in-law
also plays a very important role. In one case in the valley, the daughter-in-law
mentioned that her in-laws like her and so they have decided to stay with them
– this even though she was a Tajik and married into an Uzbek family. Her
mother-in-law does not allow her to speak in her mother tongue to the kids
because “the children should learn Uzbek properly”.
There is a pronounced division of labour in Uzbek society. Domestic aﬀairs
are almost solely in the hands of women who do all the cooking, washing and
cleaning at home (cf. Sancak & Finke ￿￿￿￿). In daily life, it is always women
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who cook. Men only take on this responsibility at ceremonies and on other
bigger occasions. As soon as daughters reach the age of fifteen, a major part of
this work is on their shoulders. This only changes when their first brother gets
married and the daughter-in-law will take on this job. Girls will assist their
mother in this from an early age on and take over much of the responsibility
later.
This imbalance survived the attempt during socialist times to promote
gender equality. Concerning jobs, women are more present in education and
health care, while men tend to occupy senior positions. In particular, many
women have become teachers but, again, the director is usually a man. The
same is true for female nurses versus male doctors. In the local administration
women find a job mainly as secretaries. There are some exceptions to this.
The head of one of the eight municipalities in Romitan tumani was a woman
during the period of my fieldwork. Technical jobs like drivers or mechanics are
also very much male dominated. In agriculture, women do most of the boring
and exhausting work, such as ridding the fields of weeds and picking cotton.
Within the family, men take a clearly pronounced position. The eldest
male is considered the head of the household and has the final word in most
issues. Women, especially elderly women, however, have quite an influence on
social aﬀairs. This became clear when I discussed marriage arrangements but
it extends to other spheres as well. Women are responsible for maintaining
social relations to a large degree. Men are primarily responsible for presenting
the family to the outside world. Thus they are in centre of all kinds of public
events, mosque visits or other village-centred occasions.
“Out of nine children, only two, my husband and his brother (one is
doctor the other one is pharmacist), assure their existence. We support
my mother and father-in-law. If we move to the city of Andijon they
would die of hunger. They do not let us go to Andijon. The other sons
can take care for themselves, but have no money left over. They exploit
us and always say they need this or that. They say they don’t even
have enough oil (cotton oil). I threatened them that I would take my
husband and move to Andijon.” (Malika)
Malika can talk like this because her husband is the oldest son, thus she is
the oldest daughter-in-law, and she is aware of her position via her husband
– socially and economically. She comes from another tuman, is educated, and
also works as a doctor, which allows her to speak more freely to her mother-
in-law. Her father-in-law is sick and old, which may contribute to the fact
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that she showed less reluctance to say her opinion but also she is known and
accepted with her attitude.
Independence and the ongoing economic transformation have had a remark-
able eﬀect on gender and generation relations. Not only has the workload for
women and men changed, but family members have become more separated
from home. This has increased especially in the last few years since interna-
tional migration has become to play an important role in the lives of people.
It is particularly true for the Ferghana Valley. Both women and men have
started to work more and harder at home and away from home. Besides their
salaries being dependent on their occupation, going to tomorqa or buying and
selling things at the market take up their whole time. Men and women have
started to make their livings not only through an intensive use of their small
plots but also by doing any kind of daily job as labourers. The number of
women spending their days at the markets, either selling their own products
or as small-scale traders, are an example for that. During these hours the
grandparents take over household activities and child caring. Also, cooking,
cleaning or other domestic work is done partially by the grandparents allow-
ing young couples to do more additional activities beyond the household or
village. While elders consolidate their position at home, women enjoy more
respect from their in-laws in their labour-intensive activities.
For young men, after finishing school, there is nothing to do besides help
their parents and hang out with their friends. This is seen as a major prob-
lem, especially by the older generation. For them it is a new and dangerous
phenomena, and it is diﬃcult to understand how somebody without a job can
spend his life on the street and be engaged in bad habits such as visiting wed-
dings uninvited and drinking in public. The older generation, which is now
retired, never experienced unemployment in their youth at all.
Birth control and other necessary resources are provided by medical points
(ambulatorya). Non-hormonal IUD was the most common method of prevent-
ing pregnancy and was available free of charge. For some informants, having
less children is a sign of development but the dominant arguments are economic
and concerning the health conditions of women. That is also why having many
children nowadays is seen as a burden. This is a very ambiguous question. On
the one hand, one son and one daughter is seen as an ideal case, and having
many children raises the question of who will take care of them. On the other
hand, having more children than two is explained with “we Uzbeks, we love
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children”. Sons are security for old age and stay with their parents to take care
of them. Having at least one son is therefore a must and families with only
daughters pity themselves:
“Sons; we need at least one son, otherwise who will take care of us.
If it is the case, we take an ich kuyew (“internal son-in-law”). Thus, a
son-in-law moves to our house. This is not very good but what else shall
we do?” (Zaynab)
Marriage is probably the most crucial social event in Uzbek society. It
creates not only new households (although not immediately) but also links
families in often multiple ways. Many couples are already linked to each other
before their marriages. Marrying a relative strengthens the existing ties even
more. Marriage in Uzbekistan is not just an issue between two individuals but
one closely followed by their relatives. The decision of whom to marry is in
most cases to a large degree also a family aﬀair. In the case of men they may
ask their parents (especially their mother) to help them marry a particular girl.
Otherwise, it is often the parents to look for appropriate marriage partners for
their kids. In the villages there were several cases of young people commit-
ting suicide because they were not allow marrying the person they wanted to.
Most people marry sometime between ￿￿ and ￿￿ and girls beyond that age are
considered diﬃcult to marry of.
Criteria for choosing one’s child’s spouse include physical closeness (prefer-
able within the same village or a few kilometres away) and a good reputation
of the family. These two aspects often speak for relatives who usually settle
within the same local area and know each other’s positive and negative sides
best. Zaynab’s one daughter, who married a far oﬀ relative in a suburb of
Bukhara, was very often a topic of conversation concerning how far away she
is and how diﬃcult it is, although her in-laws are a very good family and
she is doing fine with her life. When we would talk about marriage, a good
son-in-law, traditions and so on, I was waiting to be asked how I could marry
a non-Muslim or, expectedly, if he had converted to Islam, or about how my
parents allowed me to marry a non-Turk? However, this question was never
asked. The only thing asked was how I could marry somebody from so far
away and “how they could allow this”.
Kin marriages are preferred not only because wealth stays in the family but
for a multitude of reasons. Some of these have become even more important
after independence. “Because of economic reasons people prefer to marry their
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kin. Even if you give only ￿￿ koylek (dresses), it is excused and more is not
demanded due to the idea that kin should help kin. Of course, if you marry a
non-kin, the children are healthier and prettier.” Marrying a close relative was
strongly preferred and very often justified using the following argument: “It is
allowed in musulmanchilik (the Muslim way), in order to keep the closeness
among kin.” A Tajik family in Marxamat, with twelve children – five boys and
seven girls – told me that all their marriage were kin-based.
“Our daughters-in-law are all good girls. We have known them since
childhood; they are not unknown (begona). Our grandchildren are healthy.
All our sons-in-laws are also, in some way, kin to us. You know if you
marry your kin, you have fewer breakups and a person has good man-
ners. It is our tradition and we do not want to violate our tradition. We
do not have inherited diseases that could lead to children with disorders.
Children of an unhealthy father and mother are handicapped, in order
to prevent it, they are doing propaganda with saglom avlod ”.￿ (Zoya)
Muxammad did not feel himself aﬀected by this problematic at all and
he argued that the state takes the necessary steps in order to prevent children
from having disorders. There is no reason to avoid marrying kin. He continued
to say that, “. . . now, before marriage they (the couple) go to the tuman for
medical examination. If there is something wrong, they tell them there that
“before marriage you need treatment” and then they are allowed to marry.
During the Soviet time this did not happen”.
In contras, especially people with a medical education adopted the oﬃcial
critique of kin-marriages. Malika said that all four of her husband’s brothers
married “outside” since her husband, like herself a doctor, insisted on it due
to the high risk of retarded or sick children through kin marriages. She told
me that Tajiks, as her in-laws, prefer kin marriages to others. In that respect
she praised Kyrgyz’s and Kazaks since they do not marry a kin from the
last seven generations, like Amir Timur who also knew his seven generations.
Now, she said, “. . . only two generations are known”. Others were sceptical of
kin marriages as a danger for aﬃnal relations:
“My older sister wanted her son to marry my daughter. I replied that
if there are problems in their marriage, something doesn’t work, if they
quarrel all the time, if they want to divorce, what are we going to do? I
told her that then we would not be able to talk to each other anymore.
￿ Literally: „healthy generation“. After independence, this was one of the state programs
that were dedicated to a subject focussing on particular aspects of life.
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Later my sister told me that: “You did well, you were right, we took the
daughter of my husband’s sister and give to our daughter to their son.
Now two families – two hearts, two souls are happy.” (Faruza)
Once negotiations are settled, preparations for the marriage procedures
begin. Usually, these take place in summer. People get a break from labour-
intensive agricultural work. Some of the most labour-intensive months are left
behind, others coming up (starting from end of august cotton will be picked)
making the summer the best time to organize feasts. Other important factors
for choosing the summer include the weather – it is warm, less rain, the days
are longer so the ceremonies can last longer – as well as the fact that the fruits
are ripe and abundant.
Nice weather also allows for sitting outside, where tables and chairs are
placed in a row. The tables are decorated with diﬀerent fresh and dried fruits
and soft drinks, while dishes are served one after the other, starting with soup
and finishing with plov. The abundance of food and drink depend on how well
oﬀ the family is. Weddings are expensive and most families have to save money
for several years. On an average wedding party some ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿ guests have
to be fed and served with vodka. This may easily add up to ￿,￿￿￿ dollars.
With an average salary of ten to ￿￿ dollars (if there is a regular income at all)
this is hard to match. Weddings are the most expensive feast but a sunnet toi
of a rich family may be as costly. In a village in Bukhara a well oﬀ businessman
had arranged for a famous singer and dancers from Tashkent to come to the
sunnet toi of his only son. The amount of food and drink also corresponded
to the expectations and to his status.
After a wedding toi people talk about every detail of the event and about
the failures of the organization and its host. The amount of meat in plov,
the number of bottles on the table, how long they had to wait to be served,
how big or small the portions were and whether or not there was an adequate
supply of beverages. During my stay in Bukhara, a wedding toi (kiz or girls
toi) was celebrated with a circumcision (sunnet or boys toi) at the same time
and I was also among the guests invited. With an un-approving tone I was
told that it was as a “new tradition” to celebrate these two toi together.
“It is a shame on the bride’s family that the groom’s family covered
the entire costs of the wedding toi, especially since the bride’s family
celebrated their sunnet toi using that money. At the expenses of the
wedding toi they celebrated their sunnet toi.” (Gulnoza)
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I had heard before about this co-celebration and about the reason some
rituals are celebrated due to economic reasons. The toi was quite crowded,
almost ￿￿￿ hundred people came. I think one of the reasons why people were
so critical had to do with the fact that it was a ‘Turkmen’ toi. People criticized
the service, food and all other things using the argument that “. . . they did not
take good care of the guests, there was no order, neither the service nor the
food was good. Turkmens have no order.” It was admitted, however, that the
economic situation and the diﬃculties in the post-independence period bring
changes to traditions as in case of celebration of ceremonies and performance
of the rituals that is seen as inevitable.
While it is rare, some wedding feasts are celebrated during the winter. Most
of the time this is due to marriage arrangements being worked out lately or
because they are short of financial resources. I was told that some people are
so busy that they have neither enough time to find a girl nor to organize the
necessary preparations. Especially families with limited financial resources are
forced to postpone or reschedule their planned marriages. In the case of a poor
family, it takes more time and energy to convince the family of the girl, even
if they are relatives. A well-oﬀ family seldom has these kinds of problems. In
the valley for example, if the families work in Kyrgyzstan most of the time,
then they face payments delays, or they are dependent on the happenings of
the Kyrgyz free market economy. If payments are made and enough money is
gathered, people are urged not to wait until summer for the wedding because
their money may lose its value by then.
￿.￿ Ethnic Identity and Inter-ethnic Relations
It may be useful to diﬀerentiate ethnic groups according to their time of res-
idence or how they have come to be in the region. This distinguishes more
indigenous groups from relatively newcomers such as Russians or Tatars. Most
of the non-Muslim populations either live in the cities or in the tuman cen-
tres, while the villages are dominantly inhabited by Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz or
Kazaks. These groups have been residing here for a long time and only since
￿￿￿￿ became eﬀectively separated by the border from their co-ethnics. The
ethnic heterogeneity is aﬀected by the local conditions and circumstances such
as borders and historical movements.
As mentioned, the viloyat of Bukhara has a dominant Tajik population
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while Uzbeks and, to a certain extent, other ethnic groups are represented as
well. The Tajik speaking population shapes the entire city of Bukhara and
many of the nearby districts. Some Turkmen villages are scattered throughout
the viloyat and there is also a number of Kazaks but they live in the desert in
small settlements where they form the majority. Furthermore, in the past few
years, they have started to move to Kazakstan, where they have kept marriage
relations throughout the years. From Bukhara towards the Western provinces
of Khorezm and Karakalpakistan, the number of Tajiks diminishes radically
(cf. also Finke ￿￿￿￿).
In the villages the number of Russians was never noteworthy. Mostly, they
were teachers who came and stayed only a few years before they came to be
increasingly replaced by locals. Occasionally there were some bureaucrats who
came for education and training in kolkhozes and then also left after a certain
amount of time. Interaction with them was limited to the work place, although
they were sometimes invited to feasts. Today, the number of Russians or other
non-Muslim ethnic groups is limited to the tuman centres and they are hardly
ever seen in the villages. As mentioned earlier, there are a few rare exceptions
of elder couples who met each other in Russia during military service.
In tuman centres there are also some Armenians, Tatars, Azeri, Meskhetian
Turks or other groups who during Soviet times arrived as labour power or
were deported by Stalin (Hirsch ￿￿￿￿, Martin ￿￿￿￿, Slezkine ￿￿￿￿). Some of
them left after ￿￿￿￿ yet some of them, for example the Meskhetian Turks,
stayed since they did not have an independent state to which to go back.
The happenings in the Ferghana Valley in ￿￿￿￿ when violent conflict between
Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks broke out caused loss of life for both sides. After
that, some Meskhetian Turks were again forced to leave, but some remained
in the Ferghana Valley.
While no such thing exists in Bukhara, the Uzbeks in the valley are di-
vided into sub-categories. Some of these are along (former) tribal lines such as
Qipchaq and Turks. They were sometimes regarded as Uzbeks but sometimes
counted as separate groups. In daily life, in Marxamat, usually the distinction
was about Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Turks. If the Turks were counted sep-
arately, they had a ranking after Uzbeks and Tajiks, which were again seen as
close to each other. Turks were sometimes just Uzbeks, but they were again
diﬀerentiated by some features such as their dialect, occupational status (as
former livestock breeders) and physical features like having a slightly darker
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skin. They rarely allow their daughters to marry Tajiks.
Another category in the Ferghana Valley is Kashgarlik. Muslims from
Xinjiang immigrated to the valley during the nineteenth century when Qing
authorities suppressed Muslim rebellions. According to Komatsu, Russian
sources mention about ￿￿,￿￿￿ Muslim families from Kashgaria who migrated
to the valley; most of them went back after the peace agreement (￿￿￿￿). But
many others stayed. All over the valley there are villages, which are also called
Kashgar.
Talking about identity was, contrary to what I expected, not more com-
plicated or inflexible in the valley than in Bukhara. In Uzbekistan, one can
say that many identities and ethnicities co-exist at the same time; on one’s
passport, in a genealogical sense, and in one’s own perception. There also is
a diﬀerence between what Hirsch (￿￿￿￿) calls “written/documented ethnicity”
and “real ethnicity” (cf. also Martin ￿￿￿￿). The ethnicity category on the
identity cards is a Soviet legacy, which continues to exist. Some informants
wanted to know if there is such a category in Turkish or German passports
as they did not approve of it and thought it did not matter who belonged to
which category.
“There are other places where it makes a diﬀerence like in Bukhara city.
My son, he was sick when he was in the army. I heard about it and
immediately went there. His passport has “Uzbek” written in it, but we
are Tajiks. The doctor was also a Tajik. After I told him that we were
Tajiks, his attitude was diﬀerent and he kept my son at the hospital
instead of sending him immediately back to his troop.” (Shukratbay)
The Soviet Union generation remembers and idealizes the past, not only
in respect to economic aspects but also in relation to ethnicity. Although
the villages were not really multicultural and the experiences were mostly
limited to military service and vacations, it is remembered and believed in
multiculturalism.
“Guests, be that Russians, Tatars or Jews, were all treated very well
here. This shows how civilized Uzbeks and Tajiks are. And so also we
were invited to their weddings, worked together; even some Russians
learned to bake bread in a tandir ” (Aziz)
Since independence, ethnicity and ethnic diﬀerences have gained some mo-
mentum but have not gained a completely new dimension in Uzbekistan. Of
￿￿￿
Economic and Social Change in Uzbekistan
course there is a process of Uzbekisation but it occurred during the Soviet pe-
riod as well, especially in rural areas. Some Tajiks see this process as normal
and serene, since they have lived with Uzbeks for so long. Younger generations
have much less experience with ethnic minorities as many of them left in the
first years of independence or live in the city. As I mentioned before, contact
to the tuman or to the city is quite limited and allows for little contact to
other groups. Satipaldi was born in ￿￿￿￿ and has no idea, which ethnic groups
lived in Marxamat before. What his parents are accustomed to is shocking to
him: “What? Jewish people lived here?” Since independence, military service
is done within Uzbek territory, so there is no chance to see other places and
ethnic groups as their fathers had done. This military experience was per-
ceived as “seeing the world” and being cosmopolitan even though freedom of
travel was limited.
Adults were usually well informed about their peers in many respects, but of
course also concerning their ethnic background. When I asked who was Uzbek
and who was Tajik in the village, most found it easy to say, “He is Uzbek” or
“She is Tajik”, using the language predominantly used by that person as main
criterion. There were of course disagreements in some cases. Rigid criteria
or complete certainty of belonging was only to be found in the cases of non-
Muslims or Turkic groups like Kazaks, Kyrgyz or Turkmens, that is to say
everyone else but Uzbeks and Tajiks.
Denial of there being any diﬀerence between Tajiks and Uzbeks was quite
strong at both field sites but especially in Bukhara. This is usually attributed
to an almost universal bilingualism and frequent inter-marriages (cf. Finke
￿￿￿￿). In conversations I asked my informants to think a little bit about it, as
to if there is really “no diﬀerence” between Uzbeks and Tajiks. After a while of
thinking about it, the answer was always: “No, there is no diﬀerence”. When I
asked that question, people seriously thought about it, as if in a quiz show. In
the end, the answers ranged from “small diﬀerences” to “almost no diﬀerence”,
or “there is no diﬀerence anymore”. Naming the small diﬀerences proved not to
be possible either. These undefined, unexplained, yet existing small diﬀerences
were, according to many informants, unimportant but still existing in an unde-
fined or indescribable way. Perception of one’s own language as being diﬀerent
was not so important as I would have expected. Both languages were in some
degree intermingled, had been coexisting for a long time and were not seen as
an obstacle for inter-ethnic contact. As Uzbeks or Tajiks of Uzbekistan, they
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were very proud of themselves and of how hospitable they are. I was often
asked as to if I had ever experienced this kind of hospitality anywhere before,
which is seen as a criteria of civilization that are features of Uzbeks and Tajiks
in contrast to former nomads.
“Our ceremonies have the same form with Uzbeks, there are small, tiny
diﬀerences but they don’t matter, they are not significant diﬀerences.
I have no idea to which Tajik dialect ours is close. Since we live with
Uzbeks and mingle with them especially concerning language, there is a
lot of mixing. Our grandchildren neither understand Tajik nor Russian
properly. They grow up with Uzbeks and communicate in Uzbek. But
that’s a good thing, whoever wants to get promoted anywhere has to
have “Uzbek” in his passport (Raxmon).
In the valley, Tajiks say that since they are living alongside Uzbeks, they
speak a Tajik, which is strongly influenced by Uzbek. It is interesting that
there are no critical voices in the village against this influence. Here, Tajik
identity cannot be compared to the situation in Bukhara where Tajik schools
still exist in rural areas. Of course, the size of the Tajik population is one
very significant factor. In Bukhara, the Tajik language and the consciousness
concerning this subject is unquestionably strong and obviously local Tajik
elites also play a significant role. Diﬀerent than in the valley, there is no doubt
that good command of the Tajik language is very helpful in Bukhara city,
which is not the case in Andijon at all. “It helps make things go faster”. In the
valley, Tajiks swim with the current, which is seen the future and accepted in
a natural way. “We will all be Uzbek one day, living with Uzbeks; especially
as we do not have Tajik schools either.” In the valley, Uzbek is accepted as the
usual language. Rather, the Russian language was seen as the “enemy” that
should be resisted and not be assimilated to. This may be due to historical
events that occurred in the region such as the Dukchi Ishan uprising in ￿￿￿￿.
Both Uzbeks and Tajiks would tell me that children of mixed marriages are
healthier and particularly girls are more beautiful than others. They were giv-
ing examples like showing the daughters of the families, where couples belong
to diﬀerent ethnic groups. “Children of mestis (mixed) are beautiful.” Tajiks
are, in both settings, the ones that have the most intensive marriage relations
with Uzbeks. In contrast, those groups with nomadic backgrounds are not
seen as possible marriage partners, especially for Tajiks. In Bukhara, any dif-
ference between Tajiks and Uzbeks is denied and intermarriage is common. In
the valley it is not quite as common. Still, Uzbek-Tajik marriages have been
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going on for so long that they are not seen as inter-ethnic or mixed marriages
in the strict sense. There is nothing exceptional to them and, in fact, to call
these marriages inter-ethnic would not make very much sense for most people.
If kinship marriages are the preferred type of marriage, again it overlaps with
ethnic and it intensifies the relationships among people. Of course, there are
brides who came from other villages but they are also related in some way or
“co-ethnic”. This makes things easier. Knowing Uzbek but not Tajik or vice
versa – after all rather the exception – is not seen as a problem and it can be
solved within time. People do not perceive it as a problem: “ugrenip ketedi ”
(she will learn it within time), or “I also couldn’t speak the language in the
beginning”.
Raxmon, a Tajik informant in the valley, thinks that “Uzbeks and Tajiks
are almost the same today”, and the reason for that is, according to him,
the dominant number of Uzbeks in the region. He also strongly prefers kin
marriage. He has ten children; five girls and five boys. His two sons married
two sisters. “If you know the one kelin is good, it makes sense to get the other
one from the same family. All my kelin are Tajik. One of my daughters is
married to an Uzbek family, one daughter is married to a Tashkent one, but
the son-in-law is the son of my sister. It is good to keep a certain closeness.”
Another Tajik family with nine sons and six daughters told me that they had ￿￿
children and only ￿￿ of them survived. They have more than fifty grandchildren
and five great-grand children. They have one Uzbek daughter-in-law from
the neighbouring viloyat of Ferghana and all others are from neighbouring
kolkhozes. They are all Tajik. Two of their son-in-laws are Tajiks and four
are Uzbeks. At home Tajik is spoken but since there are lots of Uzbeks in
the neighbourhood, their grandchildren understand Tajik but cannot speak it
properly, especially since their school is also in Uzbek. According to them,
Tajiks are proficient in both languages but Uzbeks are not.
Malika is originally from another tuman that is Uzbek dominated and she
married to a Tajik whom she met at university. Her parents did not want
her to marry a Tajik because in their view Tajiks are “Lulu”.￿ However, she
insisted and her parents then came to the tuman and gathered information
about him and his family. Later they allowed the marriage to go forward. She
had proved to her parents that her husband is not a Lulu only because he speaks
￿ This term is used for gypsies in Uzbekistan who are Tajik speaking (see also Finke
￿￿￿￿).
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Tajik. In her home tuman Tajiks are put in the same category as Lulu and
“Nobody marries a Lulu except a Lulu.” One Uzbek informant from the valley
also had serious reservations about the Lulu. Allegedly, this word stems from
the marriage of two siblings, which is inacceptable for Uzbeks. Furthermore,
according to Lulu tradition women work and take care of the family rather
than men who stay at home, which is not consistent with Uzbeks’ tradition.￿
Within the same family preferences concerning the proper daughters- and
sons-in-laws may diﬀer in regard to ethnic background. For daughters it is
important that the potential son-in-laws have good jobs and are financially
secure with good families, yet for the sons emotional reasons and genealogical
faithfulness were also important. This was the case in a Tajik-Uzbek family:
“My two daughters are married to Uzbeks, actually Uzbek-Turks. But
for my sons I want Tajiks. When they were small my husband asked
them who they were going to marry, when they answered “a Tajik” he
would give them money. I did not want my daughters to marry Uzbek-
Turks, either a Tajik or an Uzbek would be better, but they did not
give up. They went to my father-in-law and convinced him and he gave
them his permission. Hence, there was nothing we could do. On the
other hand, we should be glad, some people can’t find anybody who
wants to marry their daughter”. (Malika)
Actually both sons, although their father is Tajik, cannot speak Tajik but
this is not seen as a major problem either concerning their Tajik ethnicity
or for their future marriage to Tajiks. “Tajik kelin will teach” is the general
solution since the Tajik kelin brings the language and the identity back home
again. “My husband is Tajik, but his passport says he is Uzbek. The same
counts for my sons.” Although herself an Uzbek, she wants her sons to marry
Tajiks as this is the only way for them to get their Tajikness back due to their
passports and to herself having no command of the Tajik language.
On the other hand, the distance to Turkmens and Kazaks is seen as a
nomadic- sedentary dilemma, while the language is also mentioned as a prob-
lem. Hence, Uzbeks on the one hand and Kazaks or Turkmens on the other
hand are not classified in the same category. “We are all Muslims.” But being
a Muslim, even one from the same school (Sunnites of the Hanafi branch), is
not enough to be a part of the imagined circle that is narrowing and widening.
￿ In town, Lulu women walk around accompanied by their children and give people their
blessings, for which they request money. They are found especially in front of market places
or in parking lots and spread stinging nettle incense (producing smoke in a burner) against
the evil eye and bad luck.
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And religion is not the only criteria; locality and a sedentary or nomadic way
of life also matter. “Kazak, Kyrgyz and Turkmens are diﬀerent, their Muslim-
ness is diﬀerent.” Although in some villages in Bukhara there was in fact a
shared territoriality with Turkmen (but not with Kazaks) that alone does not
help to establish and reinforce the relationships. As mentioned above, besides
their lack of hospitality Kazaks and Turkmens are also blamed for their food.
As a nomadic diet, this was not appreciated and perceived as simple and with
little variety. Nomads are “meat consumers” and “they can simply cook one
dish.”
“They just know to slaughter a sheep and eat it. They cannot cook
properly, they just know besh parmak￿ and their plov is not eatable.
Also, they do not keep their houses as clean as we Uzbeks do. During
work trips of my husband to them, in the desert, he always came back
with lice.” (Nigora)
Both groups are also perceived as “rude” and “dirty” (taza emes), because
they worked with livestock. A perceived discrepancy of the nomad-sedentary
way of life is the reason given for avoiding such marriages. When Uzbeks or
Tajiks marry a Kazak, especially in Bukhara, life can be made very hard for
brides; “kiyin aladi ”. This is seen as a permanent problem, which is perceived
as being diﬀerent than the language problem, which disappears within time.
The bride is seen as being alone amongst “nomads” with nobody around to
support or understand her.
“She has to get used to their urf odat (customs) and their madaniyat
(civilization), which is quite diﬀerent than ours. It is very diﬃcult and
she is all alone.” (Nigora)
Thus, besides ethnicity the overlapping nomad-sedentary dichotomy is another
marriage criteria. A physical feature of Kazaks, namely their shape of eyes,
was seen as highly unattractive. For Bukharians, not only Kazakstan was far
away, geographically and culturally, this distance begins already in Tashkent
and with the Uzbeks of Tashkent.
“Look, in Tashkent, which is not far away from Kazakstan; even the
Uzbeks there have slanting eyes like the Kazaks.” (Qaydar)
￿ Traditional Kazak food with boiled meat and home made noodles. It literally means
„five fingers“ as it is eaten by hand.
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The biases against nomadic groups like Turkmens and Kazaks in Bukhara
are stronger than against the Kyrgyz in the valley, where cohabitation and even
limited marriage alliances exist. In Bukhara, sedentary and nomadic groups
live in geographically separated areas (oasis and desert), hence their daily
interaction is limited. The attitude of valley inhabitants towards (former)
nomads, in this case especially Kyrgyz of Kyrgyzstan, is similar to that in
Bukhara but not as severe. Some Kyrgyz talked about their Uzbek kin and
mentioned that they had lived here for a long time and mixed marriages had
occurred. Nevertheless, their nomadic background and their traditions are
seen as an obstacle, even though they have been living in the Uzbek part of
the valley for many generations. In the valley, even though people see Kyrgyz
and Uzbeks as two diﬀerent ethnic groups, they are perceived as being close to
each other in some way. On both sides of the border Uzbeks and Kyrgyz live
together and the assimilation of the Kyrgyz to the Uzbek population, make
them similar to Uzbeks, so “they are uzbekisized”. This happens through
locality, otherwise the Kyrgyz from other regions are not seen as being close
to Uzbeks.￿￿
A Tajik informant expressed the same opinion and also categorized “Uzbek-
istan’s Kyrgyz” as being diﬀerent from “Kyrgyzstan’s Kyrgyz”. When the same
person talked about other ethnic groups such as Meskhetian Turks and their
conflict with Uzbeks in ￿￿￿￿, he would talk about what “the Uzbeks” did, but
when talking about a diﬀerent “conflict-free” subject he used the phrase “we
Uzbeks”. In the valley Uzbeks consider Tajiks and Kyrgyz as being close to
them; even though informants tended to see language as a primary form of
ethnic diﬀerence. Tajik, however, is not seen as being far, even though it is
from a diﬀerent language family. At the same time, Kyrgyz from Kyrgyzstan
are far because of the language and customs while “our Kyrgyz”, the ones liv-
ing in Uzbekistan, are perceived as being close, since they speak Uzbek and
are uzbekisized in other spheres of life. Another informant, a Kyrgyz mahalla
aqsaqal from the valley, told me that his father had married twice and the
children from the second marriage were registered as Uzbek since the second
wife was an Uzbek￿￿. He said that these children also married Uzbeks.
In everyday life, although they are uzbekisized, interaction with Kyrgyz
￿￿ Also within Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz from the south are perceived as „uzbekisized“ in
contrast to those in the north.
￿￿ Usually, the father’s ethnicity is the determining one and his ethnicity is written in the
passport.
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people is limited to the neighbourhood. Some Kyrgyz also speak Tajik as
they live in the same areas; especially children who play with other children.
Otherwise, knowledge of the Tajik language is usually limited to a few words.
”We do not give a girl to Kyrgyz. Their toi are like in Kyrgyzstan.
They ask for kalin￿￿ and they slaughter their sheep in front of her when
she comes to her new home (ayagina qoy soyadi). Of course, they also
do not care for their houses as Uzbeks do.” (Faruza)
At the same time, the Kyrgyz of the vodi are the only group, which is
prepared to take kelin from other ethnic groups. And there are families with
brides from diﬀerent ethnic groups, such as a Kyrgyz rais, who has three
daughter-in-laws; only one is Kyrgyz, one is Uzbek, and one is Uyghur. One
daughter of him married a Kyrgyz from Aravan, a tuman directly on the other
side of the border in Kyrgyzstan with a strong Uzbek population. If we think
that they are a small minority and the only group where kin marriage is not
allowed, this flexibility is unavoidable. For Kyrgyz, avoiding kin marriage
is necessary to have healthy next generations. Furthermore, if they want to
marry within Uzbekistan, they do not have any other alternatives besides the
small Kyrgyz minority. I would also argue that since Uzbeks and Tajiks prefer
to marry each other or within their own ethnic group, Kyrgyz do not have
many alternatives and are forced to be open. Kyrgyz argue against Tajiks
that they exclude them as potential marriage partners, with a kind of critic
like in following citation.
“My Kyrgyz daughter-in-law is from another kolkhoz. When she goes
home, she speaks Kyrgyz, with us she speaks Uzbek. When I talk to my
neighbours, Tatars and Uyghurs, we have a common language, namely
Uzbek. Tajiks only give kiz (a girl) to Tajiks, and rarely to Uzbeks.
We (Kyrgyz) do not take (spouses) from close relatives (karindosh ).
During Soviet times as well as today, it was often said that one should
not marry your kin, but Tajiks did not care, they continue to do so, look
at their families, look at their children, they are retarded.” (Otabek).
Tribal Uzbeks are a category somehow in-between. One family’s daughter-
in-laws are all tribal Uzbeks. According to them, between Tajiks and tribal
Uzbeks marriages are very few and have not been the case before at all. They
said they still would not mix with Tajiks but that the diﬀerences are disap-
pearing also because Tajik neighbourhoods are not separated anymore. The
￿￿ Bride wealth.
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amount of bride wealth, which Uzbeks and Tajiks do not have but Kyrgyz and
tribal Uzbeks have, is given as one reason. Although Uzbek-Turks and Kyrgyz
both practice the tradition, it does not necessarily lead to marriage alliances
between Kyrgyz and tribal Uzbeks.
“We have kalin, but the Kyrgyz ask for too much, we give one sheep
and some clothes; that is all.” (Farshod)
Russians are regarded as harmless, simple and naïve but also gracious peo-
ple as the following quote shows: “If a Russian eats a piece of your bread he
respects you, he appreciates it. Tatars eat your bread and spit on it, while
Kazaks are only good to their own people”. It is interesting that Tatars were
often regarded as, “. . . close to Russian even though they are Muslims”. One of
the reasons was their good command of the Russian language. However, they
are less appreciated as Russians are. Tatars are usually also fluent in Uzbek
and the jobs they occupy, translation and prestigious bureaucratic occupations,
are like the ones the Russians have.
“Russians do not have food like Uzbek food; they do not take care
of their houses as much as Uzbeks do with furniture and decoration.”
(Munisa)
On the other hand, Russian culture, Russian schools, Russian TV and
news means to be connected to the rest of the world, and Russian goods are
seen as having high quality. One critique of the Russians is their ignorance
to learn the native language, but there is no acceptance or tolerance of anti-
Russian propaganda. This is the only resentment towards Russians. In daily
life in rural areas, nobody talks about or discusses Russians. They were not
an important part of their life in the past that one can miss in the present.
This is diﬀerent for the urban population. Many people regret the emigration
of a well-known Jewish physician from Bukhara city to Israel because he was a
very good surgeon and the younger generation is not educated with the same
standards. A “good Soviet education system” is missed and today’s quality is
seen as bad, as “you get a diploma by bribes”. That is also one of the rare
critiques about today’s situation. One interesting point was that in the valley
there was not a significant Jewish population and contact to them was quite
limited compared to Bukhara.
During my stay, ethnic belonging was not the decisive point and the lines
were not drawn along group membership when it came to access to or ex-
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clusion from resources. Being a member of a certain ethnic group does not
automatically bring disadvantages with it but not being a member of a certain
circle does. This circle, depending on the region, can include or exclude one
or the other ethnic group. I would argue that Uzbeks and Tajiks or Kazaks
are equally excluded or included. The economic reality and the circumstances
in the post-Soviet period are new for everybody, independent of their ethnic
belonging. All members of society are confronted with this reality and they
deal with this problem via networks, which are, however, not necessarily based
along ethnic lines. They may overlap, but “power” is more important than
ethnic loyalty and solidarity. People of a diﬀerent ethnicity but of the same or
similar hierarchical positions cooperate with each other. Pressure along power
lines does not allow favours along ethnic lines.
I would thus argue that power and status is more decisive for solidarity
than ethnicity. In Marxamat certain positions are occupied by diﬀerent ethnic
groups. The xokim is a Turk (tribal Uzbek), most of the vice xokim are Uzbek
and the chief of the medical station is a Tajik but registered as an Uzbek. This
is similar in Bukhara. These individuals look after their relatives and friends
as much as they can. Friends with certain power positions have priority over
others and also sometimes over relatives since “power friends” provide support
when needed. In certain situations powerful friends are more helpful than
relatives. Status and power related problems can be solved and the benefits
also shared within the group. The situation can be seen as passing the ball
to each other; the main thing is to keep the ball within the group of players.
Of course, in the case of Bukhara a Kazak or in the case of Andijon a Kyrgyz
has almost no chance to reach certain positions such as tuman xokim, but this
was the case also in the past. A Kyrgyz informant described their status with
these words, “. . . a Kyrgyz can never become a xokim, not even his deputy, he
can at the most be a bookkeeper or an aqsaqal in a Kyrgyz mahalla.”
￿.￿ Social Networks and Solidarity Groups
I did not conduct specific network analysis in which the actors and their mu-
tual manifold relations are comprehended. The existing interwoven relations
among the actors were not asked systematically in order to establish a pattern.
The data in this part of the dissertation is based upon observations and conver-
sations with people who provided me with information about themselves and
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others. I did not feel comfortable asking people directly about their relations
and networks, especially if they held certain positions and their economic and
political power was directly related to those relations. The ethnographer is
curious but I only collected information that came to me.
The importance of social networks during socialist times has been described
by a number of authors (Kandiyoti ￿￿￿￿; Kuehnast ￿￿￿￿; Ledeneva ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿;
Humphrey ￿￿￿￿). According to Sneath, in Mongolia and other parts of post-
socialist inner Asia collective and state farms shaped “the social relations of
obligation” in the past and even after partial dissolution of those farms the net-
works survived along “the lines of power of the old organization” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
Relations generated through economic institutions continued to shape not only
Uzbekistan’s post independence economic and political developments but fur-
thermore existing structures and networks remained basically untouched. It
can also be argued that the power holders of the old organizations determined
and shaped the restructuring after independence. These existing networks
of the past also nourished themselves and maintained their links by obliging
favours to one another. These were made up partly of kin relations but also
included other categories such as party membership or common school time
spent together as classmates.
A large, flexible and well-extended kinship network of mutual social obli-
gations plays a significant role in present Uzbekistan. Any kind of help and
assistance, material and non-material, is provided and circulated in this net-
work. One reason for the importance of these relationships is embedded within
the economic system. Everyone was guaranteed a reasonable living standard
by the state but had little opportunity to go further. It was very diﬃcult to
come across luxury goods outside of the usual scope of state provision and
sometimes it was even diﬃcult to get those legally. Relatives or friends in key
positions were often the only source for getting better quality or modern look-
ing clothing. These goods often changed hands without direct payment. In
fact, they were usually part of mutual exchange relations and thus helped to
strengthen a nascent class structure within the socialist system. People with
access to scarce goods could engage in informal trading networks that would
provide each of them with what the others had (or could lay hands on). In
other cases, these relations could develop into quasi-clientele ones. Individuals
in key positions – redistributors within the economic state sector – could pro-
vide their relatives and friends with needed or wanted goods. They would then
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expect loyalty and support in other spheres (e.g. helping out when building a
house) from their clients.
Social networks did not lose their meaning or significance after indepen-
dence. They are again used for allocating scarce resources, problem solving
and for support in general. Through and within these networks help is asked
for, reciprocated and trust relations are tested and reviewed. The social and
economic changes of the post independence period redefined and rearranged
the purposes of these networks, what and when they were called upon. Trust
and reciprocity are the yardsticks of these relationships and the maintenance
of these relationships, even in the case of the smallest daily interactions like
borrowing a machine or instrument, is reconsidered according to these crite-
rions. While in the past these networks were to acquire extras and did not
serve as survival mechanisms, under the present conditions of Uzbekistan they
provide the necessary means for poor people to survive and provide remark-
able advantages for certain other people. Since in agriculture privatization did
not occur, the valuable resource of arable land is still under the control of the
state. It was handed over to certain people who are either power holders of the
past or are somehow related to them, and to some new elites who emerged as
businessman and were able to get access to valuable resources as fermer (see
also Trevisani ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
On the other hand, the village or the mahalla is a solidarity unit where
social relations are intensively lived and where kinship and neighbourhoods
overlap. It is also the place where any type of secret is diﬃcult to hide from
others. Social relations are not static and they are negotiated and renegotiated
among actors as kin, as neighbours and as friends, and strategies are adjusted
according to the circumstances. Talking about one’s own or about others
marriages, relations with in-laws or about any other new development in the
village or tuman are topics discussed among women, which are discussed when
meeting up together or in organized gap.￿￿ In gap, relations are maintained,
news is exchanged and also help may be requested. Toi, like other life cycle
ceremonies, are also the places where social networks are shown, established
and intensified. In these, one gain value through one’s guests; the more the
better. Hence the host shows oﬀ his network and the guests consequently
￿￿ Gap means ’word’ and also ’to talk’ (the infinitive being gaplashmak). This is not
only a social gathering but also a rotating savings association. The usual form is only for
men, and women then have separate gaps, but there are also mixed gap (see also Kandiyoti
￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
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remember and talk about it for years to come. Hashar is another way of
mutual help that is not only limited to kin but also involves neighbours and
friends helping with a contribution of labour. It can come in the form of a
community project or be a private occasion, for example the construction of
a house (see also Rasanayagam ￿￿￿￿b:￿￿). People are mobilized to contribute
their labour and the house owner covers the daily expenses such as meals. In
the future one of the helpers has his turn.
Close kin have intensive daily interactions as brothers, sisters and parents,
and simultaneously as neighbours. The term “xabar sorayim” is used for these
short visits, which literally means “asking news”. Of course, each visit is a
kind of information exchange and in the case of elderly people who rarely go
outside, every visitor brings news. A job at the school, ambulatorya or at the
kolkhoz administration is a valuable source of information and keeps people
with updated information. This information usually has an economic value
and is often related to the organisation of cultivation. It may include finding a
tractor driver or knowing who lost one’s land as a fermer and the like. Women
or young girls, who do not work or go to school, are excluded from information
gathering processes. Young boys are better information sources because they
spend more time outside and are often used as postmen. Oydinoy describes
the changes in personal relations in the post-Soviet period with the following
words.
“Neighbourhood relations have changed a little. Before, whoever cooked
something would bring a plate to his neighbour. Whoever needed money,
would come and ask and nobody would hesitate to lend them money.
You knew you would get your money back; you knew you would be able
to pay it back. It was not necessary to chase after it. Today, everybody
hides what they do or do not have. If you lend somebody some money,
you do not get it back. It is not easy. Let’s say you get on the bus and
see two people you know. In the past, whoever got oﬀ first, would pay
for the others before he got oﬀ. Now, either he only pays for himself
or pretends not to see the others. The driver also wouldn’t demand to
know who already paid and who didn’t, as he does today.”
One reason the bus driver now wants to know who paid is because the firms
are private enterprises and the drivers’ incomes depend on it. During Soviet
times, he had a fixed monthly salary and the number of passengers was not
directly relevant to his salary. Furthermore, people were able to pay their bus
ticket and it was not necessary to travel without a ticket.
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Some informants said that money lending today only happens amongst
close relatives. I did notice, however, some people in the neighbourhood ask
each other for money. If there is an amount of trust based on past experiences
– “you know it will be paid back” – and the borrowed amount of money is
not large (if it can’t be paid back there isn’t much of a loss), then there is
usually no reason not to help others. In fact, asking relatives for money is not
always as easy as one may think. If a son-in-law is not hard working or is a
drinker, financial support is not a matter of course. In that case discussions
and arguments take the place of helping out. Exceptions are made in situations
of bad health or if there is not enough labour power or the children are too
young to help out. Some informants believe it possible to ask their relatives
for money while others believe it may harm their relationship.
Shop owners have a list of people unable to pay their shopping on a certain
day and promising to make their payments monthly. This type of credit-
shopping (yazdirip almak) is not a simple act for either side. Some informants
claim that they would never do it because it harms one’s reputation. Some
people say it is normal because there is no other way, “what should people
do, go and steal things?” For the shop owner the important thing is to get
his money and so it matters to him if the person is trustworthy or not, which
automatically excludes certain people.
Whether a sunnet toi or a wedding feast, these are occasions where rela-
tives, friends and neighbours come together and help each other. Preparations
start many days before and there is an organized division of labour among
relatives and friends. Most of the time this is an occasion for expected reci-
procity to be enacted. These feasts are the place where networks and wealth
are represented, evaluated and even documented. These networks, of course,
always include Uzbeks and Tajiks, which is one reason why diﬀerences, if they
ever existed, are becoming negligible. According to Kadirjan, there is one more
reason why existing small cultural diﬀerences between ethnic groups – so small
that he was not able to name them –are disappearing. They are disappearing
due to “economic reasons”, so he said. Traditions are lost because of money,
there is no money left for living out traditions. The celebration of life cycle
rituals, the prepared amount of food, the number of dresses the bride gets etc.
are all placed in this disappearing traditions category.
Usually, the whole village or mahalla is invited to a toi. People are invited
and informed of the time and location, although many know and talk about
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it beforehand. If all these people are invited to the toi, one thinks of a huge
event with many guests. The toi are crowded but not as much as I imagined.
Usually, if the guests are not relatives or close friends, only one person per
family participates. There have to be good reasons for many members of
a household participating at the same time; being relatives, good friends or
reciprocity. There is also a group of people that does not come to the toi but
stops only by and show their congratulations by giving ￿￿￿-￿￿￿ sums. These
people avoid coming in and eating with the other guests. The reason behind
that is if they come in, sit and eat with the other guests, then they need
to bring a real present, more than just a symbolic contribution. And, based
on the reciprocity principle, they should also invite these people for their toi,
which increases the costs. People going to every toi, yet not giving real gifts
are not welcomed and are talked about. “They come and eat plov, fill their
stomach there, because they can’t aﬀord to cook it at home anymore”.
Organisation and control of toi are partly the duty of the mahalla rais
and his committee, especially if it is the wedding of a poor family. Besides
supporting the needy families, keeping and preserving order during feasts is
one of the major roles of themahalla rais and co. Weddings and other feasts are
cost intensive in Uzbekistan, and in the case of a family that does not possess
enough financial resources, the mahalla helps to organize the event under the
leadership of the mahalla aqsaqal who makes the necessary arrangements and
assigns jobs to the mahalla residents. For example, a new regulation was made
by the tuman administration in Marxamat regarding the ending time of feasts,
the implementation thereof was the duty of the mahalla committee. The toi
are supposed to be finished, depending on how far they are from the tuman
centre, between ￿ and ￿ o’clock pm. The main reasons for this regulation are
that people wouldn’t drink as much and hence fight less, and that visitors from
farther away can leave before nightfall thus making it easier to find transport
and return home safely.
“All these rules exist so we don’t get into trouble and order is retained.
We do not spend as much money for toi as we used to. It is still expensive
but we economize; less plov is served and there is less meat than there
used to be. In the past, we would cook large amounts of meat for toi,
something we can’t do anymore. We had the sunnet toi for my son
for three days, yet in the case of my grandchildren we just went to the
hospital and they were circumcised there, afterwards we had the Koran
citing at home and that was it.” (Yusuf)
￿￿￿
Economic and Social Change in Uzbekistan
In contrast to the valley, there is no regulation like this in Romitan, actually
quite the opposite. A toi usually starts only after sunset, because, so the
argument, all people have something to do during the day and can not come
earlier.
In spite of these regulations and in spite of the economic diﬃculties, life
cycle ceremonies remain rather costly celebrations. During such occasions a
notebook is kept and the gifts are written down. Everything is registered.
According to Bahodir, poor people are the ones that usually keep a notebook
and write everything down. Why? “They try to give a gift of the same value
back. The rich can aﬀord to buy something of the same value anyway and do
not need to calculate or push their limits. In the end, whoever is rich actually
makes a profit through their feasts. The higher your level in society is, the
larger the number of rich guests bringing valuable presents is.￿￿ I remember
the wedding toi of the xokim’s son and about how many people attended; all
tuman xokim of Andijon viloyat, the rais of other organisations, all bringing
valuable presents. If your guests are almost all of the same rank, you do not
need a notebook. In the beginning we also had one, but have since done away
with it”. (Bahodir)
Close relatives are an important means of support for expensive events,
especially for toi. Not only do they support the events through their labour,
but also by bringing expensive presents. It is not unusual to tell your brothers,
“you buy the sheep for the toi, you buy vodka”. It is actually not so much a
gift but rather a debt, and when the time comes, you pay it back”. Again, the
goods are very often not returned in the form of money, but in goods of equal
value. Wedding presents are often returned in an almost predetermined way.
“We return the value of the gift we get at toi plus a little extra. For
instance, if I get one crate of vodka (twenty bottles), I return the crate
and give also a bottle of soft drink like cola.” (Xalil)
Since toi of rich and higher-ranking people have more socially homogenous
guests with little status diversification, their gifts are also of approximately
the same value. Even though Bahodir told me that wealthier people don’t
keep notebooks, my observations have concluded that people keep notebooks,
independent of the economic status of the host. The value of gifts is measured
according to the price of one-kilo meat. If somebody brings a chapan￿￿ or
￿￿ TVs, music centres, video players, carpets and sheep are considered as valuable gifts.
￿￿ A kind of traditional coat worn over clothes (usually by men). It is stuﬀed with cotton
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contributes rice and drinks, it is calculated according to the price of meat and
an equivalent value is returned back to the same person. Everybody calculates
with that yardstick and there is nothing to feel bad about. One informant told
me that they still keep a notebook, mentioning that women are good to keep
in mind. They wrote down who brought a sheep, vodka or a carpet￿￿ so they
can bring equally valuable things back to the giver.
I wondered how, with all the people present, one could actually keep track
of the gifts given. This seems to be under the control of the women. “They
remember who brings what and always have one eye watching.” New tech-
nology does, however, aid the women in their task. During the ceremony a
video camera films everything and has a special focus on the gift-giving part
of the ceremony. “We document it, we document it by video camera and can
fast-forward and rewind to see who gave what. Furthermore, there is always
a family member who sees it.” This is used as an additional measure to book-
keeping and reduces the risk of something being overlooked.
“People are remembered according to their gifts. It does not matter
if you have enough money to buy a present or not. Especially people
who are not well oﬀ try to give presents that are at least as good as the
ones given by wealthier people. It is a long-term way of thinking; it is
a long-term investment, an acknowledgement. That’s the reason I say
that people are remembered by their gifts.” (Bahodir)
Gifts are debts, someday they have to be paid back, but the exact time of
repayment is determined by certain occasions, usually happy ones. Once, an
event in Bukhara led to trouble for both sides. A gift, which was given by the
uncle of the host family, was the reason of the dispute. The uncle wanted to
have his presents reciprocated without having to wait until the correct oppor-
tunity. He gave a case of vodka and a sheep for the wedding, yet he wanted
something in return. A part had already been paid back and a time limit for
the rest to be reciprocated was basically set, namely the next toi of the other
family. But the uncle insisted on an immediate and complete reciprocation
and then threatened the family, which asked the militsiya for help. The actual
reason for the dispute was unknown, but demanding immediate reciprocation
and, depending on the material used, there is a huge price span. It is also an appreciated and
common gift, since it can be given for any occasion; see also Werner (￿￿￿￿) for Kazakstan.
￿￿ Fabric carpets usually serve aesthetic purposes and are used both for decoration of a
wall and on the floor. Hand made carpets (kilim) are either expensive or do not fit the taste
for home decoration.
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is frowned upon and it is therefore assumed that the reason for the dispute
was most probably something quite serious.
The money for the celebration expenditures comes from diﬀerent sources,
from resource pools among kin to one’s own saved money such as rearing
cattle, from petty trade (clothing or other goods) or, depending on the region,
from smuggling cotton to Kyrgyzstan. It is astonishing how people are able
to save money, but at the same time spend so much – something I like to
call the real ”Uzbek puzzle”. The answer I get to this puzzle is always the
same: “we make toi ”, “we save money for that”, “we make debts which we pay
back throughout many, many years”, “the costs are simply beyond one’s own
means, and relatives help”. Toi are debt cycles and the debts that are made
and repaid are remembered very well. Since gifts are not given in a discrete
form, the pressure on the giver’s side is stronger. Not only the host but also
the others from the village know who presents what. This determines one’s
freedom of giving in a significant way as well as the aﬀordability of the giver.
Gifts and the obligation to return them make up a „total social fact“ (Mauss
￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]) in which the many aspects of society such as morality and economy
are expressed. Also, as Mauss pointed out, gift giving is a fine and carefully
staged and calculated act. In the Uzbek case gift giving at first glance was
pictured and told to me as „we present what we can aﬀord and what comes from
heart“, is more than that in practise. It is an obligation which is observed and
evaluated by others, and is far from situational generosity. It covers economic
self-interest, social pressure, obligations, duties and for aﬃliation, confirmation
of aﬃliation as part of the community. The clear calculation behind gift giving
is displayed very well when we look at how precise the documentation of it is.
The gifts people get are what they „deserve“ according to their records which
are kept by others, namely, the receivers of past gifts. When we think about
the narrow spectrum of potential gifts that are available, it is not rare that the
same objects become gifts for many people. In the end, in most cases, it is the
value that counts, and not its usefulness. The entry of gifts to households not
only helps finance these rituals but also confirms and solidifies the relations
and status of the individual.
I would argue that in the post-Soviet context, „generalised reciprocity”
(Sahlins ￿￿￿￿) tends to be avoided and “balanced reciprocity” gets more and
more attention and consideration. This is due to the fact that, as a binding
means of social solidarity and networks, gift exchange became a more special
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and survival relevant in Uzbekistan. Perhaps one form of „generalised reci-
procity” is the attitude of the some well oﬀ people when they oﬀer a sheep
to the community during religious feasts or on other occasions, a symbol of
giving which aims to create sympathy within the community. The annexa-
tion of „giving“ during the performance of a religious ritual also has multiple
facets. In the Uzbek context, one can interpret this as a kind of redistribution
of the surplus that is actually taken away from people. Slaughtering a sheep
during qurban aid and preparing a meal for the village also has an emotional
and moral value and is very well suited to generalised reciprocity without re-
payment. But this also shows one’s economic and political power combined
with one’s caring attitude. The involvement of kin and relatives in this gift
exchange circle, which is an economic and social act and is embodied in the
gift, carries the burden and the costs of post-Soviet economic and social devel-
opments. These exchanges, namely gifts as objects, not only keep the rituals
alive by partially financing them, but they also help to maintain the relations
among the receiver and giver of the object. The close relations can also be
annihilated by asking for gifts back or by improper returns like an unpaid or
partially paid back loan. Gift giving became a burden for the poor who are not
able to aﬀord proper gifts for certain occasions and networks. However, they
are forced to do all they can in order to be part of the reciprocal relations.
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Chapter ￿
Political Strategies: Social
Stratification and the Meaning of
Borders
￿.￿ Introduction
No matter whether it is called reform, restructuring or simply renaming the
remnants of the past, there have been massive intended and unintended changes
in Uzbek socio-economic and political landscape since ￿￿￿￿. In rural Uzbek-
istan agriculture and related resources play a significant role in this respect,
namely in relation to power relations and upward mobility. Any type of power
is based on access to agricultural resources. One group keeps the control of
them and decides who gets access; the other is the privileged and eligible one
to have access to land. Being located within one or the other group may be the
best thing to have in independent rural Uzbekistan. Often these two overlap
considerably. Those allocating land are usually also among those to whom
land is allocated. Since the Karimov regime does not give any free space for
real political participation, economic power is not only the most valuable one
but also is without any alternative. There is only one way of being a part of
the system and that is economic participation, which also brings status and
power.
This chapter is about the role of politics, local, regional as well as national
ones, in the life of people. It starts with an examination of social stratification
and elite building in the post-socialist era discussing the extent to which these
￿￿￿
sancak
reflect a continuation of the Soviet period. This is followed by an analysis of
local politics and bureaucracies that shape economic and social transactions
before the issue of the shadow of the nation state is looked at in some more
detail. The chapter ends with a lengthy discussion of the meaning of internal
as well as international borders. As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union these have changed the life of many in a fundamental way as large parts
of people’s networks remained on the other side of the border and are thus
diﬃcult to access today. On the other hand, the very existence of a border
also creates multiple new ways of making money either by petty trade and
smuggling or by day-to-day migration.
The new borders play a peculiar role in this. They are of particular impor-
tance for those with limited or no access to land and political power. Making
use of borders by crossing them (more or less legally) includes people working
in Kyrgyzstan on a daily basis to those smuggling goods back and forth, and
those trying to make large business exploiting the diﬀerences between the two
economic systems. The first group includes people who take goods from their
work place and sell them abroad to make ends meet. Entering Kyrgyzstan,
either for work or for smuggling, means to accept the conditions at the border
and on the other side of it. However, the weak bargaining position of border
crossers exposes them to any kind of exploitation. It is also obvious that there
is not a real intention to stop people, besides a few exemplary cases, so that
the power of the state is made to feel. Unexpected border closings for arbitrary
reasons or control tightening even along internal viloyat borders creates a situ-
ation of uncertainty which reminds the people of the power of the state and its
ability to exercise control over them. At the same time, however, uncertainty
leads people to use the resources and take the chances of the day since for
tomorrow nobody knows what will happen.
￿.￿ Social Stratification
Although, for example, the president of Uzbekistan was part of the Soviet elite
and has held his current position since ￿￿￿￿, it is not exactly true to say that
present elites are just a continuation of the past. It may be true for many of
the cases, especially when we look at the high-level power holders, but at the
local level things are more complicated.
It is not surprising that children of the old elite generation are equipped
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with the most important resource, namely networks of their parents and rel-
atives. A good educational background is not enough to open the doors for
a career. Financial support of ones family and social networks can help you
pass the exams and get your diploma easily in comparison to other students
who do not have these resources. According to my informants, during the
Soviet times things were not very diﬀerent than today; it was always helpful
to know people in certain positions and it was possible to get access to scarce
resources.￿ But, so a common view, today the situation diﬀers from the past
in that elites control everything and there is no instance to go and ask for
one’s rights. These people determine upward mobility in every respect, be
that economic or political. How elites support elites and produce elites can be
seen in diﬀerent life spheres and education is one of them.
People like Bahodir who have certain positions and benefit from them,
work and get (private) things done under time pressure. Positions like he has,
as a leader, a rexber, are acquired by appointment and are not permanent.
It means that the person may be in the position for years and years but it
may also be that it ends almost overnight if the balances between Tashkent
and the viloyat or between the latter and the tuman changes and respective
power holders do not correspond to each others expectations. Sometimes, the
removal of the xokim leads to changes in the entire xokimiyat, which can lead
to a wide circle of replacements. Although as far as I can see, there was no
such direct threat to Bahodir, I seldom saw him relaxed. It was not unusual
for him to come home in the evening, change his clothes and put his training
pants on and then, after a telephone call, put his suits back on again and
leave the house for many hours. In most cases the reason was “the xokim is
calling”. He was always busy with his own position’s responsibilities but also
accompanying the xokim or other administrative personal, often on occasions
a health professional has nothing to contribute. He was always available for
any kind of demands from the xokimiyat. He was taken to meetings in Andijon
as a “support person” since he had worked in the city before and knows the
people, which means he has the necessary and useful networks.
Bahodir was telling me how important it is to be a rexber. “If you are a
rexber, everybody respects you, you get things done, otherwise you are nothing
￿ In Russian this is called blat, defined as „ . . . the use of personal networks and informal
contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal
procedures“ (Ledeneva ￿￿￿￿:￿).
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and you don’t get things done anywhere”. According to him, if you are solely
equipped with knowledge, education will not get you very far. Only because he
is a rexber can he facilitate some additional income, resources and exchanges
not only for his own family, but also for his parent’s house and his brothers.
Otherwise he would not be able to manage all these things. He and his wife
often told me that their oldest son does not study well and they want him to
finish his school as long as Bahodir has his rexber position. As aforementioned,
contacts and networks are the one aspect of the benefits that one gets via his
position and the other one, the financial aspect allows the family to make the
necessary payments.
Having a higher education diploma in a rexber’s family is a must. The
quality of the education and the specific discipline have become less important
since their children get jobs not because of their studied subjects but rather
via the networks of their parents. The older generation still appreciates their
“good” Soviet education. Bahodir describes his career as a product of that
system. He is well aware that in present Uzbekistan he would not get the
same chance as a child of a simple kolkhozcu. His children, especially his
two unmarried sons, are to study and graduate while he is investing in all his
networks and resources to allow them to finish university and get their degrees.
For him and his wife as an “educated family” it is a must to have a university
diploma, especially for the sons. Their oldest son, according to the mother, is
lazy and has not studied enough for his classes while the youngest one, who
is studying medicine, is ambitious and, as a successful student, has a tuition
waiver. He passes his classes without any problem and his father knew all his
professors since they either studied together or have intensive contact via his
position in the tuman.
For others like the kolkhozcu of the present, they lack the means (economic
and social) in order to realise an upward mobility, for instance through edu-
cation. In Bukhara a young man who got his Master degree via a scholarship
from a British university was sitting at home in the village after his return to
Uzbekistan. He was not long back, but he was already disappointed that he
could not get a job. His family did not have the necessary connections, which
is in the end more valuable than his diploma. They were telling me that their
son was a good student and was sent by the government to study abroad. They
thought that when he came back the government would also take care of him
since there are not many young well-educated men in Uzbekistan. But after he
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came back he could not find a job and stayed in the village. According to his
father, he was asked to pay if he wants to get a “good job”. He was told that
with the income his son would get (salary plus bribes) he would be able to pay
it back in no time. This family possessed neither the necessary financial nor
the social capital, which is essential in order to get things done. Independence
and western education did not lead to the expected upwards mobility.
The existence of patron-client relationships in a place like Uzbekistan,
where the access and distribution of resources and overall opportunities are
unequal, is not an unexpected phenomenon (Zhang ￿￿￿￿:￿￿). Things get done
within a narrow circle of people and their networks. The relationship between
the viloyat xokim and tuman xokim, as well as between the tuman xokim and
“their fermer ” are based on personal loyalty, obligations, exploitation and im-
plicit coercion. Some elderly people and some of the present fermer blame the
xokim and make them responsible for the unsuccessful cotton harvesting. Lack
of knowhow and absence of new technology, depleted soil and lack of water are
the main problems. The “upper people” do not know about these things, or
they “know but act as if they do not know” in order to force people to work
hard. There are also critical voices accusing not the “upper people” but the
fermer. Some people work as fermer without having enough knowledge about
agriculture and without knowing budget calculations, accounting without any
kind of experience for this engagement. According to one informant, “nobody
gets a job or earns money deservedly and rightfully”. While this view is rarely
voiced, it is one that is held by a lot of people. Critics aiming fermer like that
„only certain people can get access to land as fermer and they do not know
how to work“ become a main reproach to post independence inequalities.
“If you say, I am a fermer and sit at home and let others work, how can
you be successful? You should work more. If you do not work, nobody
works. You should go and check the kolkhozcu, check the fields, check
if the water comes in time; otherwise there is no success.” (Raxmon)
As became clear in the last chapter, the kolkhozcu represent the most dis-
advantaged group in post-Soviet rural Uzbekistan and have very limited access
to any kind of resources while their labour is heavily exploited. As mentioned
before, being a child of a kolkhozcu and making a career in the old system was
possible. Bahodir’s father was a simple man, a soldier during the war, who
worked as a kolkhozcu for his entire life. His mother was not well educated
either and just took care of the many children at home. After independence,
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while kolkhozcu started to lose on their living standards and to survive with
limited possibilities, some members of the old cadre (leading positions) became
richer by monopolising power and resources. The weaknesses of kolkhozcu’s
networks make them more dependent on fermer or shirkat and they have no
means to undermine the authority of others since they are easily replaceable.
The kolkhozcu were mostly treated as ignorant, thus requiring stringent control
when they are given responsibilities. They are seen as a homogeneous group
with limited capabilities. Going to a fermer or to the xokimiyat in order to re-
ceive their delayed payments or demand their rights is usually pointless. Their
problems are seen as unimportant and their lack of networks forces them to
stay in their position.
There is also little solidarity amongst the kolkhozcu. Being related to one of
the supervisors does also not protect them from irregular payments, exploita-
tion and conflict. Under these circumstances, one must ask why the kolkhozcu
do not act collectively and if they do how is it expressed in Uzbekistan? As
Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿) stated to “. . . look beyond formal institu-
tions and statements, and into the texture of the everyday”. This helps to find
answers instead of looking for associations or organisations in Uzbekistan’s
political climate. Consciousness or protest of kolkhozcu in Uzbekistan is not
unsimilar to other places in the world and is expressed in a form of work re-
lated everyday acts like foot-dragging and absenteeism (cf. van Onselin ￿￿￿￿).
That is also why fermer and shirkat often have conflicts with the kolkhozcu
and complained about their work discipline, absentees, and unreliability.
Housing became one of the wealth and status symbols, which was not the
case in the past. The construction style and material of the houses all look the
same in tuman centres in both field settings in Romitan and in Marxamat. But
especially in urban areas like Andijon or Bukhara new houses are constructed
in spectacular ways, which displays the prosperity of the owners at first glance.￿
It should also be considered that houses are private property and to invest in
them is not only a symbol of wealth but also may be the most secure investment
that one can have. The situation is slightly diﬀerent in villages where the
￿ In Tashkent one can see even more luxurious houses. I had the chance to see many
of them during their construction in certain neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, I was never
invited into any of these houses and never had the chance to see them when they were
finished and furnished. One can just imagine from the outside how it looks inside. A short
view into the courtyard is possible, during the moments the courtyard door is opened and
closed. Humphrey talks about these new houses, the villas “as a mark of cultural change“
between the „New Russians“ and „the old Soviet nomenklatura“ (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
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diversity of income sources is not as wide as in the cities and fewer people hold
lucrative positions either in the bureaucratic apparatus or in business. The
condition of a house in a rural setting, namely renovated or not, is a significant
attribute that diﬀerentiates one from another. Doing necessary reparations and
prohibiting decay necessitates a certain amount of money, which is diﬃcult to
come by, as one often needs money for other situations such as health care
or education. In the village prosperity is shown and stressed especially on
the inside in contrast to the exteriorly splendid urban houses. The number of
rooms, having a kitchen and aﬀording a bathroom, furniture and garments are
some indicators of living in good standards. Usually, high-level cadre will tend
to reconstruct their house instead of renovating it, especially if they live in the
tuman centre. In the villages, people tend to be more modest as looks from
outside the entrance gates, eshik or darvoza, cannot always be ignored. Since
building land is a scarce resource, gradual reconstruction and renovations are
the only possibilities anyway.
While presenting one’s wealth in rural areas is rather well dosed, in urban
settlements there is no reluctance to show and live one’s wealth. In the valley,
one day I was invited to the shirkat chief accountants house in the tuman
centre. During the conversation everyone complained how people talked about
them, about people in rexber positions. Malika nodded and confirmed by
telling how hard her husband and she worked hard and that they could not save
any money with all the costs they had, like taking care of in-laws, university
dues of their children and other things. According to these two families, others
do not have any right to talk about them since their husbands are hardworking
men, and that is the reason why they are well oﬀ. Actually, both families know
that their living standards could not be done with the salaries their husbands
or the other family members get but would avoid mentioning this in front of
others.
￿.￿ Local Elites
The strong control and surveillance policy of the Uzbek state has reached
the rural areas under the policy of common peace and order. This policy
necessitates an internal centre-periphery balance. Local appropriation of state
symbols and the local representation of the state are not detached from the
centre’s directions and aims. On the other hand, an analysis of micro-political
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processes shows the “real power” or the “relative autonomy” since in everyday
life looking into how power is grounded shows the tolerance degree of deviation
from the state. Everyday power relations on the local level cannot simply
be seen as an extension of the centre. A centre-periphery balance must be
guaranteed and the cooperation between the power holders must exist so the
desired “peace and order” is guaranteed. Representation of the macro level
at the local level through the appropriation of symbols and the execution
of decisions shapes and influences the state’s “vertical” domination (Gledhill,
￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
The following examples show the ability and eligibility of state power hold-
ers, be those a xokim or a nurse from the village medical unit, and how they
transgress space. Depending on the situation, whoever is placed in the verti-
cal hierarchy holds the privilege “of spatial mobility”. Some have more power
and can transgress many spaces while some have a more limited sector for
their own. In this space, the duty is order and control and to make the state
felt. However, the needs and the happenings in the rural areas shape the re-
lationship mostly according to the wishes of the periphery. For instance, in
the valley the oﬃcials are able to stop or control smuggling; yet, it remains a
measure that exists solely in presidential speeches in Tashkent. In reality noth-
ing is done. In this centre-periphery relationship an occasional replacement of
oﬃcials happens, yet after a while the problem that led to the replacement
returns.
Not every state organ in the village does get the same appreciation from
its citizens. The kolkhoz as an institution, even though there is oﬃcially no
kolkhoz-system anymore, still enjoys an amount of prestige and power while the
selsoviet, which deals with all issues except for economic ones, does not enjoy
the same respect. The village administration is just perceived as a “document
and registration oﬃce”, even though these documents are highly relevant for
any occasion from marriage to hajj visits. However, the kolkhoz or shirkat
rais is still the one who maintains close contact with the tuman xokimiyat and
enjoys a status inherited from the Soviet period. After independence, insecure
economic conditions and the demand for land that was under state monopoly
make this institution remain remarkably significant. In contrast, the selsoviet’s
surveillance and regulative role has not promoted it to a higher level. If there
were not a picture of President Kariomov and the flag of Uzbekistan, the
oﬃce of the selsoviet rais would not look like a government place. Heating
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installations, telephones and other infrastructures are often out of order and
the car is also broken. The selsoviet is just the place where one must go to
obtain any kind of documents and to register things. It also collects paperwork
on a variety of issues for oﬃces higher up. Relations with the selsoviet are
important but not decisive for the success or failure of any kind of venture.
The aqsaqal as quasi-traditional authorities are sometimes asked to help
in dispute mediations, usually within families or in neighbourhoods. Dispute
reasons can range from marital problems to water usage or educative advice.
The aqsaqal do not, however, involve in issues, which can lead to conflict with
authorities above them. As mentioned before, local oﬃcials like the xokim are
designated to their positions and have to find the balance between peace and
order in their districts and bureaucratic interest groups above. During their
term, their own material interest must be fulfilled, but they also need to meet
state demands like the fulfilment of the cotton plan. In the Chinese case under
state socialism Zang describes a similar situation: “(A)lthough rural cadres
were designated state agents, they often faced a dilemma how to meet state
demands as well as the interests of their own communities” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). In the
Uzbek case, serving the interest of the own community means a certain level of
satisfaction with the economic situation within locally created and manageable
possibilities. Concerning political or religious issues there is less moving space.
People go, ask and complain to the xokimiyat about their economic situation
but not for political and religious ones.
Competition between regions is not only expressed on a cultural level, but is
also a topic of conversation between people. Replacements of local bureaucrats
are either seen as a case in which economic goals were not reached or order
was not kept. Unstable public order is tolerated even less than unfilled plans
and result in personnel change for certain positions. Keeping tight pressure
on people and not give any space to disorder in addition to economic success
is the guarantee for the local elites. Changing or not paying attentions to
plans is always possible – by bargaining, fulfilling it with other means or being
excused because of uncontrolled reasons like weather. But there is no excuse
for voices of protest arising. That is why local elites sometimes need to make
certain compromises and the legal apparatus works beyond the wishes of local
elites like in case of Gulnoza. Although these kinds of rules may seem to be
against the local elites, they are actually in their favour, as they can rescue
their positions by keeping public order and keeping divisive voices calm.
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The xokim actually feel the breath of upper level bureaucrats on their neck
more regularly than ordinary citizens since they have to report to them and
provide explanations when things do not work out as those above wanted them
to. Personnel changes do not happen due to the dissatisfaction of the people
on the spot or of voices from below, rather it is the dissatisfaction of the other
upper level that things may get out of control. Bureaucratic replacements,
depending on the status of the dismissed person, are interpreted as “the decision
of Tashkent” when the viloyat xokim is replaced and the “decision of the viloyat”
when the tuman xokim is dismissed. Insecurity of achieved positions, of course,
produces short-term oriented bureaucrats who try to reach their own personal
targets during their term.
Another feature of a good governor or xokim is whether or not he divides
and gives land to private fermer. At the end of the harvest season the regions
are listed on TV according to their success, that is plan fulfilment. Usually,
Andijon and the neighbouring provinces of Ferghana and Namangan are the
first and often only ones in the country. People often gave their own expla-
nations of the list and made comments such as “our soil is bad”, “we had bad
wetter” or “the xokim forced us to plant the seeds ahead of time”. Reasons for
the success of others were thus described as “their soil is better”, “their xokim
is a good one, he divided and gave the land to fermer ”, or “he is a good friend
of the president, so he knows how things work”. No matter if people like the
viloyat or tuman xokim, loosing the “battle of cotton” to other provinces is not
something they like to hear.
As aforementioned in chapter three, although only people with certain qual-
ifications can be accepted as fermer, there were often complaints about fer-
mer and unreached targets and their privileged status is scorned at xokimiyat
gatherings. The number of meetings is also justified because of the alleged in-
competence of fermer who need to have supervision. Tight control during all
procedures is seen as a must for economic success. At these meetings fermer
were also accounting for and explaining their performance and work sched-
ule. The attitude and the motto of the xokimiyat is that without surveillance
nothing will work. Surprise or regular inspections and endless meetings that
take place in diﬀerent spaces, according to Ferguson and Gupta (￿￿￿￿), are
the devices by which verticality is practiced. These inspections and meetings
are usually conducted in an atmosphere of tension and are not particularly
friendly. Furthermore, they are often accompanied by threatening words and
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punishments as I mentioned before in chapter three and four. Each level of
state authority legitimizes its procedure as well as failure by just carrying out
the instructions of their higher oﬃcials. The unsuitable decisions and orders
from above are seen as “giving these orders without knowing the local facts.”
Their main interest is merely the cotton plan. One example would be the
unsuccessful seed planting using pilyonka, which is, according to many not
suitable for Uzbekistan.
Being a fermer means being part of a circle in which state regulations are
present and the economic activities are “controlled, planned and regulated” by
the state. I witnessed several surprise or regular visits from the viloyat governor
who inspected the fields. This event turned cotton fields into a diﬀerent place
and gave it a diﬀerent meaning and significance. It is a kind of ritual in which
the state presents itself along the cotton fields where it still keeps a tight control
on it. This type of visit, which does not belong to everyday life, brings the
state back to life, at least on a provincial level, and rattles the local rhythm of
people by representing and embodying “state hierarchy and encompassment”.
It broke the locality and displayed the existence of Tashkent. This kind of
practices shows “state spatialization” by encompassment (cf. Ferguson and
Gupta, ￿￿￿￿). It is also a show of control when “orders from above” reach the
bottom and are followed.
Days before people started to talk about the viloyat xokim being on tour
and inspecting the fields. For his visit female and male kolkhozcu started to
whip away the dust and clean the main road. Up until the time he showed
up, the days were completely hectic, nobody had time to talk, fermer and
kolkhozcu were not available to meet. Preparations were limited, however.
Since the xokim is a busy man and not interested in other things it was enough
to limit the preparations to the main street and prepare the fields which are
located close to it. During the visit, the tuman xokim, kolkhoz rais, fermer
and kolkhozcu as well as village elders gathered around. But he did not come
on the day he was expected. Finally, the following day he arrived in a convoy
that let everybody know someone important was coming, being accompanied
by oﬃcials of diﬀerent hierarchical ranks and positions, and of course a police
escort. He got out of his Volga￿ with tinted windows and started to inspect
￿ Volga cars were produced in the Soviet Union and seen as a symbol of higher status. It
is highly appreciated and seen as particularly comfortable and solid. They would often be
called “Russian Mercedes”. As in the case of the province governor it is used as an oﬃcial
car for higher-level bureaucrats.
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the fields by putting a long stick into the soil (in order to control the washing
out process because of soil salinity) while other people around him informed
him of the situation, what has been done and what the scheduled steps for the
coming harvest are. His presence was the signal of how serious the whole issue
is (reaching plan target and proper cultivation techniques), while at the same
time he embodies state power and displays that everything is under control.
While he accompanying oﬃcials were part of the inspecting process, they were
at the same time being inspected by others. Questions were asked, the soil
was checked; it was checked if the fields were prepared on time or if seeds were
ready to plant. The tuman xokim’s daily power was also under surveillance but
this visit was the surveillance of the surveillance. He did not stay as long as the
preparations took, in less than an hour he had left with his convoy. After he
left, people were relaxed again. Actually, according to my informants, his visit
changes nothing in the way things are done. “He has to do these visits because
otherwise he is reprimanded for not doing his job correctly”. (Abdullah)
On the other hand, to visit a xokim is a diﬃcult matter. The xokimiyat
buildings in the tuman centre are easily recognizable everywhere with their
usually four to five floors and front gardens. They have a very similar con-
struction and painting style all over the country. Of course, symbols like the
flag and the national emblem of Uzbekistan belong on the xokimiyat’s build-
ing too. These buildings host diﬀerent departments like women, youth or the
land-register oﬃce. Each is headed by a vice-xokim. The xokim’s oﬃce is usu-
ally located on the highest floor, has a diﬀerent decoration and is generally in
better shape. Visiting the xokim at his oﬃce and getting a chance to talk to
him is not easy and the entering of his realm is highly regulated. His oﬃce is
easily recognizable not only due to the decorations but also due to the number
of oﬃcials who work for him. It was always possible to see people waiting
to see the xokim. Usually, when trying to meet him, the xokim either has a
never-ending meeting or is somewhere on a trip to the provincial capital or
one of the kolkhoz. Like the similarity of the buildings, the reasons for his
absence seemed to be the same, no matter which tuman. The chance to get
into the xokim’s oﬃce is limited. Usually, people are ordered to his oﬃce and
only then allowed to enter his space. When I was waiting for him on many
diﬀerent occasions, it was not seldom that I had either to wait for a long time
or that the appointments were cancelled (after waiting for one or three hours).
If the xokim was not in his oﬃce, nobody knew when he would be back and
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he was only reachable through his driver’s phone.
Another means of control, as well as source of annoying, were the described
inspections and endless meetings, which would often go on until midnight. All
this is done in the name of cotton. That is where the money comes and
goes; that is where the corruption nests. Moreover, by ordering fermer and
kolkhoz chiefs to the xokimiyat for these meetings, they are also reminded
where the power and authority lies. This is also the space where state politics
are communicated; yet, individual innovation and opinions are not wanted.
Communication between diﬀerent bureaucratic levels also corresponds to this
since the personal opinion of the individual is not asked. The state gives
the plan and demands the corresponding economic performance. The duty of
the individual, in this case the fermer, is to act on order rather than create
new methods or solutions or to do things according to his intentions. Although
this idea is transmitted at the meetings, at the same time these meetings boost
fermer to find solutions to their problems. Their pedagogical value, however,
is strongly contested and the ability of the chiefs questioned.
“It’s always the same, you are ordered to his oﬃce and they repeat and
repeat the same things. Nothing new. You ask me why the meetings
take so long? If they cannot say what they want to say in one sentence
what shall I do? That is the reason they take hours and hours. Of
course, sometimes there is new information but mostly, it is a waste of
time.“ (Abror)
During my stay in the two research sites, neither viloyat nor tuman xokim
made inspections in any other spheres, only in the fields. The quality of roads,
of schools or medical stations is not inspected. While these kinds of public
spaces are ignored, penetration into the private sphere happens. Besides the
control of religiosity and restrictions in feasts this also includes other types of
visits. Private households got unexpected visits in order to check the hygienic
standards and housekeeping in the name of preventive medicine. Women are
the prime subject of these visits as well as most of the visitors. Nurses from
the medical point come and visit households, talk to women and check how
clean the houses are kept and give them information on child caring and simi-
lar topics. They also register households and the notebook of the ambulatorya
is updated with the persons who live in the household and their year of birth.
Actually, this book, which is kept in the medical point, is the best resource for
getting an overview of the whole village. Through these means a continuous
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control and regulation is practiced. For this purpose it is not always a state ac-
tor who fulfils this duty, but a village elder can also do the job. The traditional
position of respect and acknowledgement that old men have is assembled with
the interests of the post-Soviet Uzbek state which uses these kinds of struc-
tures and let the elders act both directly and indirectly state agents (Dunn
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿).
￿.￿ State Interference and Perceptions
During the Soviet period, education, employment and medical care were all
seen as natural rights of the citizens (cf. Verdery ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿) and the paternalist
state took over this responsibility. This was also part of state propaganda and
citizens were made aware of it by public discourse. Although under the Soviet
regime surveillance and control were part of daily life, citizens played an active
role and influenced the flow of things, or manipulated politics according to
their needs and benefits to some degree (Ledeneva ￿￿￿￿, Shlapentokh ￿￿￿￿).
State domination was thus not static or impenetrable. This became obvious
with the cotton scandal (cf. chapter ￿). As it was made public in the end, it
not only showed the power of the state but it was also one of the examples to
show how things worked and how they had existed for years under the Soviet
regime. Local state agents were working against the central state’s interests
and were cheating by delivering cotton only on paper.
Independence has not automatically produced completely new models of
state-society-relationships. Rather, centre-periphery relations and their agents
were and are deeply entangled. After independence, the new state with its new
rules, regulations and available resources shaped its oﬃcials and gave them
duties to fulfil. The way Tashkent appears in Bukhara and Andijon provinces
and in the households of people, in their daily lives is another possibility to
understand the state (cf. Shah, Alpa ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
Post-Soviet Uzbekistan is a combination of state expansion, continuity and
withdrawal. Old practices remain as long as they serve the interests of the
present cadre and help to keep them in power. However, the state withdraws
from some spheres that simply lead to costs without immediate benefits, such
as in education or in the public health sector. The Uzbek state did withdraw
from many spheres, not necessarily because of neoliberal ideology, but rather
because of its political and economic interests, and its incapability to aﬀord
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it. This withdrawal is financial but the state still exists as a control entity.
If neo-liberalism is described as “. . . in the first instance a theory of political
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institu-
tional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets,
and free trade” (Harvey ￿￿￿￿:￿) then the Uzbekistan case is far from neoliberal
practices. Since independence, the Uzbek state has not been able to “create
and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” and
has also not “set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and
functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force
if need be, the proper functioning of markets” (ibid.). According to Harvey,
state intervention must be avoided since certain interest groups can use it for
their own benefit. That is absolutely the case in Uzbekistan where there is a
withdrawal of the state from social provision but without privatization.
The transition period and its peculiar situation, which is the result of the
demise of the Soviet Union in ￿￿￿￿, is used to legitimize any kind of restriction
and limitation in every realm of life. In the domestic discourse, the Uzbek state
represents itself mainly in terms of guaranteeing law and order. Reference to
economic success is not used as strong as one would expect. And cotton stories
are not about reaching the world market but news is usually limited to domestic
deliveries of the provinces. At least on a village level, much more is heard about
law and order, especially in comparison to states like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Afghanistan. This is the discourse that the Uzbek government makes use
of in its propaganda to legitimize its regimes and techniques. Especially the
Tajik civil war and the situation in Afghanistan are two cases that the Uzbek
government uses to argue for ever more internal security measures. Sovereignty
came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union but its citizens, who had been
under the past regime, got used to this kind of restrictions and measures. The
political aspects of sovereignty and its perception are for some people simply a
change of power from Moscow to Tashkent. “At that time we did what Moscow
ordered, now Tashkent decides.” This transfer is not greeted by everybody due
to the post-independence diﬃculties.
The Uzbek state produces and reproduces itself in everyday life in an in-
separable relationship with society, in which the state’s role and power is bar-
gained and things done accordingly. In Uzbekistan, it is not unusual that
mundane state practices which belong to daily life of state bureaucrats and or-
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dinary people show this bargaining and after that “get the job done”.￿ Besides
explicit representations of the state, implicit practices are also relevant and
shape the state’s imagination. While the Uzbek government spends resources
on the surveillance of political and religious aﬀairs of individuals and mahalla
postpon are in charge mostly for “peace and order”, individual responsibility is
demanded by the state for protecting one’s private sphere, for example, in the
case of burglary or animal theft. In this case individual responsibility is asked
without giving any resources and support. It is like partially outsourcing state
functions to individuals under the guise of self-responsibility, self-duty and
voluntarism. Rose speaks of “de-statized” “social and regulatory operations of
the state” and the role of “quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations”
in that process (Rose ￿￿￿￿b:￿￿, Gupta & Ferguson ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). When people
mention that the past had less criminality and burglary (of private things, not
state resources) and that today “we cannot expect everything from the state,
we should do something too”, it does not mean that post-independence is “a
matter of less government” but rather that the “responsibilization” of citizens
is there and asks for more self-discipline (Gupta & Ferguson ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). It is
not rare to hear and to see the motto “ozungi ozun sakla” (protect yourself).
Controlling many aspects of private life is seen as part of governing right but
other needs of citizens necessitate self-engagement and responsibility.
One highly illustrative case for this state-society relationship is the propiska￿
regime, inherited from the Soviet Union, which still continues to exist in Uzbek-
istan. As with other issues this is an example where the state takes measures
openly and directly influencing the decision-making of individuals. The in-
ternal passport system is one of these mechanisms. The control of urban
growth and population movement by the propiska system aimed at keeping
people away from cities and allowing them limited access to related resources.
Tashkent has been a restricted city since ￿￿￿￿ while Moscow and Leningrad
were since ￿￿￿￿. On the one hand passport and the propiska regime were intro-
duced for population management and “elimination of unorganized migration”.
Yet, on the other hand, socialism as a system was not confronted with an un-
organized migration problem, so in contrast to mass capitalist migration there
was no need to leave the countryside (Buckley ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).￿
￿ Stark (￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿-￿￿) uses this phrase in order to show that the demise of the socialist
regime and its formal structures does not lead to an institutional vacuum.
￿ Russian for ‘residence permission’
￿ “Clear in the language of the decree, the intended role for passports and residence
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The ending of collectives led to the end of social guarantees so the cities
became more attractive to migrate to and rural areas became less attractive
to stay. The dissolution of collective farms, loss of income and social security
led to people seeking jobs either in the cities, especially in Tashkent, or out of
the country. Urban settings with diverse economic activities oﬀer more income
sources than rural settings but these are also quite limited. Huge number of
“unemployed” ex-collective workers started to work legally or illegally in other
countries and depending on their legal status are again exposed to spatial
governmentality. The Uzbek government aims not only to maintain urban
order but also tries to keep rural order and economic productivity by keeping
labour power in its place. Cotton as a valuable cash crop necessitates cheap
labour power, and self-suﬃciency of workers is more guaranteed in rural areas
than in urban space.
Today, internal passports are an essential part of daily life and are carried by
men in their shirt pocket. Very often they are required as for bureaucratic work
or during internal militsia checks within or between provinces.￿ Circumventing
restrictions was and still is a part of daily life for many people. I met people
in Tashkent who were struggling to get their propiska through legal or illegal
ways and they had been waiting and struggling for many years for this status.
Acquiring propiska through illegal avenues necessitates connections and a sum
of money for bribery. It was a kind of never ending story and some people were
waiting for their promised propiska by paying again and again (cf. Buckley
￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿).￿
Especially in Tashkent, young men are often subjected to passport controls
and harassments by the militsia, which lead them to avoid public spaces, like
the metro and bazaar where controls are often carried out. Young bearded
men are seen as particularly suspicious and candidates for a document check.
If it turns out that he is from the Ferghana Valley, he is also a candidate for
permits in regulating population was twofold: to keep account of the population (presumably
for planning purposes) and to regulate the movement of ”undesirables” such as criminals
and kulaks” (Buckley ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). Passports contained information like a person’s identity,
address, marriage and children. Buckley mentions also how this system was used for the
purpose “. . . to distribute scarce social services, such as housing and employment” (ibid:￿￿￿).
￿ I found it interesting that women did not carry their passports with them in daily life if
there was not a certain reason like travelling or getting documents from government oﬃces.
Men who spend more time in public and are also very often controlled by militsia had their
passports always with them.
￿ Besides bribing, to marry somebody from Tashkent, or marry in name only, also helps
to get residence permission.
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further interrogation. Individuals are predicted who might be dangerous and
picked out. Some perceive the existence of the militsia as security provider and
danger reducer. The first aim is to keep people away from urban settings and
from certain spaces like markets and public transport so that their mobility and
their access to economic and public life is limited. They should not participate
or benefit from certain spaces or it should be risky for them if they try. These
people develop their own strategies either by avoiding these places as much
as possible, or by trying to find alternatives. Using the metro in rush hours
helps them to intermingle in the crowd but they can also use the bus as an
alternative.
While coming from the valley and living without propiska in Tashkent can
stigmatise somebody as “dangerous” or “fundamentalist”, in their place of origin
it is not necessarily so. Controlling mobility means to determine inclusion
and exclusion, which is again done in the name of order and peace. The
main purpose is to exclude disadvantaged people (of rural origin or from less
developed regions) from certain resources by refusing them access to certain
spaces. Despite not being criminal, people are simply excluded from certain
places. The government does not care why people use the urban environment
and what their push and pull factors are. Rural people, despite not actually
being criminals, are basically illegalised as the state controls the urban space.
How successful these mechanisms are, and whether they make people actually
stay in their village is a subject for another research. Buckley also argues that
“. . . only a slight influence” of these restrictions was to observe on “aggravate
urbanization patterns and migration flows” (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿). These administrative
means were not enough to keep migrants at home and save the urban space
and the resources for its inhabitants.
The propiska system is composed of control and punishment, aiming at
security and the inclusion and exclusion of people from spaces as well as ac-
cess to corresponding resources. It allows the Uzbek government to expand its
control on its citizens and illegality becomes a very easy to achieve but serious
issue. Being subject to oﬃcial approval means nothing more than to be reg-
istered and under control. The regulation of population movement and urban
growth is thus an important control mechanism of post-Soviet governance in
Uzbekistan. Controlling urban spaces remains a useful recipe for dealing with
post-Soviet problems or to keep them away from the centre leading to a more
positive visual image of the city and thus a more positive image of the gov-
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ernment. Managing populations for both economic and political purposes still
plays an important role and this old Soviet system is still kept in service. In
order to maintain political and economic power, there is no need for the Uzbek
government to abandon the propiska and the internal passport system. The
propiska and passport system does not fulfil any direct purpose for the city
population but has a stabilizing function in that it keeps problems away by
managing those spaces. People living in the same country belong to diﬀerent
spaces and have diﬀerent functions to fulfil, such as picking cotton. Keeping
the rural population in rural areas means keeping problems in their place, since
movement to urban areas not only causes urban problems but also makes the
problems public and visible.
Another sphere where state-society relations become obvious is NGOs. In
Uzbekistan, NGOs and other civil society organizations, foreign research insti-
tutes and foreign development projects have limited possibilities throughout
the whole country. There is little space left for institutions and information
sources since they are seen as a danger to the state and its authority. Keeping
them under supervision, closing and threatening their members is a means of
narrowing their operational space. The Uzbek government’s relation to inter-
national organizations on governmental level is also not easy.￿ A spectrum of
institutions and organisations like the IMF, ILO, Worldbank, OSI, WTO, na-
tional institutions such as the German Goethe Institute, or foundations which
engaged in democratization processes, are often faced with bureaucratic bar-
riers and have diﬃculties getting or extending their diplomatic accreditation
in Uzbekistan. Eﬀorts of international organizations to force the Uzbek gov-
ernment to do “good governance”, concerning for example privatization and
currency conversion, was not as eﬀective as expected. There are numerous
reports and information about the workings of Amnesty International or Hu-
man Rights Watch and their problems to work in Uzbekistan. These kinds of
organizations have nothing to give or donate except disturb the peace, which
makes their existence endurable.
The case of Gulnoza, which is described in chapter four, shows a remark-
able challenge to the state authority. It was a coincidence that the German
GTZ had an agricultural development project in my research site in which
informative events were organized in order to advise and teach fermer about
their legal rights. The person responsible for the project complained about the
￿ See more on NGOs in Uzbekistan in Berg (￿￿￿￿).
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diﬃculties to work in Uzbekistan in general. He mentioned that on the local
level the authorities cannot forbid this kind of events since they are approved
by Tashkent but using their own means tuman and viloyat authorities prevent
people from joining the meetings. Although the focus group was fermer most
of the participants were not fermer but were people who were obliged to par-
ticipate as “puppets” for making a crowd. They were sent by the kolkhoz to
join the meetings. The activities of the organization were strictly supervised.
Allowing some of these organizations to operate was necessary for the image of
the Uzbek government but teaching fermer their legal rights was definitely not
what the Uzbek government appreciates or wants.￿￿ However, these organiza-
tions, for example the GTZ, not only spread information, but also provided
the kolkhoz with new cottonseed, new technologies and new technical equip-
ment as part of their projects. Because of this kind of benefits the unwished
aspects of these events and organizations are also tolerated. During their stay
in the village, events like teaching fermer about their legal rights and simi-
lar subjects were continuously interrupted by serving food, the absence of the
person responsible from the tuman, or by waiting for somebody who had the
necessary equipment. The organizer was just frustrated and tired at the end
of the event because of the lack of engagement by the Uzbek side. On the
other hand, allowing the GTZ to inform fermer about their legal rights does
not mean they are also enabled to use them.
￿.￿ The Uzbek State and its Borders
It is not my intention here to give a detailed border study and ethnography.
Yet, borders became an important aspect of this study during my fieldwork,
and maybe even more in the aftermath of it, during data analyses. Uzbekistan
is a country with internal and international borders. It is almost unavoidable
to study this issue to a certain extent, as there is a continuous border crossing
as well as a strong symbolic meaning to them. As Migdal also points out:
“Borders shift; they leak; and they hold varying sorts of meaning for diﬀerent
people” (￿￿￿￿:￿) – this is the case with Uzbek borders.
For instance, viloyat borders are marked by huge metal boards. These are
￿￿ One would think that it does not matter whether fermer know their rights or not, since
they cannot ask for it. That is true. However, a pile of legal complaints is also not wished
for.
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not only decorated – mostly with cotton drawings – but also labelled with
signs, which welcome and see oﬀ travellers wishing them a safe journey. These
metal boards are supported by a schlagbaum.￿￿ With a few armed oﬃcials
the picture of the viloyat border checkpoint is completed. Cars and trucks
are stopped, contents and passports checked, and questions asked: “Where
are you coming from?” “Where are you going to?” “What are you going to
do there?” An international border checkpoint does not look very diﬀerent –
a couple of border guards arguing with a crowd of people. The atmosphere
at the international borders was more nervous and people looked even more
stressed out. The point is that in Uzbekistan one is regularly reminded of the
existence of (diﬀerent kinds of) border.
While state borders are becoming obsolete for some parts of the world
(Wilson and Donnan ￿￿￿￿:￿), they started to become more important in oth-
ers. In Central Asia they have become barriers to the movement and flow of
goods and people. Borders and border politics after independence have direct
consequences for people’s lives - politics that are the consequence of diﬀerent
economic and political agendas of the respective state. After ￿￿￿￿ people had
the idea that the system that had locked people in for decades would disap-
pear and allow them to enjoy the freedom of movement. But the years after
showed rather a diﬀerent tendency and locked people in again, although in
a diﬀerent way. The demise of the old system did not abolish the borders.
Rather, the external borders of the Soviet Union became more open but the
internal ones less so. The expected opening of the borders was quite complex
in reality since the “closed” borders of the past – the iron curtain – are not
entirely “open” today and the open borders of today are not open in the sense
of the past.￿￿
In the ￿￿￿￿’s the then new borders nominally made people subjects of
diﬀerent Soviet republics. However, a border in that sense did not exist and
did not separate them. The Kyrgyz, Turkmen or Kazak borders were not
perceived as “real” borders in the past but gave people rather a feeling of being
part of a big union and territory. As described earlier, with the usage of
“language of nationality” (Hirsch ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿) in the ￿￿￿￿’s, a discussion and
interaction began with the state and in many cases people bargained about
￿￿ Schlagbaum (barrier) is a German word, which was borrowed into Russian and is also
widely used in Central Asian languages.
￿￿ see Gainsborough (￿￿￿￿) for a similar discussion on South Asia
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which side of the border they wanted to belong to. The real borders were
between the Soviet Union and other states, with other economic and political
agendas, as Iran, Turkey or China. These, however, had no relevance in the
daily life of people. For my interview partners, the border was somewhere
out there, far away from them. Of course people were aware of the limits
of the Soviet Union and travel restrictions but today it does not seem any
better than in the past. Economically, many of them cannot aﬀord to travel
abroad; even within their own country it is diﬃcult. One positive aspect often
mentioned is that „. . . people like you, people from foreign countries can now
travel to Uzbekistan.“ This is something new and seen as a positive aspect of
independence.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian
republics made these borders a de jure and de facto thing. Now, adminis-
trative boundaries became state borders. Being confronted with this sudden
and new “border feeling” aﬀected people’s lives very directly. Uzbekistan has
borders with four other Central Asian republics with each multiple meanings
and significances. Since then, a schlagbaum has not only come to be between
two independent states, it is also found between plan and market economies.
So not only does it indicate a border, it also draws a line between limits and
possibilities of one or the other side.
Thus, real borders, depending on what they separate, started to shape the
lives of people. This is seen as a “step back” by people. With independence,
perception became diﬀerent; feeling of being stuck, restricted within borders,
which were open in the past and are closed now, makes things more diﬃcult to
accept than the other way around. At that time, ending up on the other side
did not have much economic, political and social consequences. Since ￿￿￿￿,
a separation emerged and a “real ending up on the wrong side” had serious
consequences for people. Of course, whether the “wrong side” is actually that,
depends on the eye of the beholder. Today people are not able to enjoy freedom
of movement, not only due to financial reasons but also due to the restrictions
of the Uzbek government and mutual visa regulations.￿￿
After independence, republican borders symbolized a variety of state pow-
￿￿ Another aspect of the “opening of the borders” has to do with the quality of circulated
goods. As mentioned before in chapter four, as a result of independence and the demise of
Soviet Union it became possible to get goods from other countries, but people felt betrayed
with the junk that soon arrived. “Now we have lots of things from abroad but the quality is
bad”.
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ers and politics. A debate began concerning the control of borders, their
defence and the defence of rights and sovereignty. Borders as “lines dividing
spaces as represented on maps” became boundaries “. . . at which the way
things are done changes, at which “we” end and “they” begin, at which certain
rules for behaviour no longer obtain and others take hold” (Migdal ￿￿￿￿:￿).
In my field context, within the Soviet Union there was no “we” or “they” dif-
ference regarding the economic and political policies of the republics. These
things were done or should be done according to one model in the same man-
ner. Concerning how things are done, “we” Uzbeks compared to “they” Kyrgyz
or Turkmens have always had a border without having boundaries (cf. Barth
￿￿￿￿). These boundaries are now strengthened with real borders, which sym-
bolize division, independence and otherness. And borders mean more than
lines on the maps; they divide diﬀerent political and economic systems paral-
lel to socially constructed boundaries.
In ￿￿￿￿ the existing borderline brought the necessity of a new organization
of space. Everyday life, economic and social relations had to be rethought.
In fact, social distinctions existed before the boundaries were drawn while
the economic meaning of the borders developed only after ￿￿￿￿. Things have
changed with the existence of the borders and what people make out of it
diﬀers in relation to their social and economic situation. A border is a fact
of life and one has to deal with it out of necessity. Being for or against the
borders is highly related to who has an advantage and disadvantage of it.
There has been certain continuity with Soviet times, but the borders have
also been shaped by the new politics of independence of inclusion, exclusion
and the coexistence of others within the same territory. Since the actual cre-
ation of the borders, as a marker of separation of space and people as citizens
of diﬀerent states with diﬀerent political and economic agendas, more “we”
and “they” has been produced. Independence made people of the same ethnic
groups and members of the same family citizens of diﬀerent states. The in-
strumentalisation of ethnicity is not uncommon in daily life and not limited to
a certain geographical area or historical period. If done though, it should be
necessary, meaningful and eﬀective. Concerning ethnic identity, people take
their Soviet past as a reference point in order to deal with the present situ-
ation. At the same time, concerns about the border have emotional, social,
economic or spatial and practical aspects. Some people have started to think
about their daughters who married and stayed on the other side, some are
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concerned about their brothers and sisters, while others about superior mar-
ket conditions or grazing sites on the other side of the border. The emergence
of a physical border with its porosity still allowed people certain things like
family visits or making ends meet while the latter may be risky, yet still often
better than the possibilities at home.
My two fieldwork settings each border with one former Soviet Union re-
public, namely Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. In two research settings, the
meaning of borders diﬀers from each other significantly. This meaning also de-
termines the attitude towards borders. The village in the Fergana Valley was
just a few kilometres away from the Kyrgyz border, while the one in Bukhara
was located in the inner part of the viloyat, some ￿￿ kilometres from Turk-
menistan. Two settings, two borders with diﬀerent characteristics. Diﬀerent
reasons, ranging from local, national, geographical, social to historical ones,
all play an important role in border issues.
Although the Bukhara viloyat has a border to Turkmenistan, it is seen as
quite irrelevant for economic and political reasons. This is an opinion also held
in Turkmen settlements. In this point ethnicity does not play a role since it
does not have an orientation value. In Romitan there are hardly any border
crossings to Turkmenistan. Yet the geographical distance to the border is not
decisive. In Bukhara, borders are merely seen as a symbol of an independent
sovereign state, which is to be protected and controlled against smugglers and
terrorists, and which also separates things that do not belong together. Its
existence is not seen as an obstacle for daily life or for economic survival.￿￿
After ￿￿￿￿, the population of Bukhara viloyat was not really concerned or
aﬀected by this new situation since they were neither separated from their
kin and relatives nor did Turkmenistan oﬀer any real economic or political
alternative to Uzbekistan. For the Tajiks and Uzbeks of Bukhara not only is
the border to Turkmenistan perceived as far away, but also there are many
“cultural” distances. More than distance is the lack of networks a significant
aspect in this context. Networks are created especially through marriage and
this has not been the case in Bukhara. If marriages occur in a narrow radius
this means it is marriage to kin and in close distances and thus it is not
surprising that there are no networks in a wide range. In the aforementioned
context the local Turkmens who have lived in the region for a long time (cf.
￿￿ The Turkmen border in Karakalpakistan, by contrast, has a completely diﬀerent mean-
ing, socially and economically (cf. Finke ￿￿￿￿).
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Finke ￿￿￿￿) are also seen as diﬀerent to the Turkmens of Turkmenistan. They
are “our” Turkmens. But at the same time they are also diﬀerent than “us”,
that is Tajiks and Uzbeks, due to their language and cultural habits. There are
existing prejudices against the Turkmens of Turkmenistan that can be summed
up along the nomadic-sedentary line.
But other border regions like the one to Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan play an
important role not only in social aspects but also in economic ones. Both sides
of these borders are populated by Uzbeks in addition to the titular groups.
Although the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border separates two countries with a remarkable
economic asymmetry, plan versus market, after the demise of the Soviet Union
economic and political connectedness to the rest of the world only became pos-
sible through the Kyrgyz side of the border for many people. As mentioned
before, my stay in the Ferghana Valley was not intended to be spent on study-
ing borders as a main focus of the fieldwork but it was an inevitable and visible
part of everyday life that contrasts strongly to Bukhara. Beyond the symbolic
meaning of the border there were direct consequences for people on the spot.
Challenging borders is the case in the valley since there are established social
relations and places, which have played an important role in the life of people
over time. People have oriented themselves beyond the border long before
independence. This orientation has gained a new impetus after independence
due to diﬀerent economic systems and profiting from them but also because of
other possibilities that one side of the border oﬀers.
The Kyrgyz in the valley are a case in particular. They do not consider
themselves living on the right or wrong side in respect to their ethnic belonging,
since they had been living there for a long time. They had established stronger
cultural connections with and similarities to Uzbeks than to Kyrgyz of other
parts of Kyrgyzstan. Especially when they travel in the direction of Bishkek
they, so I was told, feel completely alien. In neighbourhoods close to the border,
many Kyrgyz went to school in Kyrgyzstan up until independence. While
dividing two diﬀerent ethnic groups, at the same time the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border
separates co-ethnics from each other thus marking sameness and otherness
among inter and intra-ethnic groups. While sometimes ignored and sometimes
stressed, the border has a significant power as a unifying or separating line. For
many years after independence people continued to live without the dividing
aspect of the borders and maintained their socio economic relations with the
other side as if it were an extension of their own. Marriage practices kept
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relations alive and became a kind of motor for future perspectives.
The relationship between centre and periphery is diﬀerent than in non-
border areas or at borders with “non-significant” countries like Turkmenistan.
In that context, similar to Heyman’s work on the Mexico-USA border (Heyman
￿￿￿￿: ￿￿-￿), “border areas [have to] be seen as a particular kind of local,
politically organised ecology” (Wilson and Donnan ￿￿￿￿:￿). Uzbek borders
and their realities are only traceable when the policies, actions and failures of
both states are taken into consideration, since the borders with Kazakstan or
Kyrgyzstan compared with Turkmenistan are indeed diﬀerent. In fact, this
system produces additional borders. In Bukhara, people have nothing to do
with the border, neither economically nor socio-culturally, so for them the state
discourse of keeping terrorists out of the country and keeping the wealth of
the country inside seems plausible and realistic. In the valley, the border has
an everyday relevance and people make their ends meet through the border.
Furthermore, relatives are also separated by the border. So for them, daily life
and its realities forces them to deal with the border in order to reach resources,
relatives or other facilities.
While diﬀerences were stressed and made clear to the other side of the
border in Bukhara, similarities to others were mentioned in the valley. Lo-
cality here does not stop at the border while in Bukhara it is more limited
in space. Not only are goods crossing the border but there is also an iden-
tification with the other side. A collective understanding of being from the
valley and being part of this “civilisation”, with its Tajik or Kyrgyz minorities,
survived independence due to the importance of locality in the Uzbek context
that unites Uzbeks from Andijon closer with those from Osh than with those
from Bukhara.
Borders are the places where the state performs “power” and “control” but
also where this power is challenged. Discourse on control of territory, the
political system and resources are used to legitimize authority and surveillance
in and on the edges of the country. Territorial unity, having a secular system,
no civil war and keeping the wealth of the country in the country are the
basic arguments of the Karimov regime and so every good citizen is to have
sympathy and understanding for the security measures. While perhaps not
to the same extent but in a similar way as Bornstein argues in relation to
the West Bank, the Green Line also shapes everyday life and how people use
opportunities to make a living (Bornstein ￿￿￿￿: ix).
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Policing, next to national ones, internal borders is an especially strong
reminder of state power to its citizens. Uzbekistan has a schlagbaum “border
eﬀect” that people regularly encounter. In that respect it is not so much
separating geographies and policies but the extending of state writ as far as
possible in order to make people feel the “state”. On the other hand, to be
“forgotten” by the state in Uzbekistan is not only a feeling felt by citizens
along the border, since the “empowerment” of citizens and the denial of access
to resources is not limited to the margins of the country.
￿.￿ Making Use of Borders: Legally and Ille-
gally
Borders have created new restrictions, but new opportunities have also arisen.
In this respect, the meaning of their existence as a part of daily life in both
settings is quite diﬀerent. This is not merely related to the settings’ distance to
the border. It is more than geographic distance, since if a border is considered
and seen as an opportunity, no matter how far, how dangerous it is to pass it,
people will struggle to cross it. A single reason or a bundle of many diﬀerent
reasons can push people to cross borders. Some people stay long on the other
side of the border and some do not. One may cross it due to economic or
political reasons, some cross it in order to visit relatives or a wedding party
and some to visit holy places. If people think they will profit from crossing
the border, then they will – no matter how dangerous it is. Borders, like lost
jobs or unpaid salaries, brought one of the significant changes in peoples’ lives.
Some of them were confronted more directly and intensively than others.
But in order to cross it and to do so regularly, one side of the border
should oﬀer something the other does not. Briefly, there is no reason to cross
the border to Turkmenistan from the perspective of my Bukhara filed site
residents.￿￿ When two separate countries resemble each other economically
and politically, there is no special value from the border. The situation on
the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border is completely diﬀerent. National economic and
￿￿ In the Khorezm province the situation is diﬀerent. Here, the residence of co-ethnics
and relatives on both sides of the border makes travelling back and forth for weddings and
funerals highly relevant for everyday life although it is often mentioned that the Turkmen
side is quite well patrolled. Economic aspects are of secondary importance in comparison to
kinship relations. People smuggle fuel but do not cross the border as labourers (cf. Finke
￿￿￿￿).
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political developments in Uzbekistan have an impact on both internal and
international border regulations where local communities need to find a way
to deal with. From political refugees to ordinary smugglers this border oﬀers a
large spectrum of possibilities in contrast to the Turkmen border. One of the
main reasons is diﬀerences in property rights and economic opportunities.
“If you pass the canal, things are diﬀerent. To the Kyrgyz the land is
divided and privatised. They do not work anymore. It is Uzbeks from
here who go there and take care of the trees, water them and pick the
fruits. The crops are shared according to an agreement. You can bring
your share home with you, and the traders come to your home and they
sell it again. Some people became rich by working for Kyrgyz, renting
their land and working it.“ (Sharzod)
A flourishing border economy or making ends meet via border crossings
are, in the words of Heyman, more related to “local ecology” rather than to
“advantages of physical geography” (￿￿￿￿:￿￿). In the case of the Ferghana Val-
ley, it is the co-existence of two economic systems and the overlapping ethnic
composition on both sides of the border. Both, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks have kin
relationships across the border, which may help work and trade arrangements.
In the current economic situation smuggling into and out of Kyrgyzstan is one
of the most important components of the survival. Another option is to dislo-
cate the income resource completely beyond the national borders, namely to
Kyrgyzstan, without chancing the place of residence. Some Uzbeks work there
as daily labourers, while others stay for longer time periods. Picking one kilo
of cotton in Kyrgyzstan is paid ￿,￿ times more than in Uzbekistan. In ￿￿￿￿,
per day it was possible to earn up to ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ sum. Spending one week
there one was able to end up with a huge amount of money for Uzbekistan
standards.
Besides this flexible daily basis employment, getting some piece of land
from the owner and working it by oneself is another option for some. Some
Uzbeks leased land up to ￿￿￿ hectare. In this case, the owner provides technical
support and a tractor. The arrangements are in the form of share-cropping but
conditions can be very diﬀerent. The advantage for the labour migrants is that
the produce can be sold on the free market in Kyrgyzstan. Earning money in
Kyrgyzstan and spending it in Uzbekistan is seen as a particularly lucrative
option because living conditions are cheaper. In fact, however, Uzbeks from
Uzbekistan are working primarily on the fields of ethnic Kyrgyz. Occasionally
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co-ethnics are oﬀering jobs but relatives were not mentioned as employer. The
reason was also clear for the commuters because “as nomads Kyrgyz lack of
skills of agriculture and have the Uzbeks work for them”.
Many activities along the border can be defined as illegal and the centre
is concerned about these illegalities but the maintenance of political order
requires it to turn a blind eye in that respect. This is partly due to the
fact that provinces are put in competition to one another, especially when it
comes to achieving the “cotton plan”. Movements of goods within Uzbekistan
from one province to another represents inter-border smuggle; it is considered
“stealing the wealth of the nation” in that case “the wealth of the viloyat” or
“the success of the viloyat“. Taking cotton and wheat out of the viloyat is seen
as treason to the viloyat and smuggling beyond national border is regarded as
treason to the nation.
“Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, and it is not my job to look after people.
Everyday five thousand people come from Osh to Andijon - if each of them
would buy a loaf of bread, there would not be enough left for my people”. These
are the words of president Karimov on TV (cited in: Megoran ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿). I
was also often told by people that border controls were necessary in order to
keep the “wealth of the nation”. Furthermore, as a marker of the extent of the
state, some borders are occasionally closed in order to remind both countries’
citizens of its power. So, in one sense, the uncertainty leads people to take
risks because they just don’t know what may happen the next day. The way
the Uzbek state defines and controls its territory and population by drawing
borders and checkpoints follows the same logic. Being present in everyday life
through checkpoints, controls, and documents or through a modest degree of
social support is the main agenda of the regime. The border areas are aﬀected
to the same extent as the centre. These are all done under protectionist and
paternalist reasons for the well-being of its subjects.
On the other hand, it is understandable even for state oﬃcials that people
need this option to secure a living. With the help of bribery, border crossings
are not a big issue. Of course, if one does so on a daily basis there are prob-
lems and arbitrariness but most of the time by paying some sum of money it
is sold. “If you pay, you can always cross the border. If you pay enough, even
a truck can pass the border with whatever goods you have.” (Timur) Accord-
ing to informants the border militsiya knows who, how often and for which
purpose crosses the border. Depending of these criteria, the amount of money
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to be paid is calculated mutually. Of course, there were days when controls
are tighter and the border less permeable. Both guards and commuters are
thus related within an illegal exchange system. There were no serious com-
plains about the border guards in contrast to other migrants’ experiences who
send remittances from Russia or Kazakstan. Commuting on a daily basis and
creating an acquaintanceship with border guards enables trust and even some
emotional attachment to develop. Each side knows the rules of the game’, so
that people know how to behave during border crossings. This includes to
know how much to give, how much to take, and how much to forward to ones
superiors.
Still, border crossing is an exhausting act, especially carrying goods from
one side to the other. Of course, the payments at the border are seen as a
sacrifice but as a worthy one. Commuters were most of the time not using
the word “bribe” rather they were describing the moment of illegality. Their
expression when crossing the border is “gaplaship otush mumkin”, meaning to
talk one’s way across the border. This gaplaship is a process which starts
with polite greetings and continuous by bargaining and negotiating on the
sum to be paid. Nevertheless, disputes at the border belong to everyday life in
the Fergana Valley and crossing them is an everyday struggle. People accept
them to some degree since they happen regularly and the people know what
is waiting for them. Of course, the Kyrgyz primarily blame the Uzbek border
guards and the Uzbeks the Kyrgyz ones, but it is also not rare for people to
complain about their own border personnel. Going to the market, visiting
relatives, smuggling goods or going to a wedding can all be travel reasons but
it does not necessarily mean that people get diﬀerent treatment according to
their travel purpose. In fact, a smuggler can be treated better than a wedding
guest since many factors play an important role during checks. Sometimes
soldiers act as bullies and harass people without any reason. Regular border
crossers are more experienced and know how to deal with the soldiers and
their wishes. Smuggling of essential goods and natural resources necessitates
another expertise, competence or knowledge since it is not the business of
ordinary people. In a similar way, smuggling goods in large amounts – by
truck – needs another negotiation power than daily bag carriers. Leaving
Uzbek territory and entering Kyrgyzstan, and doing so regularly is not only
tiring but it also necessitates skills for dealing with custom oﬃcers irrespective
of whether they are co-ethnics or not. That is “why it is not everybody’s thing
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to do”, as I was told.
Also women as daily workers or small traders often begged at the border
that they had to get their goods to the other side since they need to support
their families and feed their children. This gender aspect is very often used
when the men did not get enough sympathy from oﬃcials. On the Cambodian-
Thai border, Cambodian women were “emphasising their sameness” with Thais,
even though they belong to diﬀerent nationalities (Kusakabe, ￿￿￿￿:￿￿; see also
Tsuneishi ￿￿￿￿). On the Kyrgyz –Uzbek border where both sides have a similar
ethnic configuration, arguing in that sense is not diﬃcult, also due to mutual
linguistic competency. Both sides of the border are inhabited by co ethnics
and there is a strong relationship between them. Weddings and funerals are
also constantly used as arguments. These border movements also necessitate
things other than bribes or gifts. Creating a kind of sympathy, aﬃnity and
solidarity is a key for crossing the border. A reference point is sought and is
intensively used in order to make border checks a little easier. Everybody has
a similar but also slightly diﬀerent story to overcome border harassments, like
earning “bread money” for children or having sick family members and needing
money for their treatment. Some of these stories are true, some of them are
not, but they all make border crossings possible and profitable.
Those border soldiers who are from diﬀerent parts of the country are not
always susceptible for these kin arguments. On the other hand, it is also
obvious that there is not a real intention to stop people at the border besides a
few exemplary cases in which the power of the state is represented. Although
the state watches and regulates the “aﬀairs” along the border, and continues
to tighten border crossings, mobility continues in a way. The Uzbek–Kyrgyz
border gained a meaning that did not exist to the same extent in the past and
began to oﬀer some options to its residents, for instance in economic aspects.
The cards have just been dealt here and the residents of Marxamat need to
find other income resources besides the limited kolkhoz land usage. The border
became the heart of things in Marxamat, as a problem and a solution. As
Green points out, “Marginality, too, can become part of the heart of things,
precisely because of its asserted marginalization in relation to the heart of the
things” (￿￿￿￿:￿).
It is here that people open themselves to the market economy in Kyrgyzs-
tan. Work in Kyrgyzstan also means insecurity of job and payments. Legal
or illegal, the weak bargaining position of border crossers exposes them to any
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kind of exploitation. Still, people are better paid and have more options than
at home. While the Uzbek government creates the push factors, at the same
time it enables the conditions of exploitation for its beloved citizens at and
beyond the border. For people in Marxamat, there are many reasons to turn
to Kyrgyzstan especially in the post-independence period. When crossing the
border it means accepting the conditions on the other side. Border crossing
and seeking ones livelihood in Kyrgyzstan is, for diﬀerent reasons, not a solu-
tion for everybody. Although some Tajik villages in Marxamat are also located
directly at the border, they do not engage border crossings as much as Uzbeks
and Kyrgyz. One reason for that is the absence of co-ethnics on the other side.
Considering the situation after ￿￿￿￿ with unemployment, irregularly paid
or insuﬃcient salaries, borders not only oﬀered Uzbeks an opportunity for
survival, but also for local oﬃcials the chance to fulfil their economic goals.
While the border secures “bread money” for many, others, like people involved
in the cotton business, make huge profits through smuggle since the border
helps to fulfil the cotton plan in Andijon viloyati. Sometimes, what is smuggled
to the other side of the border, in order to sell at world market prices, is bought
again locally in order to fulfil the plan. Barter between states or provinces is
another possibility to achieve that.
Smuggling is not limited to international border crossings. Omida lives in
Kuva, a city located in the neighbouring province Fergana but not far from
Marxamat. The road from Marxamat to Kuva has a small checkpoint at the
viloyat border. For frequent travellers this checkpoint is nothing more than a
place to greet soldiers and oﬃcers, but less frequent travellers must stop and
show their documents and open their car trunk – a usual procedure at every
province border. It is not very common, however, to see a woman behind the
steering wheel, especially in a microbus, a Damas. Omida is in her mid-forties,
energetic and talkative. She drives from Kuva to Marxamat regularly in order
to collect pilyonka, which is her business and income resource. She buys used
and unused pilyonka from kolkhozcu and takes them to Kuva to resell them or
make plastic bags from them. Since cottonseeds are planted under pilyonka in
the viloyat of Andijon, but not in Ferghana, there is always a bulk of used and
unused available. Kolkhozcu have easy access to this resource since pilyonka
removed from the fields are not returned to the kolkhoz. Furthermore they
also have access to unused material, which is sold to Omida (one kilo for ￿￿￿￿
sum). Thus, similar to Soviet times, using state resources in one’s own interest
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(Verdery ￿￿￿￿) is still a valid option to make a profit. Using state resources
for private business enterprises is hardly uncommon and nobody thinks twice
about it. Transporting pilyonka and crossing province checkpoints is possible
through bribes but Omida also says that, “they know me and let me pass.”
Personnel change at the border crossings necessitates new arrangements and
requires introducing herself to the new guards so the routine gets back on track.
She talked with an ease and carelessness, which showed she had complete
confidence in what she was doing.
Besides their function as a survival strategy for many people, border cross-
ings also have a “relaxing eﬀect” despite all the problems, frictions and tensions.
It is a kind of valve – not only for the people but for the Karimov regime as
well. I would argue that what happens at the border does not happen because
borders are on the margins of state control and represent a “weak periphery”,
but because the “strong centre” has its own agenda and intentionally keeps the
border weak or strong in order to secure its survival. The flow of untaxed
goods is basically accepted since the border represents a main income source
for people neglected by the incumbent regime. In daily life, restrictions along
the border are due to diﬀerent reasons – sometimes a local incident caused by
a cow or somebody getting caught while crossing the border, and sometimes
because of tensions between governments.￿￿
Thus, what happens at the border does not undermine state authority,
rather it is known and a blind eye is turned on it. People expect the state to
show the same authority and restrictions in diﬀerent spheres for diﬀerent citi-
zens. In the end, this flexibility allows the regime to survive. Allowing diﬀerent
degrees of control for diﬀerent issues in diﬀerent places is the survival strategy
of the Uzbek government, not its “weakness”. Furthermore, diﬀerent forms of
state action sometimes do not appear as state actions at all (Walker ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿,
Das and Pole ￿￿￿￿, Ong ￿￿￿￿). While introducing new rules and penetrat-
ing private spheres of citizens by diﬀerent kinds of regulation, like scheduling
wedding feasts, on the other hand unexpected flexibility like condoning illegal
border crossings and smuggling gives a fuzzy image of the state.
In that case, marginality means lying at the margins of state territory and
being diﬃcult to reach geographically. According to my informants, during
￿￿ Megoran and Reeves have published extensively on border issues between Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley (Megoran ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿; Reeves ￿￿￿￿). Their
work describes in detail ethnographically the space of border and people’s everyday practices.
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the Soviet period the areas were more oriented towards Kyrgyzstan and not
to the centre of their own republic. Bazaars in Kyrgyzstan – in particular the
city of Osh – were the orientation points. Although after independence places
became more diﬃcult to reach, the direction of orientation did not change due
to many reasons. Connectedness to Kyrgyzstan actually makes the Marxamat
people marginal for Tashkent but they are occasionally better oﬀ in economic
terms. At the same time, Uzbeks as border crossers represent a marginal
group in Kyrgyzstan because of their insecure working and living situation.
Their detachment from the centre connects them more to a global economic
and political system than being in centre but they are also marginalised where
they are connected in this case in Kyrgyzstan.
After ￿￿￿￿, the border regime started to function in terms of separation and
restrictions of movements. It is also the same border regime that allowed for
the establishment of border economies as a compensation of the state’s failing
abilities. Connectedness to co-ethnics, relatives and to the world market exists
along the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border – and that in every aspect: religious, ethnic,
kinship and economic from local to global. This border allows people to go
and visit the mosques freely, and if needed to use the Kyrgyz contingent for
hajj (cf. chapter ￿.￿). Thus, by crossing the border via Kyrgyzstan, not only
economic but also religious connectedness to the rest of the “Islamic” world
is made possible. Crossing the border is a kind of experience that confronts
reality in Uzbekistan and does not necessarily correspond to the state discourse
or TV news. In Marxamat, many people had the chance to see and question
their own state in relation to Kyrgyzstan while in Bukhara “belief in the state”
still played an important role.
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Ideological Strategies: Views on
Modernity, the State and Religion
￿.￿ Introduction
One common view on post-socialist societies is that their fall left people with
an ideological vacuum, which is not easy to fill. This is grounded in the idea
that state socialism was an overarching and all-encompassing ideology that
had replaced traditional worldviews such as religion. After its disappearance,
people would therefore have to look for alternatives to guide their lives and
social interrelations.
Islam plays a key role in this. While Uzbeks try to perform and carry out
rituals and ceremonies as a part of their religious duty, for most of them it
does not determine their daily lives. Independence is a chance to learn and to
talk more about religion, yet it also has its own new limits. In people’s minds,
there is no doubt that an Uzbek is a Muslim anyway. And although many
perceive of themselves (and others) as not particularly good Muslims, there is
always the chance to become one. This process demands time and knowledge,
meaning that one can acquire that status at a certain age when enough free
time is available and one is taken care of by one’s children who take over the
stress of making ends meet. The insecurity of the post-Soviet order did not
lead many people to seek comfort or solutions in religion. Religion is far more
a regulator of behaviour or an approval of certain attitudes concerning the
diﬀerent spheres of life. Not only religion, but also other spheres of life are
under state control and this makes the remembrance of the past a positive
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experience in many respects.
This ideological search, if there actually does happen to be one, obviously
takes place against the backdrop of the Soviet legacy and its ideas on moder-
nity, religion and the role of the state. This chapter will therefore begin with
a look at the attitudes people have towards the former system and how they
contrast that system with the contemporary state of Uzbekistan. Issues of
modernity and civilization play a prominent role in this respect and also in-
form peoples’ understanding of the future. I will then analyse the place of
Islam in contemporary society as well as the usage that some individuals make
out of it’s revival before turning to everyday practices. The chapter concludes
with a look at future perspectives and ideas about modernity.
￿.￿ Discourses on State, Modernity and the Ide-
ological Vacuum
The idea of a homo sovieticus , free of traditional values and religious blindness,
was a powerful one, although it did not translate as heavily into everyday life
as socialist engineers had hoped for or in the way that western Sovietologists
wrote about it. In fact, when remembering the previous period, socialist ideals
play a relatively small role. Rather, the most missed aspect of Soviet times is
the aﬀordability of goods and especially the economic security and regularly
paid salaries. While, according to some informants, it was not even that easy
then if you had a family with many children, one was definitely less worried.
“For ￿￿￿ sum a month”, as a common saying goes, “you could have a reasonable
life; much better than today”. Yet, how this was possible and how the whole
system worked goes unmentioned and unquestioned. How the system came to
an end is also not reflected by many.
“In the past, everything was better. One didn’t have to cultivate plots.
Salary was simply enough. Everything was available. It wasn’t a prob-
lem to get construction material for a house. Everything came from
Russia. We lived in a time when people came by car to school - today,
everybody walks. Everywhere everything was the same price. It wasn’t
possible to buy so many and so diﬀerent goods. You know, during Soviet
times we did not know and we did not really think about how to make
a living. Now it is diﬃcult to get used to it.” (Sardor)
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Thus, nostalgia arises from declining living standards, insecurity and an
unpredictability people did not experience in the past. However, as became
clear in the preceding chapters fragments of socialism continue to exist in
Uzbekistan in diﬀerent spheres such as in the political, economic and social –
in some aspects to a high degree and in others to a lesser. In some aspects
they are clearly definable, in others they are fuzzy. Skills and knowledge
are a further issue considered by those socialized under the Soviet regime to
have been superior in the past. Thus, for example, the older generation sees
themselves as more capable in agricultural work than the younger ones. They
appreciate the fact that the practical work in the kolkhoz, which they did as
an obligation during school times, is now available to them as a resource of
which they can make use today, as a source of knowledge in order to satisfy the
family’s needs. This loss of knowledge is also seen as the reason for agricultural
failures, which are to be seen in the performance of some fermer.￿
“The young generation does not understand agriculture. We have a
Russian education; we spent enough time on the fields and worked in
the kolkhoz. But now, the younger generation do not know as much as
we do.” (Ismoil)
As has been described, after independence the Uzbek government disman-
tled most of the socialist welfare system. It did so not by privatization but
far more through suspension. Yet, the Uzbek case is diﬀerent than that of
other “advanced industrial countries”, which Rose describes as “privatization
of public utilities and welfare functions a new emphasis on the personal re-
sponsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own
future well-being and upon their obligation to take active steps to secure this”
(￿￿￿￿a: ￿￿￿-￿￿￿). In Uzbekistan, it has been independence, which has pushed
the social from government space. The diﬀerence is that this push occurred
without a privatization of these services. They simply disappeared; in some
cases, like kindergartens, they shrunk to a minimum, in others, like the public
transport system, they became unaﬀordable.
Actually, blaming the past regime or making the Uzbek culture responsi-
ble for the drawbacks of the present is not very widespread. To some degree,
the feeling of being economically inferior and other deficits seem to have been
compensated by independence. A comparison to neighbouring countries is a
￿ Cf. also Wall (￿￿￿￿) on knowledge negotiation and management in rural Uzbekistan,
focussing on the Khorezm Region.
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significant reference point when creating an ideal state type. In particular,
the events in neighbouring states like Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
legitimize the authoritative style of the Uzbek state in the eyes of most of its
citizens. The paternalistic state is, however, not associated with any particular
ideology. A state should care for its citizens, provide the necessary infrastruc-
ture and support the poor and the weak. It should be strong in order to care
for its citizens and maintain order without, however, interfering too much in
the business of those citizens. Due to its civil war following independence,
the Tajik state is seen as a particularly chaotic one. Judgments are usually
made concerning the respective presidents; the way countries are governed is
merely seen as a result of their personal capability. Any potentially appreciable
political and economic developments in these neighbouring countries, such as
privatization or more freedom of speech, are not mentioned in this comparison.
“Look at Tajikistan, look at what happened, conflict and war. Look at
Kyrgyzstan; look at Kazakstan, there is no law, everybody does what-
ever he wants to. And the corruption; in Kazakstan you cannot travel
from one place to another without paying somebody oﬀ. Once the in-
terior minister travelled undercover and witnessed this and confessed as
to how bad it is; he paid a lot of money on the way.” (Akram)
One explanation for the present diﬃculties revolves around the costs of
securing independence and protecting the state from its neighbours. Without
these expenditures, there would be time and money for other things.
“A big part of the money nowadays is used to fix the borders. Otherwise,
there would be more for development. It costs huge amounts of money,
this border issue, the president has been saying this for a long time.”
(Ulugbek)
Although talking about politics was not only avoided by my side but also
by my interlocutors, there were some conversations about the president and
his work. According to some people, it is not necessary to question things,
especially the orders of the president, since he knows what he’s saying and
doing. If the things do not work, it is not his fault but rather that of the
people under his command who do not fulfil his orders properly. He is seen as
a father who cares for his family.
“If there is order, than everything works well. If the things were done
the way Karimov says, everything would be fine. What the father says,
the child should do (atanin aytqaninin bolanin kilishi kerek ).” (Botir)
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The president is defended while others who work under him are seen as
being responsible for the existing problems. The president supposedly does
not know what is going on and he is not informed about the happenings on
the local level. A further explanation is that he knows what is going on but
he is alone and the people around him do not let him change things. In the
end, he is the good guy and the others who work with him are not. Diﬀerent
explanations are given for centre-periphery relations and malfunctioning poli-
tics. One argument is that in the centre, the administration is not acquainted
with the local realities and makes decisions, which they attempt to implement
using diﬀerent mechanisms of force. The other argument sees the centre as
well informed and aware of local realities, yet the local representatives’ cor-
ruption undermines the centre’s concept. The still existing plan economy and
the manipulation of plans can also be seen as a reinterpretation of the centre
at the local level.
The Uzbek government sees the privatization of agriculture as sawing oﬀ
the branch you are sitting on or slaughtering a goose that lays golden eggs.
For some people, privatization in general is synonymous with the withering of
the state and it is perceived as negative and seen as causing an ineluctable
decay of things since nobody cares or feels responsible anymore when things
are privatized. In the past, the state as an entity was the cheated one but
not seen as a cheater. Therefore, the privatization of public resources is also
unwelcome and often illustrated by the case of Kazakstan where the president
is said to have sold the country to foreigners. The paternalist state is one
that carries the main responsibility in significant life spheres. It is not seen as
necessary for the individual to carry any responsibility. Rather, privatization is
seen as dangerous being that private is more widely associated with corruption
and unfairness than is the state. This is similar to the case of the xokim, who
are seen as corrupt while the state is not. The state is Karimov and he does
not know what is going on.
Not only having enough financial resources for basic needs but also a cer-
tain quality of goods is highly appreciated when remembering the past. It is
often mentioned that, “after the demise of the Soviet Union quality and quan-
tity declined”. The terms “good” and “enough” often refer to the abundance
and substitutability of things, which was possible in the socialist economy
with its social security. The time under Brezhnev is remembered as the best.
One village resident described how he manages his life in relation to given
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circumstances. He argued that if there were more resources available, then
the president would distribute more but at the moment there is simply not
enough. That is why they should learn to make a living from what is allocated
to them. This recipe involves far more eﬀort and workload than in the past
but he has an understanding for the situation.
“Look, for instance, if you are a teacher and a dehqon, you can live well.
ten sot of land - you can use it for potatoes and after that for corn. It is fine.
At the moment, out of a total of ￿￿￿￿ sum, Karimov spends ￿￿￿ on building
up the country and ￿￿￿ sum on the people. But within time, ￿￿￿ sum may
end in the people’s pocket while the rest will be used for the construction of
the country. Slowly we are moving forward.” (Ilyos)
The concept of modernity is thus strongly associated with the socialist
period. With the demise of the Soviet Union, being part of the world was
also taken away (without, however, questioning the merit of independence).
The thinking is simple: the Soviet Union was a world power and Uzbeks were
a part of it. The system gave its citizens that feeling. Now, it is broken.
During my field stay, besides western standards of living and fashions, Soviet
(interchangeably with Russian) products were perceived as the benchmark
of good and modern (see chapter four). These products of the past are still
perceived as modern in the present and their durability is favourably compared
to the unaﬀordable western modernity of the present. This creates a “Soviet
modernity” and allows it to stay alive. However, the present imperfections are
excused using the term “transition period” and are not seen as a fault of the
people or the state.
At the same time, for Uzbeks and Tajiks being modern and civilized has a
strong correlation with a sedentary way of life. Dirt roads and poor dwellings
of custom oﬃcials are seen as a symbol of a lack of development and according
to this criterion, Kyrgyzstan is poor and undeveloped. Although people long
for reforms concerning a market economy, berating Kyrgyzstan in that respect
is common. Conflict is further seen as a sign of backwardness. This primarily
applies to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. If it weren’t for the Russians and being
part of the Soviet Union, it is believed that Uzbekistan could have ended up
like Afghanistan. It is also a generally acknowledged view that the Russians,
while avoiding mentioning them as colonizers, brought modernization to Cen-
tral Asia even during the imperial period. The starting point of that is always
seen as the infrastructure developed during the Russian invasion. Roads, elec-
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tricity, schools and hospitals are some of them. Russia brought the world to
Uzbekistan through the mass media of Russian news channels.
Interestingly enough, what is not mentioned are the eﬀects these things
had on the status of women. Quite the opposite, Uzbek women dressing like
Russian women is not at all appreciated. Picture broadcasts from the streets
of Tashkent with women dressed in tight trousers or miniskirts is frowned upon
and seen as bad Russian influence. When I was planning to have a dress sewn
in the village, we were discussing the model of the dress. I was asked if I
wanted to have a Russian or Muslim cut. I asked what the Muslim model was.
“The Muslim model is the Uzbek model, it is a diﬀerent cut than the Russian.
It looks like ours. It has a wide cut along the chest so that it does not cover
your body tightly and does not accentuate it. We wear trousers under it, so
you can sit and move comfortably.” No doubt, for many reasons, I decided on
the Muslim model.
￿.￿ Religious Revival and State Control
Since religion does not feature among the main foci of my research, I will not
provide a comprehensive picture of its role in the community, for the individual
and for the state. According to a number of historians who worked on Central
Asia in recent years published valuable works on Islam and its suppression
during socialist times (Northrop, Kamp ￿￿￿￿, Khalid ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, Keller ￿￿￿￿).
Islam was aﬀected by the Soviet regime in the same way other religions were,
perhaps even somewhat less because the regime did not want to oﬀend a large
and sensitive part of the population. The closing of mosques and the exiling
or murdering of priests occurred at various stages of Soviet history. During
the period of the Second World War, the destruction was stopped and even
the reopening of mosques was allowed in order to keep the Muslim population
at spirit.
It is very diﬃcult to judge how much the anti-Islamic, or eﬀectively atheist
propaganda aﬀected the minds of ordinary people. Not only was first-hand
research not possible for western scholars, but also the data used by Sovietol-
ogists was based on secondary and often questionable sources. The works of
prominent scholars like Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (￿￿￿￿) are ex-
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amples of this.￿ Much of this literature made us believe that it did not have
any aﬀect at all and that one day Islam would experience a revival and help
to overthrow the evil empire (Beningsen & Wimbush ￿￿￿￿). This proved not
to be the case but the degree as to which people accepted Marxism as a re-
placement ideology remains largely unclear. Another picture found in some of
the literature on Islam in Soviet times is that of a reduction to folklore and
a withdrawal to the domestic sphere. According to this view, the government
had been quite successful in destroying what may be called “oﬃcial religios-
ity”. Thus, deprived of their educated priesthood, what remained was a folk
understanding and practices that were strongly embedded in traditional social
life (such as circumcision and sacrificing).￿
Without touching the dichotomy of public (or oﬃcial) and parallel (or un-
derground) Islam, discussions concerning lived religion were not that easy dur-
ing the Soviet era as they are at the present. How meaningful this dichotomy
and the separation of religious spheres according to these concepts are, is not
the focus of this study.￿ People like Azoda remember the past using the follow-
ing words. “At that time, before independence, religious meetings could not
be held as easily as they are today. It was forbidden, yet done secretly. They
would come and ask if we had anything to do with religion.” Nevertheless,
what this shows is that the possibility of practicing religion did in fact exist,
even if not as free as one may have wished. However, this was not only a Soviet
problem. As the residents of my field sites admit, knowledge of Islam suﬀered
in this period and the religion was lived merely by practiced rituals. Rather,
a dilemma was seen between oﬃcial ideology and private attitudes towards
religion (cf. also Shahrani ￿￿￿￿:￿￿￿).
”During the Soviet period, we only prayed secretly at home. In the
entire viloyat, there was only one mosque. Outside we were influenced by
atheist propaganda while at home against kafirlik (infidelity).” (Qaydar)
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the independence of Uzbekistan
enabled a reconfiguration of religious aﬀairs. The early days saw a significantly
more positive attitude towards religion in general and Islam in particular,
as was to be expected. For many, this period meant being able to practice
religion freely, yet it did not last long. Restrictions on religion were soon
￿ For a thorough critique of „Sovietological Islamology“ see DeWeese (￿￿￿￿).
￿ For a Soviet view on this see Poliakov (￿￿￿￿)
￿ See also Saroyan ￿￿￿￿
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to be introduced and legitimized by the state using discourses about “peace
and order”. But also, for many informants, the present situation necessitates
regulations and zero tolerance for fundamentalists. The civil war in Tajikistan
and the situation in Afghanistan are usually given as examples in this matter.￿
For the Uzbek government, the construction of a few mosques, allowing fasting
during Ramadan and the Friday prayer were seen as suﬃcient religious freedom
and that attitude soon replaced the relaxed atmosphere of the early days of
independence. The government tries to control any kind of opposition by all
means possible and by using local or international events as a pretext for the
legitimization of authoritarian rule. Religious movements suﬀer under this
political atmosphere, as do other political movements.
After independence, the appearance of Islam in public is thus still rather
limited. Too much religious education, visiting mosques or fasting are quickly
seen as characteristics of fundamentalism, which threaten the peace and or-
der of the country. In contrast, life-cycle rituals like circumcision, which was
practiced under the Soviet regime, did not receive special attention from the
government since they are seen as a part of the Uzbek identity, as part of being
Muslim. Thus, citizens’ devotion to religious aﬀairs is strongly controlled and
determined by the state. Whoever stays within the given frame will not be cat-
egorized as a “Wahabi” or “fundamentalist” and thus not as anti-government.￿
On the other hand, one’s type of clothing or beard, or the organizing of reli-
gious meetings can turn anyone into a suspicious citizen, a citizen who does not
appreciate independence and the peaceful, harmonious life in Uzbekistan. Es-
pecially young men are placed under observation by state institutions starting
from the mahalla level.
This is, again, not everywhere the same. One’s own locality and superior-
ity towards other places and rivalry between provinces are not only stressed
by using delicious food and being more “civilized” but also by the degree of
religiosity. The outstanding position of Bukhara as a traditional centre of Is-
￿ See Louw (￿￿￿￿: ￿￿-￿￿) for diﬀerent movements and events, which support the state
discourse and legitimise restrictions on religion in Uzbekistan. One of the significant events
is the Tashkent bombings in ￿￿￿￿. Conspiracy of political opposition by Islamic groups
and their attempt on Karimov’s life was the main explanation used to justify authoritarian
politics.
￿ The term „Wahhabi“ is used by people as a label without actually knowing the meaning
of the word. It is associated with danger and extremism. Atkin (￿￿￿￿) also argues that
this term is used to refer to people who threaten the existing system. In my field sites, this
term is also used as a generalization for Muslims who intend to change the existing system.
People are classified under the term without really diﬀerentiating who these people are.
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lamic education is well known (Frye ￿￿￿￿, Levi & Sela ￿￿￿￿, Keller ￿￿￿￿). This
provides the city with a certain symbolic power in contemporary Uzbekistan
despite its rather marginal role in politics. Its religious importance in the past
reached far beyond the boundaries of Central Asia. Students came from all
over the Muslim world to attend one of its hundreds of madrases and many
spent decades or sometimes their whole lives in the city. It ‘acquired a rep-
utation as a bastion of conservative orthodoxy in which the ulama ruled the
roost” (Khalid ￿￿￿￿:￿￿).
Today, neither the city of Bukhara nor the rural areas have the reputation
of being particularly religious in comparison to the Ferghana Valley, which is
commonly considered the most religious region of Uzbekistan. Some people
see the reason for this in the past resistance to Russian and Soviet occupa-
tion; others would claim that Islam has always been stronger in the Ferghana
Valley. Others argue for a correlation between the more urbanized character
of the Valley and the importance given to education. This goes in line with
high population density, superior infrastructure and a higher level of economic
development. In Bukhara and other parts of the country, people consider it a
fact that the Valley is more religious and that more people from there go to the
hajj. With its madrases, Bukhara is still famous and strongly associated with
Islam. But in terms of practice, people in the Valley are believed to show more
interest in the study of Islam. For people from the Ferghana Valley, religiosity
is seen both as a sign and a result of intellectuality.
“The old Qoqand khanate had a tradition of skilful and talented people;
a development going way back. Other places have only started now.
Bukhara and Samarqand, compared to the Valley, do not give the same
importance to religion. People went to madrases from other places, but
not the Bukharian people. The locals didn’t consider it important. In
Bukhara, they study but they do not have ambitions. There are many
erudite people from the valley on the president’s staﬀ. In other places,
they only know how to take care of their livestock and similar things. As
you can see, people here were always educated; the intellectual people
come from the Valley”. (Farxod)
Whether or not people became more religious after independence is an-
other discussion, but the symbols of religion certainly became more visible in
everyday life. It is diﬃcult to arrive at a conclusion concerning any potential
increase in religiosity since there is no way to compare religiosity in the pre-
and post-independence period due to a lack of data. If one measures religios-
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ity by headscarves, beards, mosques or food and drinking habits, then religion
started to show itself and take its own place in society. In the post-Soviet
context of Uzbekistan, the claim that religion came out of the domestic pri-
vate sphere and into the public is thus partially true. But on the other hand,
since control of religion is so strict, and being stigmatized as a fundamentalist
happens quickly and is rather dangerous, living Islam publicly definitely has
its restrictions. The idea of “living Islam” according to one’s own imagination
did not really come true after independence. Religion became and is an aﬀair
of the state, which determines the limits of it. The anticipated de-privatizing
of religion did happen, however within certain restrictions. The fact that one
is quickly labelled a fundamentalist leads young men to practice religion pri-
vately at home instead of going to a mosque. Older men feel more comfortable
to practice in public since in their case it is seen as a sign of wisdom and as
adequate behaviour of their age.
Thus, religious freedom under the Uzbek government is shaped by many
regulations, restrictions and control mechanisms. In the first years after in-
dependence, mosques were opened all over the country. It became a common
feature of every rural community to have a mosque, often being housed in a for-
mer kolkhoz building. Soon, however, the building of mosques became strictly
controlled and was put under surveillance by the state, again unlike neigh-
bouring Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan (McBrien ￿￿￿￿). I was told that many, if
not most of the newly established mosques were again closed only a few years
after their foundation and new mosque buildings were not allowed. According
to my informants, since ￿￿￿￿, ￿’￿￿￿ out of the ￿’￿￿￿ mosques in Bukhara have
been closed. There is no possibility to check the accuracy of these numbers,
but what does seem to be confirmed rather often is that initiatives to build
mosques are hampered. The closings were justified using the explanation that
they had initially been constructed without using the proper procedures. So,
in fact, all mosques had to close and register again. In this process, the ma-
jority was not allowed to re-open. Mosques stayed closed due to reasons such
as missing documents, poor construction conditions or sometimes without any
real reason at all. The decrease in the number of mosques also brought another
change in religious activities. Most people visit the mosque only on Fridays
or religious holidays and otherwise practice at home. Too frequent visits may
make one suspicious in the eyes of the local administration. Only on special
occasions like qurban aid, most of the male population attend mosques and
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pray in public.
In Romitan there are a few functioning mosques in the villages. In Marxa-
mat, between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿, five mosques had opened, yet since ￿￿￿￿ only one
has continued to be in operation in the entire tuman. Here, as in other cases,
several hajji got together and made an application to the viloyat for the reopen-
ing of a mosque. All documents were ready and were only awaiting a signature.
It is a troublesome and exhausting procedure to open a mosque. Construction
expenses are not the main problem in this respect. They are covered by do-
nations; even by people who do not attend the mosque. The main problem is
rather finding somebody who takes responsibility of the mosque. This person
also has to guarantee that the mosque will be no place for fundamentalist and
anti-government voices. Taking this responsibility is not everybody’s concern.
￿.￿ The Role and Status of Religious Authori-
ties
With the revival of religious practices and public discourses, it also needed
authorities to take responsibility. Mullah and domla are used as categories for
referring to people who are knowledgeable in reading and teaching the Quran
and teaching children the Arabic script. It is also accepted that they expect
to be paid for these and other performances during life-cycle rituals. As a
result of the Soviet period, these people tend to be few. Often, a pilgrimage to
Mecca can bring one to a status of being recognized as a religious authority.
Of course, simply being a hajji does not mean that this person is trained or
has any competence in religious knowledge. If this person profits from his
personal charisma and from a certain position in the past, and combines these
with his new role, then he may be quite successful and be acknowledged as
an authority, at least in comparison to others. If available, usually a hajji or
another respected person is in charge of religious rituals. Besides the spiritual
aspects, this combination of old and new status as a hajji can create social
and economic capital for some people.
Becoming a hajji is not that easy. In principle, everybody can go to the
hajj, at least whoever can aﬀord to pay for it and is able to collect the neces-
sary documents. In order to manage the trip, the person needs around $￿’￿￿￿
for the preparation and an additional $￿’￿￿￿ to take with him. Furthermore,
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the bureaucratic procedures and bribes to pay are too much for many people
to aﬀord. As with other religious issues, going to the hajj is strictly regu-
lated. Firstly, every state has a certain quota for the hajj set by the religious
authorities in Saudi-Arabia and, if only for this reason, some regulations are
necessary. But the procedure common in Uzbekistan once again shows the role
of the state as one of surveillance instead of that as an organizer or supporter
of its citizens’ needs.
The first step is to make an application to the selsoviet. The candidate
should be known as a good citizen; he himself as well as his relatives should
not show any fundamentalist tendencies and not be convicted of anything.
The person receiving the necessary documents is then allowed to go one step
further and make his application to the tuman centre. A medical examination
is undertaken and after this some basic information about the trip and its
religious meaning is provided in the viloyat. If he or she has proven to be a
suitable candidate the person is allowed to go to the hajj. This is the procedure
for an ordinary citizen, for members of the elite the entire procedure may
be easier and more comfortable either via bribes, personal relations or by
travelling via the quota of another country like Kyrgyzstan.￿
Besides the spiritual aspect of the hajj, there is also social and economic
aspect to it. A trip to Mecca can, at least afterwards, be turned into other
types of capital. Reputation is one of those. Being a hajji carries with it a
meaning, which is highly useful in daily life. When I asked about the status
of being a hajji and if it has any relevance in daily life, the following citation
summarizes the general opinion as well as my own observations.
“For instance, if a hajji goes to the xokimiyat, he gets more respect
simply because he is a hajji. His wishes are not declined as easy as
yours or mines. When he goes to the bazaar and asks for the price of
something he gets a diﬀerent price. Or he bargains and oﬀers a price that
is accepted simply because he is a hajji. To every toi he is invited, he
can eat himself full (karni toyar ), he gets gifts and money.” (Abdullah)
Besides being fed, there are many more benefits for a successful hajji. Since
independence, many rituals and ceremonies, like circumcision or mourning, are
conducted more freely and are performed publicly. One does not need to be
religious or have knowledge on Islam for this. They are and must be carried
￿ In the Valley, the number of applications is higher than in other parts of Uzbekistan
but the basic procedure is the same. The only diﬀerence is the role of the mahalla as a first
step before applications can be made to the selsoviet.
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out by everyone. A circumcision ceremony, a wedding, a funeral, moving to a
new house or when a wish comes true: there is always an accompanying ritual
with a religious character.
I would argue, however, that being a hajji does not bring the same ad-
vantages for everybody in the post-Soviet context. The case of Hajji Bobo
may illustrate this. His past status as a school teacher allowed and prepared
him for his new position after his retirement. He went to Mecca in ￿￿￿￿ and
was the first person from the village. For a while, he was the only one in
the kolkhoz.￿ His social capital from the past allowed him to gain access to
other resources. I do not want to claim that he went to Mecca in order to
gain power and economic benefits, but even today others who have been to
Mecca are not regarded with the same authority as he is. As one man told
me, he is still a “fresh hajji ” and he does not get as many requests as Hajji
Bobo does. Perhaps his reputation is a combination of many factors like his
past status, his charisma, and his knowledge and experience in dealing with
people and particular situations. This capital cannot, of course, be gained by
others retrospectively. Hajji Bobo profited from his past in diﬀerent settings
for diﬀerent reasons. Besides earning additional money, he also enjoyed a kind
of privileged status in the tuman, which is useful for a host of other issues.
The situation is similar in the other settings. A Kyrgyz mahalla aqsaqali
in the Valley mentioned an increase in the number of people going to hajj. He
added that only “educated hajjis” can make money out of it, while others do
not or cannot use it for that purpose. According to Kadir, when people came
back from the hajj, sometimes a kind of competition would commence about
who could take advantage of the status. In one case, this turned into a conflict
culminating in a mosque being burned down. Two hajji both wanted to be the
mullah of that mosque, and then one of them burned it down.
During Ramadan, Hajji Bobo was not to be seen, this was the “peak season”
with lots of invitations. Typically, the host of the ceremony picks him up or
organizes a transport and then at the end he is driven back home again. During
the first days of Ramadan, Hajji Bibi told me that for iftar we did not need
to wait for Hajji Bobo and after a week it became clear that he was invited
somewhere almost every night and came home late. Besides money and gifts
(clothing, sweet and others), he also brought bread home with him so during
￿ In total, there were some ten from the kolkhoz and an estimated thirty from Romitan
tuman. During my stay, nobody from the kolkhoz managed to go to the hajj.
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Ramadan a lot less bread needed to be baked at home. This slowed down after
Ramadan, yet didn’t stop completely. On such occasions Hajji Bobo has quite
a busy time schedule. Sometimes, I noticed how he would leave home and then
return later with bundles of loaded plastic bags. What he brought back in his
pockets is, of course, harder to guess. Hajji Bibi told me that sometimes he
only receives gifts (and no cash), yet sometimes, depending on the host, he
gets up to ￿￿￿￿ sum from one invitation.
One day, the oldest daughters of Hajji Bobo stopped by and told her mother
that “. . . some people are gossiping. They are talking about father’s tight
schedule and that he sometimes gets three to four invitations a day. They
are jealous.” I wanted to know whether other hajjis or others knowledgeable
on the Quran were not invited as often as Hajji Bobo: “Of course, they are
also invited but everybody wants Hajji Bobo. That is why he has three or
four appointments a day. He does not want to upset people and accepts their
invitations. When other people don’t get invited as often, people start to
talk.” Actually, neither Hajji Bibi nor her daughter, were really bothered by
the gossip. The status of Hajji Bobo is unchallengeable. Sometimes, he was
not only overbooked but also exhausted and would then send a young boy as
his representative. This boy already accompanied him occasionally and was
also being prepared by Hajji Bobo for the entrance-exams to Mir-i Arab, the
most famous of the madrasa in Bukhara.￿ The jealous people, according to
his daughter, were other hajji who could not make use of their status and turn
it to an economic resource as Hajji Bobo had done. Moreover, having Hajji
Bobo in the ceremonies is not only seen as something normal and as part of
the performance but is also a status symbol, which he accepts despite his busy
calendar.
Other religious personnel hardly have the same degree of authority. They
are not perceived as a competitor of Hajji Bobo because they are not seen
as a religious authority. This is particularly true for women whose is limited.
Nevertheless, they may also have some economic and social gains. They are
invited for the women’s iftar or osh bibiyo ￿￿ but not on other occasions. After
iftar , the host paid them money and gave gifts like cloth or head scarves. In
￿ Hajji Bobo has ￿ students whom he teaches the Quran. They come three times a week
quite early in the morning. One of the students had already been in Mecca. These courses
are also paid. Again, in this aspect his social and political skills are very important, and a
former kolkhozcu would hardly be able to make it.
￿￿ See Louw (￿￿￿￿) and Krämer (￿￿￿￿)
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one osh bibiyo , there were around thirty to forty women (some of them left
before the ceremony ended) and each gave ￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿ sum to the woman in
charge. Besides the spiritual aspect of these gatherings, it is not very diﬀerent
from the gap in which women socialize, exchange information and fulfil their
duties depending on their status as neighbour or bride (see chapter five).
There are a few religious specialists outside of these formal and informal
denominations. One of them is Kadir. Especially younger people mentioned
his name very often to me when the discussion turned to religion. “Did you
meet Kadir Aka? He is very well educated and knows everything about Is-
lam”. Kadir is indeed an educated man who studied in Cairo and works as an
elementary school teacher in Kyrgyzstan, just on the other side of the canal
where he commuted every day. Kyrgyzstan does not have enough teachers,
which is why Kadir can work there without problems. He knows that he is
looked up to when it comes to religion and his brother who works in the Na-
tional Intelligence Service protects him from harassment - otherwise he would
already be behind bars, as he said. This allows him to speak rather blunt. He
does not have the money to go to hajj and he does not see the necessity in the
near future, as he is a strong critic of the regime.
￿.￿ Religious Practices and Understandings
For the majority, since independence making ends meet is seen as the toughest
task of all and therefore “there is no time left for religious rituals”. People who
do not engage in religious duties legitimize their attitude using this expression.
Providing the entire family with enough food and other necessities is also
perceived as a kind of religious service. While the young people work at the
bazaar or on the fields, the old pensioners stay at home taking care of the
children and can easily engage in religious activities. Practicing religion is thus
also seen as a division of labour. Furthermore, there is little sympathy for a
young person devoting too much eﬀort to religion and thereby not fulfilling his
obligations for his family.
I will define many people according to their understanding of themselves
as “Muslims in progress”, someone who needs to gain knowledge in order to
become a “real Muslim”. A real Muslim is defined as someone who knows more
about religion and also practices it properly. Lack of time is given as a main
reason for why people cannot devote themselves to more intensive learning.
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While the older generation is said to have time to practice and the younger
ones nowadays grow up learning about religion properly, the generation in-
between devote themselves primarily to economic activities in order to feed
their families.
“We started to get to know about our religion since independence. Now
we have to work hard in order to feed our families. There is no time
to pray and if you fast you cannot work on the fields under the heat of
the sun. You cannot work hard. If you stay at home like my parents, it
is fine. When we retire we will have more time to learn and to devote
ourselves to religion. The young generation has now started to see, hear
and learn about religion more than we did. We learned at school that
there is no god, yet in our hearts we believed that there is one. But they
wanted to make us atheists.“ (Zafar)
However, not following these practices is not seen as a sin or not being
Muslim, since being an Uzbek automatically means being a Muslim. One can
only be a better Muslim, yet there is no need to hurry since there is enough
time in the future and until then one can still argue that “we are on the way
to becoming one”. Of course, there are people who are stricter with religious
duties but the above-described attitude towards religion is common.
Everyone, however, practices life-cycle ceremonies like circumcision feasts
or marriages, which are directly associated with Islam. Circumcision is the rite
of passage for boys, “becoming a real Muslim by circumcision”. In addition to
that, there are certain days like the seventh and fortieth day of mourning,
Ramadan and the feast of sacrifice qurban aid, as well as the ninth of May,
or “Hatira Künü” (remembrance day)￿￿ when cemeteries are visited and peo-
ple spread wheat and place flowers on graves. Besides qurban aid, there are
also other occasions on which a sheep is slaughtered and the meat is cooked
and distributed. For example, after the replacement of the kolkhoz chief, his
successor organized a visit to Naqshbandi where he sacrificed a sheep and dis-
tributed its meat.￿￿ He had two reasons for this. The first was his thankfulness
for getting his job, the second was his wish, as he said, that the fulfilment of
the cotton plan would allow him to keep the job. But there are many other
occasions on which people visit holy places and express their wishes or show
￿￿ This is the end of the Second World War and is still an oﬃcial holiday. Monuments
with lists of fallen soldiers are visited and flowers are laid down.
￿￿ A major Sufi order named after Muhammad Baha ad-din Naqshabandi from Bukhara,
where his tomb is also located.
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their gratefulness for wishes to come true, like having a son or getting rid of a
sickness.
Praying regularly is another practice done mostly by the elderly or the
young generation. Middle-aged people use similar excuses as those described
before. The same is true for fasting during Ramadan. In Bukhara, many had
only recently started to fast and many more were planning to do so in the
future. The sons of Hajji Bobo fasted during Ramadan the first time. Alisher
said he pursued two intentions through this. The first one, of course, is the
fulfilment of his religious obligation and acquiring merit from God, but, as he
frankly admitted, he was also keen on losing some weight.
“Since independence, we are free. Nobody needs to hide if he or she is
fasting. During the Soviet time, they forced people to eat lunch when
we were working. If you did not have lunch or drink tea with the others,
they would become suspicious and have a talk with you, asking you why
you weren’t eating. It gave us headaches. That is also why we did not
fast.” (Gulnoza)
In Marxamat, Oydinoy told me that in her school most kids from the
fourth grade onwards, and even many younger ones fasted. She continued by
explaining that when a few children started to fast, others would join them.
This is also a kind of pressure on older people and some of them start fasting
when they see children doing it. In the Valley, social control and pressure are
given as the main motivations to fast.
“If the neighbours fast, it is kind of unavoidable to do so as well. I was
ashamed when I saw small school children fasting. However, I am really
looking forward to the end of Ramadan. Now, the weather is not so hot
and days are not so long. When we have fasting in hot summers, then
less people fast, otherwise we would all collapse when picking cotton.”
(Munisa)
During Ramadan, some women, in rotation, organized iftar , the breaking
of the fast, several times a week and invited each other. They were either
from the neighbourhood or relatives and friends. Men also had their own
separate iftar meetings. As I mentioned before, if gatherings, meetings or
invitations do not take place among close relatives, women and men always
sit in separate rooms. I always arrived with my host shortly before iftar .
After breaking their fast, some women read texts either in Uzbek or in Tajik.
After these readings, there was no discussion about the texts. Some women
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listened carefully; some exchanged the latest news with a neighbour sitting
next to her. Nobody there was acknowledged as a religious authority. During
these visits, I met one woman regularly who dominated the meetings with
her readings. She was in her mid-thirties and had a powerful voice. She
was nicknamed “Tajik”, as she spoke Tajik better than Uzbek. And she read
in Tajik. Sometimes, some women would complain that she should read in
Uzbek because they couldn’t understand everything. Others preferred Tajik
because it sounds more impressive and sends them into a state of trance.
In contrast to rituals, food taboos are not directly associated with Islam
and the people were not particularly concerned with them. Dealing with food
taboos was mostly quite relaxed and again attributed to a certain age and
status of people. They are to be obeyed when people start praying or go to hajj.
During the very first days of my stay with Hajji Bobo’s family, his wife oﬀered
me a piece of kalbasa , a Russian type sausage, which was bought especially
for me. It is highly liked by the whole family. Without providing any reason
or explanation, I kindly refused. I wanted to avoid eating pork. Kalbasa can
be made out any kind of meat and they very likely contain some pork. Hajji
Bibi was trying to be a good host and convince me to eat; perhaps she thought
I was shy. “The kalbasa is from the city, it is good quality and expensive”. In
the end, my lame and unconvincing excuses of “not being hungry” did not help
and I had to admit the true reason was that I wanted to avoid eating pork.
All the other members of the household, her grandchildren, son and daughter-
in-law, enjoyed this rarely available sausage. Hajji Bibi herself also refused to
eat it saying that in her age and with her status she cannot allow herself to eat
kalbasa anymore. When she was young she ate a lot, yet now she prays and as
the wife of a hajji she cannot eat it any more.￿￿ “But”, she said, “you are still
young and do not pray, so you can eat it”. This type of behaviour or attitude
towards religion was common. She did not try to explain her behaviour in
a religious way, such as with food taboos forbidding her to eat pork. Social
reputation and status were more important in this respect.
I was never oﬀered kalbasa in Hajji Bobo’s house again, but in other places
it was not a rare event. Once, Hajji Bibi and I visited somebody together. As
￿￿ Hajji Bibi gained this status through her husband. She has not been to Mecca, unlike
her husband, and she cannot read the Quran in Arabic script. She told me that because of
her husband, she got the name Hajji Bibi. In contrast, the wives of other hajjis’, even those
who had been in Mecca themselves, are not called “Hajji Bibi”. She was the only one in the
village.
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usual, the host did not want to let us go without oﬀering us something to eat
and prepared a quick meal with fried kalbasa . Before I could open my mouth
and recite a polite story of not being hungry, Hajji Bibi proudly told them
“she does not eat kalbasa because of the pork” and continued to say, “she is
like us, she is Muslim, like us Uzbeks”. The host did not know what to say for
a while until she added, ”we are all Muslims, but we forgot during the Soviet
time, now we start to learn our religion again.”
For many people, neither eating nor keeping pigs was seen as a problem.
In some villages, people keep pigs and find it to be a lucrative business. Arif
has four pigs and sells the meat at the bazaar in Bukhara.￿￿ Although in the
last years he and others have had some complaints from neighbours, leading to
some giving up this business, there are still people like him who keep pigs. The
complaints are not so much explained religiously but, as mentioned earlier, for
climate reasons. And the disgust shown towards pork is remarkably less than
in my own experiences in Turkey. It is seen as practical and useful for the
body and as nutritious for children.
“Under the heat of the Bukhara sun, you cannot keep pigs; they smell. It
is suitable for places like Germany where the weather is cool. Otherwise,
it is good. Those who pray avoid pork but it is good for the body. It is
also financially good. They reproduce very quickly and the shashlik is
very delicious because the meat is fatty. A slice of bread with pork fat,
especially in the winter, helps to keep the body warm. It is particularly
good for children; they can eat it before they go to school”. (Zafar)
The attitude towards alcohol is similar and its consumption is very com-
mon. If somebody refuses to drink, the reason is usually “I can’t take alcohol
cause I am allergic”. Women usually do not want their husbands to drink so
much, again, not for religious reasons but rather due to financial reasons and
its eﬀect on the physical and mental well-being. Women drink amongst them-
selves at their meetings; occasionally a bottle of vodka and some white wine.
In public, it is frowned upon. Alcohol consumption by young people is also
not approved of; not so much because of religion but because it is considered
a bad habit and may lead to hooliganism. For the elderly, it is similar to the
attitudes towards the consumption of pork. When they start praying, they
should stop. Of course, this particularly applies to hajji (although some of
￿￿ In the rural markets, the number of customers buying pork is limited but in the city
there are enough customers like Russians or other groups.
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them still occasionally drink vodka). Hajji Bobo used to drink lots of alcohol
when he was school director.
“When I was young, before my retirement, I used to drink. We had
visitors from the tuman or I had been at the tuman for meetings, so I
had to drink. But since I was in Mecca I do not drink anymore. I do
not, however, forbid my sons to drink. When we were young we all did.”
(Hajji Bobo)
It also did not disturb Hajji Bobo when alcohol was consumed in his pres-
ence. Only his wife complained when the sons drank. ‘What will the other
people think about us? It is not appropriate for sons of a hajji to drink”. But
at the same time, she would tell guests or me to finish my glass and not to
leave any vodka left over. On the other hand, when my husband was with me
and we were visiting people, I was asked how my life at Hajji Bobo’s house is,
and if he (my husband) gets enough to drink.
The amount of vodka consumed at wedding feasts, circumcisions, birth-
days or classmate meetings is indeed remarkable. If somebody does not oﬀer
enough alcoholic beverages he is seen as a bad host. “Either you do not oﬀer
alcohol at all, or if you do than there must be enough for all”. Therefore,
the cost of alcoholic beverages is an important part of the feast expenditures.
Relatives often cover the costs of alcohol and thus make their contribution to
the wedding. People talk about feasts primarily mentioning the number of
guests present, the amount of meat eaten and the number of crates of vodka
that were consumed. These are the criteria for a good feast. Like meat, al-
cohol consumption is also a criterion of a certain living standard and is not
perceived as being inconsistent with religion. In a similar sense, after meals or
when passing a cemetery a short prayer (omin) is read and ones face is wiped
with ones hands. It does not matter what kind of food has been consumed or if
someone has drunken vodka; it does not prevent one from doing this practice.
Proper dressing was even less of an issue. The headscarf was not really a
subject people talked about in everyday-life. Debating the way of tiding it or
what kind of scarf one uses is something new and unusual for most people.
Most Uzbek women, married or unmarried, young or old wear a loosely tied
scarf allowing some of their hair to be visible. This form is now distinguished
from a bigger headscarf, necessary for the „new form“ of covering all of one’s
hair. I was told that women from Turkey cover their hair like that and that
Uzbek women learn from them. Women with this new way of covering were
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to be seen in the city or maybe in the tuman but not in the village. Wearing
headscarves or the covering of one’s hair in general, however, is only loosely
related to religion. Hajji Bobo’s wife, their daughter and daughter-in-law all
covered their hair in the traditional way. I also got some headscarves as gift
and was asked occasionally if I do not want to use them and cover my hair like
them. When I did, it was commented that “. . . it looks good when you have
one, it fits you.”
However, there was a case in the village of a woman whose clothing was a
topic of discussion. She was from a well-known family that was not terribly
religious, yet the whole family suﬀered from her decision to wear a burka.
This was seen as backwardness and directly associated with Afghanistan, with
radical Islam and the Taliban. She was divorced and lived in her brother’s
house, a well-respected fermer (and very fond of drinking). Both were invited
several times to the village administration with the goal of convincing her to
stop wearing the burka. Furthermore, Hajji Bobo, as a distant relative, was
occasionally asked to talk to her, without success.
If somebody has relatives with “fundamental religious tendencies”, these
people are excluded and avoided from the very beginning. According to state
oﬃcials, they are a threat to the stability and the peaceful coexistence of
Uzbekistan. People from the neighbourhood are also frightened to contact
them, no matter if they actually believe in their ideas or not. One reason
for the, while very limited, success of Islamist movements is the low level of
education among the mullah, as Kadir described. They could not satisfy the
needs and demands of the people. As is typical when it comes to a low level
of religious knowledge, it is easy to pull people in any direction, be that tra-
ditionalist, fundamentalist or reformist, as he categorized them. The second
category, often labelled as Wahabi, are in fact few. There are some people
who support them, often due to personal experiences of being put in jail where
they had to wait years for a trial and were then sentenced with little evidence.
As Kadir argues, repression will not solve the problem if the injustices in
Uzbekistan continue to exist. In his view, injustice, corruption and economic
diﬃculties are the reasons why people seek answers in extremist or fundamen-
talist movements, in line with what anthropologists like Schoeberlein (￿￿￿￿)
and Zanca (￿￿￿￿) would also claim.
There was also little discussion in the Ferghana Valley about what kind of
Muslim one is. Only once was I asked about my school of thought within Islam.
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Following my answer, I was recognized as “one of us”. At the beginning of the
conversation, this circle of “one of us” was large, including Kyrgyz or Kazaks.
Soon Uzbeks and in particular Tajiks were then considered to be more religious
than any other groups. Beards and headscarves are seen as symbols of this,
although they may take a negative connotation. “Tajiks in Tajikistan look
like Afghans. For them, religion, fasting and praying are not only important
for men but also for women”. Otherwise, being Muslim is not seen in strong
opposition to being Christian or any other religion. Non-Muslim habits, like
eating pork or drinking alcohol, are called “Russianness”. The term Christian
is never used in that context, even if the Uzbek self-perception is based on the
claim that “we are Muslims, we are not allowed to do so”. Still, people who
drink remain Muslims, just not good Muslims. Nobody was ever seen to have
become Christian due to his non-Muslim habits; one merely may become “orus”
(Russian). There was no discussion on the faiths of others. An Uzbek-Russian
comparison was mostly based on tradition rather than on religious diﬀerences.
In that respect, Uzbeks defined themselves as being devoted to family and
kinship needs. Russians are seen as more self-oriented, but also as people who
know how to enjoy life more than Uzbeks.
￿.￿ Views on Modernity and Future Perspec-
tives
I would thus argue that the vast majority of people in contemporary Uzbek-
istan do not choose religion as some kind of escape from economic diﬃculties,
frustration or as an ideological vacuum after the demise of the Soviet Union.
If that were the case, there would be masses of people choosing this path as
a strong alternative to their present life. The concept of Muslimness (musul-
manchilik) is, however, often used as a quick and convincing answer in order to
explain things like dress codes or architecture. The latter applies, for example,
to courtyards, which block the inside of the houses from outsiders’ views: “You
should have privacy, when women go to the toilette, it should not be seen by
neighbours on the outside. It is also more safe to construct houses like that.”
Another view was that “. . . we do not have canalization where the wastewater
from the bathroom mixes with that of the kitchen, if they flow together it
does not fit musulmanchilik, that is why we have the toilets at the end of the
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courtyard”. But in the same household, many sacks of flour were kept in a
corner of the toilette, which seemed to me to contradict the aforementioned
description of musulmanchilik.
Furthermore, there is no recognizable rejection of Western models. Af-
ter being connected for ￿￿ years now, the West remains, however, a kind of
“Imaginary West”; a local cultural construct that is based on forms of knowl-
edge and aesthetics but not necessarily referring to any “real” West. This also
contributes to “deterritorializing the world of everyday socialism from within.”
(Yurchak ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿). Occasionally, people would say that what they get now
is not the “real” but just a “fake” western brand.
When people say, “now we start to live in a market economy”, or “this is
the market economy, you should take care for yourself now”, this does not
mean that neoliberal principles actually replaced the state in Uzbekistan since
control and planning continue to exist in the most important spheres. Rather,
the Uzbek state simply withdrew itself from those parts of the social sphere
it is not able to service anymore. However, when the conversation turns to
land, people say it should be private. At least, land distribution is highly
desired, even without full ownership rights, similar to private plots with limited
usufruct rights. Future expectations of people in relation to privatization have
already been realized in some neighbouring countries. Diﬀerent than in the
Valley, where Kyrgyzstan is seen as a good example of privatization, in my
Bukhara field site privatization is still perceived as being far away. When I
confirmed that in Turkey or Germany the state gave the land to individuals,
people turned to others in the room and, accompanied by a gesture of surprise,
stated that “. . . in Turkey land is also privatized”. I was then told that, “We
are also slowly on this way”.
Another criterion related to modernity is the number of children one has.
With development, the number of children decreases and, according to some
informants, that is the case in present Uzbekistan. I cannot confirm if this is the
case because Uzbekistan became more modern or, like other informants said,
because due to economic diﬃculties people cannot look after many children
properly. At the same time, it was amazing to see so many people who had lost
so much life quality but kept telling me that with independence development
came to Uzbekistan. In the end, the sinking birth rate was usually seen as
a result of economic events and illnesses (the latter in turn due to ecological
reasons). The Soviet era is perceived as a time when women did not have to
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weigh so many factors when it came to giving birth to many children.
“We did not think that much about the future of the children, whether
we can take care of them or what will happen to them. We just gave
birth. Today, it is not that easy; you need to think about it. The young
generation is more reasonable and only has as many children as they can
care for.” (Munisa)
Most families, especially those with a tradition of higher education, do
whatever they can to make sure their children - particularly their sons – can
study. Of course, the best option is that a son studies and gets a good
job, with which he can also make money and has good connections. But the
main wish is that he should study whatever he can and then one will see for
which positions he can apply. Besides the economic aspect, prestige and family
tradition (even if it is only two generations) are also very decisive. Children of
certain families are strongly encouraged to study and get a university diploma.
For elites’ children there is no problem to find a job after their graduation.
An alternative to universities are the newly founded colleges. These can be
described as a kind of vocational school. There is an entry exam but, according
to my informants, by paying ￿￿,￿￿￿ sum, even unsuccessful candidates can
get registered. The construction of colleges with colourfully painted facades
was one of the symbols of state investments, especially in the Ferghana Valley.
These schools are shown as an example of development and modern investment
by the government. Critical voices complained that nothing happens except for
the construction of these colleges, which fall apart after a short time. Not only
the number of colleges but also their construction quality was under critique
from many people. Some people expressed a greater need for factories in order
to create jobs. For others, the graduates from these colleges will build up a
qualified labour force for the future which makes it necessary for the president
to invest in them.
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Conclusion
It is ￿￿ years now that an independent Uzbekistan appeared as a result of
demise of the Soviet Union. This dissertation is about the life in two rural
settings of the country and how individuals and the families manage to live
under new emerging circumstances. It was neither possible to cover every
sphere of their lives nor was this the objective of this study. My aim was rather
to describe life after socialism, living with its legacy and remnants, which are
not only alive in the memories of people but also inherent in the peculiarities of
the current ‘Uzbek way” towards transformation. This necessitates a respond
from individuals, which has to make the impossible possible and which I called
the real “Uzbek puzzle”￿. For some parts of the puzzle I found answers and
explanations, for others I did not. The reasons behind this are diﬀerent. Some
may be related with me as an anthropologist while some are related with the
field site, namely the state of Uzbekistan. However, I believe that this work
gives an insight into the lives of people in this part of the world diﬃcult to
approach.
The life of people in both field sites has changed since independence in
many respects. For some, it has brought radical changes, for some it has not.
The majority of the rural residents have faced a tremendous decay of living
standards after the collectives were either dissolved or became non-functioning.
For a certain number of people, who were part of the former socialist rural
elite, these introduced changes did not cause radical alterations, or at least
less unfortunate ones. They were able to preserve a superior economic and
political standing in society. Agricultural land is the main income resource in
￿ A term used by Zettlemeyer (￿￿￿￿) for the relative success of Uzbekistan’s transforma-
tion policy that seems to contradict the expectation of economists.
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the rural areas and the object to fundamental changes but also a realm where
the past continuous to exist. All land and much of the agrarian production
is still ultimately under the control of the state. In this institutional frame,
actors try to find their place and improve their position or, in most cases, not
to loose where they are and what they have. A handful people become fermer
while many others work for them as kolkhozcu or simply use their small private
plots as dehqon. The changing socio-economic context and the uncertainties in
everyday life is something new for both fermer and dehqon but the meaning
and the extent of concernment diﬀers significantly. I tried to approach their life
after the break down of the collectives as intimate as possible and to picture
their relations with each other as well as with the state.
It is thus essential for everybody in rural Uzbekistan to obtain and retain
access to land in one way or another. Fermer, who are mostly the people well
situated with economic and political resources, obtain this access easily. Oth-
ers get access to some land through by working for them or for the transformed
collectives, the shirkat. The absence or insuﬃciency of salaries makes land is-
sues more significant since the private plots are hardly enough to survive. This
situation is grounded not only in the agricultural production process and the
lack of employment facilities for the landless labour force but also in the power
relations and a new type of dependency, which did not exist in this form and
extent in the past. In rural communities where locality plays a very important
role and people are linked with each other via kinship, neighbourhood and
friendships ties, power relations and dependency gain another dimension and
complexity, characterised by asymmetric relationships and a lack of trust in
state institutions among those who lost most of their former benefits.
Since cotton still strongly determines the state agenda, the lives of ru-
ral residents is also shaped to a large degree by its cultivation cycle and its
side products. However, the profit goes to a rather limited number of peo-
ple, namely those fermer who are well linked to the local government and
in particular to the state oﬃcials themselves who control the process from
within the shirkat or the xokimiyat. All the others have to employ also non-
agricultural activities as a part of their survival portfolio, depending on their
capabilities and the local conditions. While the land as a basic resource plays
an important role, life after independence necessitates more resources, skills
and creativity in order to make ends meet. Daily expenses and even more life
cycle expenditures are an enormous burden, in addition to money needed for
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health problems or higher education. While some fermer feel responsible for
their labour suppliers, who are often also kin or neighbours, it is far less than
what kolkhozes provided for their workers in the past. The decisions taken
under these circumstances have immediate eﬀects on gender and generational
relations. For example, higher education, which was more or less available for
everybody and not costly during the Soviet period, became not aﬀordable for
many families so that daughters are pushed more into to domestic sphere and
are not allowed to study as a university degree is more preferred for sons.
Corruption is an additional income source for many people, from high-level
state oﬃcials to everyone who has something to contribute to the market.
Access to land, getting a diploma or a standard health service not only cost
significant amounts of money as bribes but in addition need the existence
of networks with people in power. Today, many infrastructural facilities like
education, health and transportation are aﬀected by a significant decrease not
as a result of neo liberal policies but rather as a result of Uzbekistan’s politics
and economic policy. The rules of free market economy and democracy are
deliberately applied in some realms of life as long as it does not cost the state
anything and it does not endanger its authoritative rule.
At the same time, a new understanding of the state, new power relations
and new economic challenges determine the conditions in which individuals
act and try to satisfy their needs as good as they can. One major strategy
is bypassing the restrictions on the way. Within this scenario, the household
is not only a production entity but also the main unit of solidarity and trust.
In that respect, generational support and pooling of available resources like
pensions and cultivation of plots increase also the mutual dependency among
generations. This has further increased in recent years with the growing out-
migration. Now, grandparents become also the main nurse for their grand-
children while the parents seek their fortune in other places beyond the state
borders.
The early years of independence saw not an economic transition but also
ethnic and religious aspects were concerned. Ethnic clashes and religious fun-
damentalism were frequently evoked scenarios, which were thought to be di-
rectly related to the demise of socialism. This has not happened to the degree
expected. While a few tragic inter-ethnic conflicts occurred in the Ferghana
Valley, these remained limited in scope and time. Neither religious diﬀerence
nor inter-state disputes have so far provoked violent events. Ethnic relations
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are overall quite peaceful compared with many other parts of the world. The
long historical co-residence and existence of inter ethnic marriages between
Uzbeks and Tajiks are some of the reasons behind that. Relations with other
ethnic groups, depending on the region, is more diﬀerentiating, in particular
along the (former) nomadic-sedentary divide. Even today, Kazaks or Kyrgyz
are perceived as nomads, which determines their place as inferior in the social
and political landscape. According to the degree of similarity or diﬀerence, the
Uzbeks as the titular and numerously dominant group allow others to co-exist
or eventually assimilate. The fundamentally flexible concept of Uzbek identity
helps in this regard (Finke ￿￿￿￿).
One other aspect, mentioned in this study, is religion. My data show in this
respect a similarly flexible rapprochement of actors as in the case of ethnicity.
It is appreciated that after independence one can live one’s religion, in this case
Islam, more openly than in the past but this does not mean that everybody
is strongly interested and involved in the spiritual aspects of life. It is also
true that people are concerned about fundamentalist movements, which can
endanger the “peace and order” of the country but this is first of all a highly
politicized discourse in Uzbekistan and used for control and surveillance by
the state. There is a watching eye on religion as was the case during Soviet
times. It is, however, no longer perceived as an ideology against socialism that
one should get rid of, but is seen as an inevitable component of independence
that should be controlled in someway.
From the actor’s perspective, it is time to learn more about Islam but it
is also a question of time and generation. The middle-aged generation mostly
involved in heavy economic activities and socialized under the socialist ideology
argues that they do not have enough time to dedicate to religion and they are
on the way of becoming “good” Muslims. In contrast, the older generation
has the suﬃcient time as their children care for them. This generation is also
not under that close suspicion from the state oﬃcials and less likely accused
of fundamental intentions. Young men, who have no job perspectives and are
not socialized under the Soviet regime, are the most suspicious group and can
easily be stigmatized as religious fundamentalists. As one interlocutor put it,
“in Uzbekistan, as much Islam is allowed as Islam allows”.￿ I had the chance to
observe how religious knowledge can also be a significant economic resource.
People nowadays ask for this service and they pay for it. There are a number of
￿ The first name of President Karimov is Islam.
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occasions and rituals where religious blessing is wished for, from circumcision
feast to the fulfilment of the cotton plan. As in other spheres, like becoming a
fermer or a local state oﬃcial, religious authorities are usually people with a
certain background and access to resources.
The current transformation in Uzbekistan and other parts of the former so-
cialist world is first and foremost a process of fundamental institutional change
(Finke ￿￿￿￿). This includes all levels of institutions from neighbourhood rela-
tions and religious attitudes to the change of property rights regimes and the
design of the new nation state. As institutions prescribe specific rules on how
to act towards others, they also shape, economically speaking, the incentive
structure and thus the choice of strategies by individual or collective actors.
As this study has also shown, trust is a major aspect in this respect. Trust
in institutions and trust towards others is needed for any kind of cooperation.
It unifies actors and enables solidarity among them. Solidarity is not only
something encouraging but also a safety net if somebody fails. If we put these
concepts in place, we may be able to understand why in present Uzbekistan
(extended) families and households not only form the basic production and
the consumption units but also are the main solidarity groups. When ”rules of
the game” can be violated at any time and this has no consequences for the vi-
olators, trust and cooperation suﬀers tremendously. This shapes the attitudes
not only towards the state and its institutions but also towards other actors. If
believe in justice and fairness is - for good reasons - not very strong, actors not
only avoid risks but also do not fight to seek their rights. Moreover, in order to
take risks information and knowledge are necessary components so that actors
feel reasonably confident making specific decisions. Thus, the general lack of
trust in the post-socialist context, again, advantages certain groups in rural
Uzbekistan while others become even more excluded from economic and social
resources.
The post-independence period is seen as a time to work and one where in-
dividual responsibility is asked for. Daily basic expenditures become seriously
an issue to worry about. While this is the most trivial thing for many people
around the world, it is not so for members of formerly socialist societies and
one may wonder about the adaptability of Uzbeks to the post-independence
conditions. Maybe it is worth to think more about the skills of individuals as
an important survival strategy. Making use of any available kind of resources,
turning social capital into an economic one, or the creativity of labour organi-
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sation within the household all necessitate certain skills. According to Barth,
“. . . we all live lives full of raw and unexpected events, and we can grasp them
only if we can interpret them - cast them in terms of knowledge or, best, antic-
ipate them by means of our knowledge so that we can focus on them and meet
them to some degree prepared and with appropriate measures. Thus a person’s
stock of knowledge structures that person’s understood world and purposive
ways of coping in it” (￿￿￿￿:￿). If we consider independence as an unexpected
event, Uzbeks grasp it diﬀerently according to an individual’s knowledge and
how good they are equipped with the necessary means. One may find the
answer on who deals and copes with post independent challenges in Barth’s
explanations, “[K]nowledge is distributed in a population . . . and [K]nowledge
provides people with materials for reflection and premises for action” (ibid).
Uzbeks who were socialized under the Soviet regime may be better equipped
with knowledge and skills as one can imagine - and some of them make more
out of it than others - but this knowledge can be the explanation of the ability
to survive in view of the unexpected and often unpleasant developments they
have to face today and in the future.
￿￿￿
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